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Our imagination is stretched to the utmost, 
not, as in fiction, to imagine things which are not really there, 
but just to comprehend those things which are there. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Richard Feynman (1965) The character of physical law. MIT Press, Cambridge. 
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  A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S  
 
 
 
A quest is an appropriate metaphor for the “messy process that most students 
experience while they study for a PhD”1. As the poet W.H. Auden explains: “To go 
on quest means to look for something of which one has, as yet, no experience; one 
can imagine what it will be like but whether one’s picture is true or false will be 
known only when one has found it” 2. He defines six elements that characterise a 
quest: 
1. A precious object and/or person to be found and possessed or married. 
2. A long journey to find it, for its whereabouts are not originally known to the 
seekers. 
3. A hero. The precious object cannot be found by anybody, but only by the one 
person who possesses the right qualities of breeding or character. 
4. A Test or series of tests by which the unworthy are screened out, and the hero 
revealed. 
5. The guardians of the object who must be overcome before it can be won. 
They may be simply a further test of the hero’s arete, or they may be malignant 
in themselves. 
6. The helpers who with their knowledge and magical powers assist the hero and 
but for whom he would never succeed. They may appear in human or in 
animal form. 
 
 With this thesis, I have achieved my quest and obtained my “precious 
object”, a lifelong dream to one day get a PhD. Deciding to pursue a PhD was a 
heroic decision, especially because it meant I would need to combine going on this 
with a full-time job and a family. It certainly has been a long journey during which I 
waded through econometric swamps, got lost in forests of insignificant results, 
battling monster test statistics that told me my model was rubbish. But also I 
turned round corners that suddenly revealed new and beatiful vistas.  
1 McCullock, A., 2013. The quest for the PhD. International Journal for Researcher 
Development 4(1) pp. 55-66 
2 Auden, W.H. 1969. The quest hero. Texas Quarterly, 4 (Winter 1961), 81-263 
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 Finally, Auden is especially right in stating that without helpers (mostly in 
human form), who have aided me with their knowledge and occasional magical 
powers, I would never have succeeded. This section of the thesis is dedicated to 
them. 
 My quest started in Ethiopia with a project on sesame, and I am grateful to 
everyone who helped me find my way in this beautiful but enigmatic country: Eleni 
Gabre-Madhin despite her busy life, provided me with past IFPRI questionaires 
and data. Sorsa Debela Gelalcha and Terfesa Dandena of Ffarm, Dawit Alemu of 
EIAR, Piet Visser of SNV and Delelegne Abera helped me collect data and were 
always ready to provide me with additional information. Geert Westenbrink and 
Joep van den Broek of the Royal Dutch Embassy made the baserline possible. 
Alula Pankhurst was very hospitable to me when I was in Addis Abeba.  
 I was lucky to present much of this thesis at various ISNIE conferences, 
where I always learned something new and received valuable feedback from 
colleagues working in the field of New Institutional Economics. 
 I was fortunate at LEI to have had managers who encouraged me to pursue 
a PhD and stick to it: Frank van Tongeren, Andre de Jager Siemen van Berkum and 
Hans van Meijl. Many colleagues at LEI and Wageningen UR shared thoughts and 
provided advice as well as the very welcome moral support: Ben, Edward, Fédes, 
Geert, Giel, Gloria, Henk, Ida, Jeff, Katerina, Marie Luise, Michiel, Petra, Roel, 
Sabrina, Stina, Ton, Verina, Xiaoyong and Yuca. Also other colleagues at 
Wageningen UR helped me in similar fashion: Sietze Vellema and Jennie van der 
Mheen with thoughtful discussions within the VC4D programme, Jos Bijman, Jack 
Peerlings, Paul Ingenbleek with feedback on earlier versions. My colleagues from 
the DEC group always made me feel welcome, despite me being an external PhD 
candidate. Betty and Dineke provided timely administrative support and 
information. A few colleagues deserve special mention for helping me on my quest 
with specific knowledge or magic. Jo Wijnands helped me think critically about the 
sesame sector in Ethiopia, Thom Achterbosch staunchly supported this research 
within KB, Marijke Kuiper generously lent me the format for this thesis, Karl 
Shutes performed econometric magic from which my analysis greatly benefited, 
Lindsay Shutes helped me climb the rocky path of becoming better writers and 
provided me Bradshaw space to pursue my quest. Finally I owe much to Derek 
Eaton, who inspired me to always climb higher, and who joined me on new and 
exciting paths in our quest to, in his words “make ourselves better economists”.  
 During a quest, a wise wizard with a white beard usually provides crucial 
guidance. Although my supervisor Erwin Bulte does not have a white beard yet, he 
fits the description of a wizard in all other ways, with his sense of humour, his vast 
knowledge on relevant literature, as well as what seem to be magical powers to get 
to the heart of a topic almost instantly, asking the necessary questions, pointing me 
to hidden pathways. Any remaining errors are therefore my own. Last but not least, 
he continued to have an unshakeable faith that I would finish this quest before he 
indeed started to grow a white beard. 
 Many friends have supported me by accepting that I would be busy with this 
quest and that they would not be seeing much of me. I hope I can make amends 
soon. Some deserve a special thanks. Adrie Huissoon for letting me use his 
wonderful inspiring atelier to work in peace. Janet Kamphorst was my 
“ervaringsdeskundige”. Michele Wilks and Mark Speer provided coffee and 
sympathy on Tuesdays. Sandra, our “Haag treinâh”, Alice, Annelies, Bert, Dorothe, 
Ellen, Elly, Fred, Gusta, Jacqueline, Martha, René, know that running has kept me 
sane and fit, but I would like to let them know that their interest in my PhD and 
help with the propositions has also meant a lot to me. Maaike Kempkes and 
Margaret Brugman, who know me since I started as a student in Wageningen, have 
continued to encourage me during this long journey.  
 I inherited the love for learning and research from my parents; they and my 
sister Marieke never doubted I would succeed. 
 The hero in the quest usually has a staunch supporter and loyal friend who 
makes the difference at certain crucial moments. I was fortunate to have Ken. He 
made my quest possible in so many ways, encouraging me to go out and combat 
the “friendly monster”; he is my hero, as are Ava and Julian.  
 
 I dedicate this PhD thesis to my two grandmothers, Willemien de Groot and 
Mensina van der Woude, who knew the value of education and who should have 
been born in a different age. 
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1.1 introduction 
When one thinks of Ethiopia, it is probably not sesame that comes to mind first. 
For many it is a surprise to learn that Ethiopia is the world’s second largest 
exporter of sesame, after India. 
 Ethiopia went through a period of rapid economic growth since the early 
1990s. Its annual growth rate has averaged around 7% in the past two decades, 
raising the per capita GDP from US$164 (current dollars) in 1993 to US$470 in 
2012 (World Bank 2013a). Sesame production and exports have increased as well; 
from 1993 to 2010, the value of sesame exports increased a thousandfold to almost 
US$294 million (FAO 2014). However, inefficient marketing is still hampering 
exports (Wijnands et al. 2009). 
 Markets are important to economic development (Stiglitz 1989). Although 
markets are extremely important in Africa, they are often characterised by high 
transaction risks and costs. Most African markets are governed by informal 
arrangements; but Fafchamps (2004) cautions that there has been a tendency to call 
“informal” everything that “is not of Western inspiration”. The many different 
forms of African market arrangements and institutions have often been lumped 
together under the heading of “informal sector”. Hadfield (2005) echoes this and 
argues that the complexity and multiplicity of the institutions that support 
contracting are still underappreciated in the literature. While many different forms 
of African market arrangements and institutions exist, they all aim to solve similar 
coordination and enforcement problems. 
 The past decade has seen a surge of interest in market development 
approaches amongst aid agencies, including the Dutch government. However, in 
his seminal work on African markets (Fafchamps 2004), Fafchamps was careful in 
his policy advice to improve markets, stating that “recommending policy in the 
absence of counterfactual evidence is dangerous” (Fafchamps 2004, p. 456). In the 
same year, Dixit (2004, p. 150) declared that despite a wealth of material “neither 
empirical not theoretical research has yet advanced to the point of offering clear or 
confident policy recommendations for the process of institution-building or 
reform”. Gabre-Madhin, who collaborated with Fafchamps on many studies on 
markets in Africa, and who did an extensive analysis of grain markets in Ethiopia 
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(Gabre-Madhin 2001),3 seemed to disagree as she believed that there were, in fact, 
various solutions for improving African markets, as elucidated in her TED talk of 
May 2007 (Gabre-Madhin 2007). She consequently switched her role as a 
researcher to that of practitioner, helping to establish the Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange (ECX), becoming its first CEO in April 2008. 
 The ECX can be seen as a major institutional change in the sesame markets 
of Ethiopia. Institutions affect the distribution of assets, incomes, and costs as well 
as the incentives of market participants and efficiency of market transactions. Being 
the first of its kind in Africa, there is little understanding of how such a major 
institutional change impacts markets that are mostly governed by informal 
institutions and social network capital. Despite a “remarkably wide array of 
opinions about the ECX’s impacts on traders and farmers”, the ECX has not been 
evaluated, although “such a review is sorely needed” (Renkow & Slade 2013, p. 51). 
With many other African commodity exchanges languishing (Sitko & Jayne 2012), 
there is much interest in the ECX model from African policy makers and donors. 
A better understanding of commodity exchanges is therefore crucial to develop 
policies that aim to improve agricultural markets both for farmers and traders. 
 In many of the research and development programmes on agricultural 
markets in developing countries, the emphasis has usually been on improving 
(smallholder) farmers’ access to markets. The crucial role of traders in making 
markets more efficient is often overlooked. Fafchamps (2004) argues that micro-
economic theory has devoted a lot of attention to producers and consumers, but 
has failed to identify a separate role for the “economic agent par excellence”, the 
trader. According to Shepherd (2005) a prevailing hostility to the trading sector 
results from a focus on trading margins taken rather than functions performed, 
leading to a reluctance to consult with traders or their representatives. Almost 10 
years later, Sitko and Jayne (2014, p. 56) still note that “of all the private sector 
actors involved in African cereal markets, none has been more maligned or 
misunderstood than the private traders who assemble grain at the village-level”. A 
paper published by the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Authority (ECEA) 
describes (small) traders as “middlemen who do not add value but merely snatch 
the benefit which could have accrued to the producers”, labeling them “usurers” in 
3 She was the first head of the Ethiopia Strategy Support Program (ESSP) of IFPRI, which 
was set up in 2004 to provide direct support to the Government of Ethiopia in the design 
and implementation of its national agricultural development strategy. See Renkow and 
Slade (2013) for an extensive evaluation of the ESSP and its role in establishing the ECX.  
 
                                                        
the sesame value chain, and characterises the traditional sesame markets as “highly 
interwoven and manipulated by various brokers who are involved at each stage of 
sesame trading” (Abera 2011, p. 22). This illustrates that even the ECEA, which is 
supposed to support traders, regards them with suspicion. Better understanding is 
therefore also needed on the role of (small) traders in developing markets, as well 
as farmer–trader relationships. 
1.2 markets, formal and informal institutions 
1.2.1 market institutions 
The fundamental role of market institutions in economic development has been 
increasingly recognised since the seminal work of North (1973; 1990; see also 
Acemoglu et al. 2005; Greif 2005). To understand economic development in 
Ethiopia, it is important to understand its markets and their development. In 
general, markets play a paramount role in Africa (Fafchamps 2004). Agricultural 
markets offer substantial opportunities for (small-scale) farmers to increase their 
production and incomes. They are also important for poor consumers who spend a 
significant proportion of their income on food. Finally, they provide (informal) 
employment opportunities. 
 The neo-Austrian school of economics (with Mises and Hayek) has 
emphasised that in complex modern societies, markets are much better as a 
coordinating mechanism (i.e. the “invisible hand” of Adam Smith) than a set of 
politically constructed rules (see Birner & Zijp 2002). As Bowles phrases it (2004, p. 
57) “economists specialise in unintended consequences and, since Bernard 
Mandeville and David Hume, have studied the way the actions of many individuals 
acting on their own, produce aggregate outcomes that nobody intended”, which 
has also been termed “spontaneous order”. Adam Smith illustrates this with the 
example of a woollen coat: many people are involved in producing a woollen coat 
without a central planner being involved. Friedrich Hayek, one of the founders of 
the concept of spontaneous order,4 argues that market economies are better in 
allocating societal resources because of the specifics of the information required. A 
4 Hayek used the term catallaxy, “the order brought about by the mutual adjustment of 
many individual economies in a market”(Thompson 1991). 
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centralised planner using centralised statistical data cannot convey this information 
because the statistics are created by abstracting away from the particulars of the 
situation (von Hayek 1991). The economic failure of many communist, centrally-
led countries seems to have proven this point. The debate about the role of the 
market mechanism, which has been ongoing for over a century (White 2012; Slater 
& Tonkiss 2013), was reignited after the financial markets crashed in 2007.5 Indeed, 
the financial crisis has led people to critically re-examine the more laissez-faire view 
of markets again. 
 The debate about the role of the market indicates a gap between the 
theoretical concept of a (perfect) market or “perfect competition”6 and the messy 
reality of real markets. The neo-classical view of a market embodies many buyers 
and sellers, no entry or exit barriers, perfect factor mobility, perfect information, no 
transaction costs, and rational market actors who strive to maximise profits. These 
assumptions facilitate mathematical modelling, which may explain the tenacity with 
which economists have clung on to these simplified assumptions.7 In 1988, Ronald 
Coase complained that “although economists claim to study the working of the 
market, in modern economic theory the market itself has an even more shadowy 
role than the firm” (Coase 1988, p. 7). Furubotn and Richter (2010) point out that 
modern mainstream economics has given no more than “fleeting consideration” to 
the market as an institution, or the institutions that support a well-functioning 
market. 
 Markets cannot create the various prerequisites that are necessary for their 
implementation such as the existence of contracts, the institutions necessary for the 
enforcement of contract, and the physical and institutional organisations that are 
necessary for transactions to occur (Boyer & Hollingsworth 1998; Blaug 2002). 
5 The global financial crisis made Alan Greenspan, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and 
proponent of deregulated markets, to concede that the near collapse of financial markets 
had exposed a “mistake” in free market ideology: “I made a mistake in presuming that the 
self-interests of organisations, specifically banks and others, were such that they were best 
capable of protecting their own shareholders and their equity in the firms”, cited in The 
Guardian of 24 October 2008 (available at bit.ly/1uYLAAd; retrieved 4 December 2013). 
6 See Stigler (1957) for a historical overview of the development of the concept of perfect 
markets and perfect competition. Stigler also notes that the two concepts are often used 
interchangeably, but are, in fact, different.  
7 This has led to the comparison of neo-classical economics to a drunkard searching for his 
keys under a streetlight although he lost them some distance from the light. When asked 
why he is searching in the wrong place, the drunkard answers “because it is lighter here” 
(see also Kaplan 1973).  
 
                                                        
Bowles (2004, p. 57) states that the “invisible hand” is in fact directed by an 
“alchemy of good institutions [which] can transform base motives into valued 
outcomes”. The New Institutional Economics (NIE) school, which has its roots in 
Coase’s work, envisions a much less perfect world with transaction costs, imperfect 
foresight, and economic actors who are not always rational (but boundedly rational) 
(Furubotn & Richter 2010) and has greatly advanced the understanding about the 
market as an institution, as well as the institutions that support a well-functioning 
market. 
 Studying agricultural markets in Africa substantiates the fact that real 
markets hardly fit the neo-classical economists’ assumptions of a market, 
compelling Fafchamps (2004, p. 4) to conclude that studying markets in Africa 
forces one to rethink the very nature of markets. What is taken for granted in rich 
economies is often absent in African markets. One of the most salient features of 
African markets is the high level of transaction risks and costs, which are related to 
missing or weak institutions. Gabre-Madhin (2006) suggests that to comprehend 
the role of market institutions, there are essentially two areas that must be 
understood. The first is the role and complexity of institutional arrangements; the 
second is the mechanism of institutional change over time (see also Aoki 2001). 
For the first area, two dimensions are important: coordination and enforcement. I 
will delve deeper into these two areas in the following sections and discuss how (a 
lack of) information and enforcement institutions lead to high transaction risks and 
costs. 
1.2.2 coordination (information) and enforcement 
Coordination can be primarily viewed as an information problem that emerges in 
all stages of a transaction (search, negotiation, monitoring, and enforcing 
contracts). In most African markets, formal information and enforcement 
mechanisms are missing or incomplete. The cost (in terms of money and time) of 
obtaining relevant and reliable information is often very high in Africa (World Bank 
2002), which includes the transmission of information on prices, quantities 
supplied, quantities demanded, actors and their actions, product quality and 
attributes, and processes. An important body of economic literature has focused on 
the problems of imperfect, asymmetric, or incomplete information (Akerlof 1970; 
Stiglitz 1985; Stiglitz 1989). 
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 Hadfield (2005) explains that the problem of enforcement (or contractual 
commitment) refers to the commitment necessary to support agreed-upon 
exchanges that take place over time. Enforcement comes down to the problem that 
one party invests in resources or gives up other opportunities, expecting the second 
party to take the actions agreed upon, such as paying the first party or providing a 
return service at a future point in time. Or in other words “seek to bring ex post 
incentives in line with ex ante agreements, to produce the outcome that the second 
party promised” (Hadfield 2005, p. 178). 
 An effective and efficient legal system is important for enforcement. Even 
when few disputes are actually pursued in court, it alters people’s incentives to 
behave opportunistically and improves the efficacy of other forms of contract 
enforcement. In many countries, the legal system is too costly and unreliable 
(Rodrik 2008). In this case, self-enforcement mechanisms and reputation 
mechanisms are available (Dixit 2004). Self-enforcement mechanisms change the 
consequences of actions. For instance, the risk of losing a valuable trading 
relationship when an agreement is breached may be a sufficient deterrent. 
Reputation mechanisms alter the likelihood of future transactions with potential 
trading partners if an agent defaults on an agreement: when someone attains the 
reputation of being untrustworthy, others will not want to trade with this person. 
To function well, the reputation mechanism requires information about reputation 
to be captured and disseminated to potential trading partners. In some cases, the 
possible enforcement mechanisms are either not credible to all parties or have high 
costs. In such cases, otherwise lucrative transactions will not occur and economic 
performance will suffer. This is often the case in African markets, and exchanges 
remain cash transactions, with no time between the quid and the pro (Fafchamps 
2004). 
1.2.3 transaction risks and costs 
When buyers and sellers in African markets deal with a lack of information and/or 
a lack of enforcement mechanisms, they face several transaction risks. These entail 
for instance, the risk that the other party will provide misinformation about current 
market prices or that the other trading party will renege on the agreement. Such 
transaction risks are an important, but often neglected, element of marketing 
(Shepherd 2005). Dorward et al. (2003) state that policies have paid insufficient 
 
attention to the problems of transaction risk in poor rural areas. Contrary to 
Williamson (1979), who argues that institutional arrangements aim to minimise 
transaction costs, Dorward and Kydd (2004) propose that the purpose of 
institutional arrangements is to minimise transaction risks. Parties in an exchange 
need to incur costs to protect themselves against transaction risks, and Dorward 
and Kydd (ibid) therefore view transaction costs as necessary investments. Their 
focus is therefore not on reducing transaction costs but on reducing transaction 
risks, and on finding the most appropriate institutional arrangement that will reduce 
these risks. This thesis adopts the reasoning of Dorward and Kydd. 
 In general, there are three types of transaction costs related to risks present 
in exchanges (North 1990; Furubotn & Richter 2005): 
1. Search and information costs: someone considering a certain transaction 
must search for a suitable and reliable party with whom to trade, and this 
search process involves costs, especially when the risk of trading with an 
opportunistic partner is present. These costs may consist of visits to possible 
traders (in different markets), communication (e.g. telephone calls), looking 
up prices, testing quality, and measuring quantity, etc. Acquiring this kind of 
information plays an important role in most African markets, especially 
when market information systems are lacking. 
2. Bargaining and decision costs: these costs relate to time and (legal) advice 
that is put into bargaining and negotiating the agreement between parties. 
This agreement can be put into a formal (written) contract or an informal 
(verbal) deal. Again, information plays an important role as some parties 
may have information that they do not disclose (called asymmetric 
information). Without fixed prices and quality standards, bargaining may be 
a difficult issue, fraught with transaction risks. 
3. Supervision and enforcement costs: these costs are related to the input of 
time and costs to monitor whether the agreement is implemented, to avoid 
opportunistic behaviour by parties, and to enforce agreements. Information 
again plays a role in monitoring, which may be costly, especially when 
parties have an incentive to conceal that they are not complying with the 
agreement (i.e. increasing risks). 
 
 Williamson (1979) recognises the inherent risk underlying any transaction 
because of bounded rationality and opportunism. Bounded rationality implies that 
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agents experience limits in formulating and solving complex problems and in 
processing (receiving, storing, retrieving, transmitting) information. As a result of 
these behavioural assumptions for economic organisation, all (complex) contracts 
are unavoidably incomplete, thereby hindering the implementation of complex 
incentive alignment processes: relying on “contract-as-promised” is fraught with 
transaction risks (Williamson 1981; Williamson 1991). Opportunism can be defined 
as acting out of self-interest with deceit. Asymmetric information makes it costly to 
distinguish opportunistic from non-opportunistic behaviour ex ante; one does not 
know whether the other party is telling the truth (about prices or quality) when one 
is not privy to the other party’s information. 
 In addition to behavioural aspects, there are also specific attributes of a 
product that may increase transaction risks and thus increase transaction costs 
(Williamson 1979; Milgrom & Roberts 1992; Dorward et al. 2009), which Masten 
(2000) applied to agricultural products: 
1. Asset specificity (specific investments which may not have an alternative 
use. If the sale fails, the producer is left with costly investments) 
2. Uncertainty 
3. Frequency of transactions (e.g. once per year or continuous) 
4. Difficulty of measuring performance in fulfilling the terms of an agreed 
transaction 
5. The need to coordinate other transactions with other actors 
 
 Not all are relevant for sesame production in Ethiopia. Asset specificity is 
not really applicable, as the investment made for sesame production consists of 
inputs (land, fertiliser, and labour) that may also be used for other crops. 
Uncertainty is important though, in several ways. There is inherent uncertainty due 
to varying climatic conditions (onset of rains and temperature, etc.), which affects 
sesame production (in terms of quantity and quality). Uncertainty also arises from 
market conditions: prices are not known in advance. Frequency of transactions also 
applies. Sesame is harvested only once a year. Because of the characteristics of 
sesame (see chapter two), it must be harvested and sold fairly quickly, as it cannot 
be stored for long. This increases the risks of price failure (sales cannot be spread 
out over a longer period). It also puts pressure on the relationship between farmers 
and traders. A lack of quality standards and reliable measurement equipment 
(especially prior to the ECX) makes it difficult to measure performance (how much 
 
sesame of which quality is being sold). Even after the ECX, measuring 
performance in terms of quality remains an issue (see chapter two). Before sesame 
can be sold, farmers need to obtain the necessary inputs (labour, fertilisers, and 
tractors), which is often difficult as the market for these inputs does not always 
function well (Tefera 2010; Gelalcha 2009). Also, traders need to purchase sesame 
from farmers and traders before they can sell; the number of intermediaries 
involved in trade is a result of the difficulty of coordinating sales and purchases. 
1.2.4 formal and informal institutions 
The problems of coordination, information, and enforcement and the resulting 
transaction risks and costs may be solved by market institutions. The well-known 
definition by North (1990) of an institution is that it consists of the rules of the 
game in a society. Aoki (2001; 2007) and Greif (2006) elaborate this definition by 
defining institutions as collectively recognised rules and symbols plus behavioural 
beliefs (i.e. expectations) of agents about other players’ choices and intentions. 
“Meaningful rules” are those that are generally respected and obeyed. Institutions 
are formed to reduce uncertainty (i.e. risk) in human exchange. Together with the 
technology employed, they determine the transaction (and production) costs 
(North 1995). Davies and North (1971) distinguish between institutional 
environment and institutional arrangements. These may be formal or informal. 
 An institutional arrangement is a set of rules or agreements governing the 
activities of a specific group of people pursuing a certain objective, such as market 
transactions (agreements to exchange goods and services), or organisations8 (formal 
groups involving individuals working towards a common purpose). These activities 
involve the exchange or coordination of goods or services (such as labour). The 
arrangement may be either a formal or an informal one, and it may be temporary or 
long-lived. It provides a structure within which its members can cooperate, or 
provides a mechanism that can effect a change in laws or property rights. 
8 North (1990) emphasises that organisations are not part of institutions, but are like players 
in a game. North et al., (2006, p. 3) emphasise the importance of organisations: “while 
institutions frame all human behavior, it is through organisations that people carry out 
complex social interactions. Understanding human development requires understanding 
how institutions shape the kind of organisations available for sustainable human 
cooperation”.  
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 The institutional environment consists of the broader socio-economic 
framework; the set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules that 
establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution. The different 
institutional arrangements take place within the institutional framework. A 
“framework of law” is a necessary condition for a market economy to succeed. 
Rules governing elections, property rights, and the right of contract are examples of 
the type of ground rules that make up the economic environment. However, social 
rules (culture and norms) are equally important. Although the institutional 
environment is often equated with formal rules, this is not necessarily always the 
case. Figure 1 shows the distinction. 
Figure 1: Relation between formal and informal institutional environments and arrangements 
 Formal  Informal 
Institutional 
environment 
Government rules and 
policy, state law 
 Culture, norms (e.g. 
corruption), social 
capital 
       
Institutional 
arrangement 
Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange, producers’ 
organisation, traders’ 
association 
 Informal farmers’ or 
traders’ groups, 
savings associations, 
social capital 
Note: arrows depict effects; dotted lines depict the focus of this thesis. 
 
 Each quadrant influences another quadrant. For instance, culture and norms 
may influence how a producers’ organisation is managed. Formal government rules 
may impinge on how informal farmers’ saving associations are run. The 
institutional environment has a larger effect on institutional arrangements than vice 
versa, as its reach is much broader (depicted by larger arrows). However, this does 
not mean that an institutional arrangement has no influence on the environment; a 
producers’ organisation may successfully lobby for changes in a specific 
government rule, for instance. The focus of this thesis is on the interaction 
between formal and informal institutional arrangements; i.e. the bottom two 
quadrants. 
 How these four quadrants interact; i.e. whether they are substitutes or 
complements is a much debated topic, usually discussed in terms such as social 
capital versus formal contracts, or trust versus law (Woolthuis et al. 2005; Zasu 
2007; Lazzarini et al. 2004; Williamson 2009; Mellewigt et al. 2007; Zenger et al. 
 
2002; Poppo & Zenger 2002; Ahlerup et al. 2009). Whether these are substitutes or 
complements depends on their specific function in solving problems of 
coordination (or information) and enforcement. 
 Social capital is an important element of the informal environment and 
informal institutional arrangements (see figure 1). Although trust is often 
mentioned in this respect, it is not strictly an institution. Trust may be defined as 
one’s expectations regarding others’ choice of actions that have a bearing on one’s 
own choice of action (Dasgupta 2000). Norms and trust form the cognitive of 
social capital; whereas formal and informal networks form the structural social 
capital (Uphoff & Wijayaratna 2000; Van Rijn 2014). A thick network of 
interpersonal relations (e.g. social network capital) characterised by trust may 
function to resolve the problems of coordination and enforcement. Social capital 
reduces transaction risks by facilitating collective action (Olson 1965). The 
literature on social capital and trust is extensive. Braithwaite and Levi (1998), Das 
and Teng (2004), and Kramer (2006) provide detailed overviews. 
1.2.5 institutional change 
How institutions change is an age-old question (Bowles 2004), but one that is still 
very much on the research agenda (Mahoney & Thelen 2010; Ostrom & Basurto 
2011), as the process is still often poorly understood. Little is known, for instance, 
about the interactions between new formal rules (i.e. a designed institution) and 
pre-existing social norms (Eggertsson 2005, pp. 30–31), or how the four quadrants 
in figure 1 influence each other. The question of why and how institutions can 
change has hardly been satisfactorily dealt with in economics or in the other social 
sciences (Aoki 2001). 
 Aoki (2001, p. 231) defines institutional change as “a situation where agents’ 
beliefs on the ways a game is played are altered in critical mass”. For example, if the 
traffic rule “riding on the left-hand side” is imposed, there will be institutional 
change only if a sufficient number of people adhere to this rule. Institutional 
change therefore does not include “mere changes in statutory laws and marginal 
changes in agents’ strategic choices in response to mildly changing environments 
according to chosen rules” according to Aoki (ibid). A newly imposed rule may 
become a “paper tiger” if no one adheres to it, or if only few people change their 
behaviour. However, North (1990, p. 89) stresses that “the single most important 
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beliefs on the ways a game is played are altered in critical mass”. For example, if the 
traffic rule “riding on the left-hand side” is imposed, there will be institutional 
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point about institutional change (...) is that institutional change is overwhelmingly 
incremental”. Although most institutional change is incremental, as North suggests, 
one can only identify that institutions have, in fact, changed when a majority of 
people have changed their mindset (beliefs) and behaviour (strategic choices). 
 Bowles (2004) distinguishes two traditions of institutional change, 
constitutional and evolutionary. The first, “constitutional” tradition, sees 
institutions as (social) rules that can be designed to solve a certain problem. The 
second tradition, “spontaneous order”, sees institutions as the product of countless 
interactions, the aggregate consequences of which are often unintended. There are 
parallels between the constitutional and spontaneous order tradition and formal 
and informal institutions. Formal institutions are usually designed to solve a certain 
problem. Informal institutions are the product of social interactions, evolving by 
trial and error, building on old institutions, a process also termed “bricolage” 
(Campbell 2004; Brousseau et al. 2011). The constitutional tradition may have 
contributed to the notion shared by some economists that “getting institutions 
right” is the way to develop economies (Rodrik 2008), and that optimal institutions 
may be designed, a notion debunked by various institutional economists 
(Eggertsson 2005; North 1990; Bardhan 2004). 
 Eggertsson (2005) makes a distinction between social and physical or 
production technologies and explains that while technical change is an engine that 
drives sustained economic growth, its transfer is not effective unless it is 
complemented by social technologies (or institutions). The successful transfer or 
introduction of new social technologies is more complex than the transfer of 
production technologies because pre-existing institutional arrangements often 
undermine the effect. Fafchamps (2006) adds that in markets in developing 
countries, reliance on informal networks is likely to be optimal for the actors 
involved. Successful institutional reforms therefore depend on active support from 
a large portion of relevant actors (i.e. critical mass), which may not be automatic. 
Eggertsson (ibid) cites Williamson (1985) to explain that expected transaction costs 
(fears of opportunistic behaviour by the other side) create powerful incentives to 
abandon promising projects. This illustrates the interplay between the 
constitutional tradition (designed institutional change) and the spontaneous order 
tradition (spontaneous institutional change). Despite apparent differences between 
the two, Aoki (2001, p. 236) argues that there is a common condition involved in 
bringing about a change, which is that the critical mass of agents needs to begin, 
 
even if gradually, to modify their beliefs and actions to form a new equilibrium, 
intended or unintended. The two mechanisms of institutional change become 
intertwined in this manner. 
 Stiglitz (2001) proposes a useful framework to understand the interaction 
between social capital (informal institutions) and the development of (formal) 
institutions within institutional change. He proposes that the nature of social capital 
changes with the level of institutional development (with more formal institutions). 
Early on in the development of market economies, markets are thin and market 
institutions are underdeveloped. In addition, many governments, especially in 
developing countries, cannot provide an adequate underpinning of law; the 
apparatus of state law is often costly, slow, unreliable, biased, corrupt, weak, or 
simply absent (Dixit 2004)9. A lack of formal market and government institutions 
does not mean that economic activity grinds to a halt. Groups create informal, 
alternative institutions to provide the necessary economic governance (Dixit 2004). 
 As market economies and institutions develop, several functions of the 
social network capital become less useful, and some of the network of 
interpersonal relations gets dispensed with. The value of social network capital with 
its personal relations declines, replaced by contracts embedded in a reasonably well-
functioning legal framework. Social capital does not disappear, but is “restructured 
and deepened, not in the form of ‘rules and regulation’ to substitute or complement 
the market and the state, but in the form of tacit knowledge” (Stiglitz 2001, p. 65). 
Tacit knowledge was introduced by Polanyi (1967) to distinguish between formal, 
codified and explicit knowledge. Hodgson (1998) cites Commons (1934) to explain 
the link between tacit knowledge and institutions. Institutions are formed as 
durable and integrated complexes of habits, customs, and routines, which echo the 
definition of institutions by Aoki (see above). These preserve knowledge, 
particularly tacit knowledge in relation to skills, “with institutions acting through 
9 According to Dorward et al. (2006, p. 11), there are various reasons why many 
governments in developing countries are unable to offer information and enforcement. In 
general, governments in developing countries face a number of difficulties in defining and 
implementing their roles in marketing systems. These arise in (a) defining public goods and 
wider social interests, (b) identifying the best means of pursuing these interests (which may 
at times be conflicting), and (c) their ability to pursue these interests. These difficulties 
result from the limited capacity of the state (for example in information, finance, and 
skills), limited competitive and incentive processes to promote innovation and risk taking, 
and conflicts between wider social interests and the interests of specific groups and 
individuals within government. These difficulties are especially manifest in many African 
countries (World Bank 2002). 
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time as their transmission belt” (Hodgson, ibid, p. 180). The collection of habits, 
customs, routines, and tacit knowledge makes it easier for groups and individuals to 
work together, especially in complex market settings; knowing what to expect from 
others and what other expect from you lowers enforcement and coordination (and 
information) costs. It may be compared to a game with a complex set of rules, 
whereby the players know the rules well, and can start playing immediately, instead 
of first reading the manual, learning the rules, and getting to know the other 
players. 
 A note of caution is provided by North et al. (2013), who argue that no 
simple or linear relationship exists between institutional and economic 
development. They observe that many developing countries are not ready to adopt 
institutions that function well in Western Europe or North America. If they do, 
these institutions often function very differently. They criticise the neoclassical 
assumptions that growth will occur whenever profitable opportunities present 
themselves, and markets will work if not impeded by political or social 
interventions. They argue that this is because many developing countries are 
fundamentally different from developed countries. This difference lies in the ways 
that different societies tackle the ubiquitous problem of violence. In an earlier 
work, North et al. (2009) present a conceptual framework that emphasises the fact 
that developing societies need to limit the problem of potential violence by various 
groups in society. In societies they term “limited access orders”,10 the elite restrains 
violence through rent creation from limiting entry to the economic and political 
system. Because of these rents it is in the interest of powerful groups and 
individuals to refrain from using violence, thus achieving social stability and order. 
These societies are characterised by a de-facto non-democratic political system, few 
organisations (predominantly associated with the state), a small and centralised 
government, as well as a “predominance of social relationships organized along 
personal lines, including privileges, social hierarchies, laws that are enforced 
unequally, insecure property rights, and a pervasive sense that not all individuals are 
equal” (North et al. 2009, p. 12). Limited access orders preclude thriving markets 
and long-term economic development. As we will see in chapter two, Ethiopia fits 
well the description of a Limited Access Order. 
 By contrast, many developed countries are what North et al. (ibid) term 
“Open Access Orders”, with systematic competition, entry, and mobility; they also 
10 Or natural states, because most societies fall into this category. 
 
                                                        
foster thriving markets and long-term economic development. The source of 
development is the transition from a limited access to an open access society. Three 
doorstep conditions are preconditions for the start of the transitioning process: (1) 
the rule of law for the elites (2) existence of perpetually lived organisations, 
independent from the ruling government, and (3) consolidated political control of 
the military. However, transition is neither automatic nor irreversible; all steps in 
the transition will take place within the logic of the natural state (i.e. with the 
consent of the elites); shifts in economic and political access are deeply connected 
at all times. 
 The literature discussed above has highlighted that the interactions between 
designed formal institutions and informal institutions, as well as how these 
institutions change, are still poorly understood. The question how formal 
institutions and informal institutions interact brings us back to the different 
viewpoints of Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin sketched earlier. A designed formal 
institution has intended and unintended consequences on informal institutions. 
While Gabre-Madhin focused on the intended consequences, Fafchamps warned of 
unintended consequences. Stiglitz (2001, p. 67) cautions that formal institutions are 
not always a good substitute or complement for an informal institution: “A real 
disaster may happen when states are powerful enough to disrupt an existing local 
cooperative status but not capable enough to replace it with anything functional 
and less arbitrary. Examples here abound and they are powerful reminders of the 
potentially destructive role of otherwise well-intended development projects”. It is 
interesting to note that Gabre-Madhin was careful to point out that the ECX would 
“not aim to eliminate traditional markets around the country, but rather to build up 
these informal markets by adding technology and systems to bring more 
transparent, more efficient, and more reliable trading to all concerned” (Gabre-
Madhin 2012, p. 6). This is in line with Fafchamps’ careful suggestion that 
interventions should focus on fostering social capital, i.e. on a smoother and more 
accurate dissemination of information through informal networks and business 
associations. He anticipates that technologies that improve information enable a 
switch from informal to formal institutions, solving information and coordination 
problems (Fafchamps 2006, pp. 1182–1183). 
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institutions that function well in Western Europe or North America. If they do, 
these institutions often function very differently. They criticise the neoclassical 
assumptions that growth will occur whenever profitable opportunities present 
themselves, and markets will work if not impeded by political or social 
interventions. They argue that this is because many developing countries are 
fundamentally different from developed countries. This difference lies in the ways 
that different societies tackle the ubiquitous problem of violence. In an earlier 
work, North et al. (2009) present a conceptual framework that emphasises the fact 
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violence through rent creation from limiting entry to the economic and political 
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These societies are characterised by a de-facto non-democratic political system, few 
organisations (predominantly associated with the state), a small and centralised 
government, as well as a “predominance of social relationships organized along 
personal lines, including privileges, social hierarchies, laws that are enforced 
unequally, insecure property rights, and a pervasive sense that not all individuals are 
equal” (North et al. 2009, p. 12). Limited access orders preclude thriving markets 
and long-term economic development. As we will see in chapter two, Ethiopia fits 
well the description of a Limited Access Order. 
 By contrast, many developed countries are what North et al. (ibid) term 
“Open Access Orders”, with systematic competition, entry, and mobility; they also 
10 Or natural states, because most societies fall into this category. 
 
                                                        
foster thriving markets and long-term economic development. The source of 
development is the transition from a limited access to an open access society. Three 
doorstep conditions are preconditions for the start of the transitioning process: (1) 
the rule of law for the elites (2) existence of perpetually lived organisations, 
independent from the ruling government, and (3) consolidated political control of 
the military. However, transition is neither automatic nor irreversible; all steps in 
the transition will take place within the logic of the natural state (i.e. with the 
consent of the elites); shifts in economic and political access are deeply connected 
at all times. 
 The literature discussed above has highlighted that the interactions between 
designed formal institutions and informal institutions, as well as how these 
institutions change, are still poorly understood. The question how formal 
institutions and informal institutions interact brings us back to the different 
viewpoints of Fafchamps and Gabre-Madhin sketched earlier. A designed formal 
institution has intended and unintended consequences on informal institutions. 
While Gabre-Madhin focused on the intended consequences, Fafchamps warned of 
unintended consequences. Stiglitz (2001, p. 67) cautions that formal institutions are 
not always a good substitute or complement for an informal institution: “A real 
disaster may happen when states are powerful enough to disrupt an existing local 
cooperative status but not capable enough to replace it with anything functional 
and less arbitrary. Examples here abound and they are powerful reminders of the 
potentially destructive role of otherwise well-intended development projects”. It is 
interesting to note that Gabre-Madhin was careful to point out that the ECX would 
“not aim to eliminate traditional markets around the country, but rather to build up 
these informal markets by adding technology and systems to bring more 
transparent, more efficient, and more reliable trading to all concerned” (Gabre-
Madhin 2012, p. 6). This is in line with Fafchamps’ careful suggestion that 
interventions should focus on fostering social capital, i.e. on a smoother and more 
accurate dissemination of information through informal networks and business 
associations. He anticipates that technologies that improve information enable a 
switch from informal to formal institutions, solving information and coordination 
problems (Fafchamps 2006, pp. 1182–1183). 
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1.3 objectives and research questions 
The overarching objective of this thesis is to improve the understanding of 
institutional change, in particular the question how the establishment of a formal 
market institution (the ECX) affects informal market institutions (i.e. the beliefs 
and behaviour of sesame farmers and traders) in Ethiopia. Based on the literature 
reviewed, I argue that if the ECX resulted in institutional change, it means that a 
critical mass of agents (i.e. traders and farmers) needs to have begun, even if 
gradually, to modify their beliefs and behaviour. To understand institutional 
change, therefore, the thesis must first analyse the pre-existing informal institutions, 
and how these have changed. I unpack the ‘how’ question by analysing whether the 
formal institution of the ECX complemented or substituted informal market 
institutions. I argue that the ECX will be successful if it can complement existing 
informal institutions where necessary and substitute less effective informal 
institutions in terms of coordination and enforcement. Based on the literature, this 
thesis takes trust perceptions (beliefs) and social capital as important ingredients of 
informal institutions. Market transparency (information on prices, standard grades, 
and standardised weighing equipment) is taken as an important ingredient of formal 
institutions (ECX); these should lead to lower transaction costs. More or less 
implicit is the issue of intended and unintended consequences of the ECX. This 
thesis does not present a comprehensive exposition of these, but aims to highlight 
certain aspects in the chapters. The chapters consist of independent academic 
papers, each intended as a stand-alone contribution to the literature. 
 I formulate two main research questions: 
1. How did the formal, designed institution of the ECX impact informal 
institutional arrangements? 
2. To what extent did the ECX achieve what it intended: bring more market 
transparency and reduce transaction costs? 
 
 These questions are analysed for farmers in chapters three and four and for 
traders in chapters five and six. Figure 1 may be used to depict how the chapters 
are organised according to the research questions (figure 2). Chapter two provides a 
background on the formal and informal institutional environment as well as the 
formal institutional arrangement of the ECX. 
 
Figure 2: : relationship between the different concepts, research questions, and chapters 
 
 
1.4 research design 
This thesis analyses four data sets collected between 2008 and 2012. Two were 
collected by interviewing farmers in 2008 and 2012 in two main sesame growing 
areas in Ethiopia: East Wellega and West Tigray. Another two data sets were 
collected by interviewing sesame traders in 2009 and 2012. The questionnaires used 
for this thesis were based on questionnaires developed earlier by IFPRI for the 
Ethiopia Strategy Support Program. The research is not, and was never intended as, 
a rigorous impact evaluation using difference-in-difference methods. The lack of a 
control group makes this impossible. However, the research design has tried as 
much as possible to approach a difference-in-difference evaluation by (i) 
interviewing farmers and traders in two different periods, with the ECX becoming 
mandatory between these two periods; (ii) interviewing farmers in two different 
areas of Ethiopia, to analyse the variety and extent of influence of the ECX; and 
(iii) interviewing different traders to gauge the degree of impact the ECX has had 
on them. 
1.4.1 farmers’ survey 
In 2008, four woredas (sub-districts) in the East Wellega Region and one woreda in 
the West Tigray Region were selected on the basis of amount of sesame grown (see 
figure 5); on the fact that the agro-ecological circumstances differ; and on the 
importance of the ECX presence in the two areas. In East Wellega farmers grow a 
variety of crops, of which sesame is just one. Farmers are also less affected by the 
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ECX. By contrast, farmers in West Tigray usually specialise in sesame as their main 
cash crop. Also, the ECX has an active presence in Humera town, close to the 
selected kebeles (municipalities). More woredas in East Wellega were selected 
because there are fewer farmers who cultivate sesame. After selecting the woredas, 
a number of villages or kebeles were randomly selected in East Wellega (12) and 
West Tigray (4). In these villages, farmers were randomly selected and interviewed, 
using a standard questionnaire. In 2012, the same villages were revisited, but 
because the enumerators were unable to interview the same farmers, farmers were 
randomly selected instead. 
1.4.2 traders’ survey 
Selecting traders at random is not feasible in practice (Porter 1995; Barrett 1988). 
First, it is not known how many traders are engaged in the sesame trade. Second, 
traders travel between markets, and there is no way of knowing which traders will 
show up at a given market. I have followed the strategy used by Porter (1995): 
where possible, every trader selling in the market was interviewed. In large markets 
this was not feasible, and an on-the-spot sampling strategy had to be devised to 
obtain as representative a sample for the market as possible with different types of 
traders being selected. 
 The intention was to interview the same traders in 2009 and 2012. However, 
because traders usually move between markets, this was no easy task. Traders who 
participated in the 2009 and the 2012 surveys were later identified by matching 
unique combinations of age, education, start-up capital, and age of firm. The 
difficulties of sampling in markets have been observed by others; in the Gambia, 
for example. Barrett (1988, p. 4) writes that “a rigorous sampling procedure” was 
“impractical”. In rural markets, which are frequently set up on open ground with 
numerous entry and exit points, the problems are particularly great, especially 
where stalls are few and most traders simply arrange their goods on makeshift 
places. In another example, Bromley (1980:154) describes a sampling technique he 
used in Ecuadorian urban markets. Loveridge (1995) argues that sampling error is 
likely to be smaller when interviewing traders than when interviewing consumers or 
producers. The number of traders in a market is usually substantially smaller than 
the number of consumers or producers, so a small number of respondents 
translates into a high proportion of the population. 
 
 Figure 8 shows the locations of the traders who were interviewed in 2009 
and 2012. Markets in 50 woredas were selected (in the regions of Addis Ababa, 
Benishangul Gumez, Amhara, Oromiya, and Tigray), where sesame trade is an 
important activity. In these markets, available traders were asked to be interviewed. 
As can be seen in the table below, the enumerators occasionally had to travel to 
different woredas because trade would shift depending on market days. Figure 8 
shows that traders were interviewed along the main routes that sesame travels from 
the major production areas in the north-western regions. 
1.5 outline of the thesis 
Chapter one introduces this thesis. It presents the conceptual framework that 
underlies the different chapters, based on a review of the literature on informal and 
formal institutions. It also describes the data that is used for the different analyses. 
 Chapter two provides background on sesame markets in Ethiopia and its 
main actors (farmers and traders). It explains the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange, 
provides information on sesame prices and describes Ethiopia’s institutional 
environment. 
 In chapter three, I focus on the factors associated with informal institutional 
arrangements. I use farmers’ perceptions of opportunistic behaviour by traders, 
which can be used to measure trust. I find that most farmers in Ethiopia’s sesame 
markets view traders as opportunistic and only very few engage in long-term 
relational trading with trusted traders. Based on data collected in Ethiopia in 2009, 
I find that the lack of market information is linked to negative perceptions of 
traders’ trustworthiness; without information, farmers find it difficult to verify 
traders’ trustworthiness. Further analysis reveals that farmers who have a more 
negative perception of traders tend to participate less in markets, selling to fewer 
market outlets and more often to cooperatives. 
 Chapter four builds on the findings of chapter three and examines whether 
the newly established Ethiopian Commodity Exchange through its affiliated 
Primary Transaction Centres (PTCs) has led to improved market transparency. I 
argue that market transparency will lead to reduced transaction costs for farmers 
and increased trust in traders. This chapter shows that the ECX has been successful 
in increasing market transparency and decreasing transaction costs. It argues that 
traders are behaving less opportunistically as a result of market transparency, and 
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this has improved farmers’ trust perceptions about traders and even slightly 
increased relational contracting and significantly increased credit relations. 
 Chapter five explores whether the creation of the ECX and its formal 
monitoring and enforcement institutions has affected the role of social capital and 
trust. Consistent with a simple theoretical marketing model, the panel data suggest 
that this is indeed the case. Trade in sesame is increasingly governed by formal 
rather than informal institutions, and in response traders appear to have broadened 
their trading network, rely more frequently on traders with whom they do not have 
social relations, and have reduced the provision of credit that cements personalised 
relationships. They also have lower levels of trust in the intentions and capabilities 
of their trading partners, and attach less weight to trust. 
 Chapter six investigates the nexus between performance, credit, and social 
capital of traders. Social capital is found to be important for obtaining credit, but 
may constrain a trader to a few trusted trade partners, restricting his ability to 
purchase from others, thus limiting performance. Trade credit increases working 
capital and enhances the amount a trader can purchase, improving performance. 
This chapter shows that it is the small traders at the upstream end of the trade 
network who are most constrained by social capital, because they need to assemble 
small amounts of sesame from a large number of trade contacts. The Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange, which became mandatory for all sesame trade after 2010, 
has made trade credit less common although its importance did not decrease. The 
policy implications are that better credit facilities should be available to small 
traders, who are typically overlooked in microcredit schemes and are usually cash-
constrained. 
 Finally, chapter seven concludes by providing a discussion of the main 
findings of this thesis and offering recommendations for both policy and future 
research. 
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 2.1 informal institutional environment 
To understand the current sesame markets, and how traders and farmers interact, it 
is important to understand the history of agricultural trade, traders, and farmers in 
Ethiopia, which is different from other countries in the region. Sesame (figure 3) 
has played an important role. 
Figure 3: Sesamum indicum L 
 
Source: Wikicommons  
Ethiopia has long been known as a country that produces various agricultural crops 
and trade. One of the earliest accounts, by Marco Polo in the 13th century, notes 
that it produces rice, wheat, flesh, milk, and sesame and that the country abounded 
in “all the necessaries of life” (cited in Pankhurst 1961, p. 200). Marco Polo also 
describes the flourishing markets and trade claiming that there was a “class of 
merchants” in Ethiopia “living by trade”. Two centuries later, accounts by various 
Portuguese travellers corroborated this, and reported that there were weekly 
markets all over the country where people could buy everything they wished: cows 
and mules, fowls, capons, salt, incense, pepper, myrrh, camphor, and various small 
articles. However, trade was generally not based on cash sales but on barter, with 
salt, gold, and bread often used as currency (Pankhurst 1961, p. 307). 
 For centuries, Ethiopia was also part of a well-travelled trading route using 
caravans from North Africa, Greece, and India. Lefebure observed in 1840 that it 
was “extremely remarkable” that “amid the anarchy which reigned for several 
centuries ... commerce was not interrupted, and that the caravans could cross the 
country freely without being disturbed by the soldiers” (cited in Pankhurst 1968, p. 
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346). The international trade was dominated by Muslim merchants from North 
African countries. Because of this, many domestic merchants were Ethiopian 
Muslims.11 Muslim merchants were treated with contempt by Ethiopian Christians, 
both for their religion and for their occupation, which was regarded as undignified 
(Messing 1965). Also, craftsmen (blacksmiths, butchers, tanners, potters, and 
weavers), who were also often traders (or artisanal traders as Watson (2006) calls 
them), were at the bottom of the hierarchical order in northern Ethiopia (Amhara 
and Tigray) (Amborn 2009) and south-west Ethiopia12 (Freeman & Pankhurst 
2003).13 Messing (1965, p. 402) describes Amhara trading practices in the 1960s as 
driven “not so much by the desire to drive a good monetary bargain as by the 
desire to carry out the transaction without being mocked”. He gives the example of 
Amhara basket makers on the Gondar market who would refuse to admit that their 
wares on display were for sale. Watson (2006, p. 77) describes a village in south-
west Ethiopia where farmers, on the one hand, and artisanal traders, on the other, 
peddled negative stereotypes about the other, with farmers believing that the 
artisanal traders were untrustworthy “because they are always trying to cheat 
someone the market in order the secure a more advantageous deal”. 
 The only “respectable” occupations were considered to be farming, 
husbandry, warfare, government, and the church in Amhara (Messing 1965; Baker 
1992), and the same holds true for south-west Ethiopia (Watson 2006). The 
positions of authority were connected to holding land, and (artisanal) traders were 
therefore excluded from these positions. The (artisanal) traders found various 
mechanisms to cope, forming social networks with other (artisanal) traders such as 
the fuld’o network which connected traders in the region around Konso14 in south-
west Ethiopia, up to the Kenyan border and Addis Ababa (Tadesse 2002). 
Domestic Muslim traders formed their own social networks with foreign Muslim 
traders. Such networks would help secure passage for its members, providing 
support for traders in times of misfortune, and have their own code of practice 
11 Gabre-Madhin notes that the Ethiopian word for brokers (delala) is derived from Arabic, 
resembling the terms used in Nigeria (dillali) and India (dalal), indicating that the practice 
of brokerage may have originated in Muslim commercial practices. 
12 Farmers in South-west Ethiopia (etenta) were strictly divided from artisanal craftsmen 
(xawuda or xawd’a) and did not intermarry. 
13 Amborn (2009) estimates that the division of work into agriculture and full-time crafts 
and trade has existed since the 17th century. 
14 Several ethnographic studies have been carried out in Konso in the South-west (see 
collected articles in James et al. 2002; and in Schlee & Watson 2009; Watson 2006). 
 
                                                        
with sanctions and fines. The traders and middlemen in and around the major 
towns of Addis Ababa were dominated by Gurage. The Gurage are an ethnic group 
from Gurageland that was defeated by Amhara in 1889, after which many Gurage 
were enslaved and brought to Addis Ababa. Others migrated to Addis Ababa as 
free labourers in the early 20th century, which was facilitated by the fact that their 
agricultural production system of enset allowed male members to migrate to Addis 
for several months a year. The Gurage took up low-status occupations such as 
trade. Their expansion of trade activities to other towns was facilitated by the 
closely-knit character of Gurage social and cultural organisation. Their reputation 
as being astute in business matters and shrewd entrepreneurs has become legendary 
(Baker 1992). 
 The brief Italian occupation (1935–1941) changed little in Ethiopia; in 1941 
Haile Selassie was back on the throne as emperor. Some 40 years later, in 1974, 
Ethiopia experienced an enormous upheaval with the overthrow of emperor Haile 
Selassie and his feudal rule by the Marxist regime called the Derg.15 All banks and 
major industries were nationalised, a sweeping land reform programme was 
implemented that declared all land as the property of the state, and landholdings of 
more than 10 hectares were outlawed. Not a great deal is known about how the 
traders fared under the Derg (Watson 2006). According to Tadesse, institutions 
such as the fuld’o network went underground during Derg rule. The policies 
implemented by the Derg regime undermined the land-based power of indigenous 
elites in several ways. The land policies took away resources and power from 
wealthy and powerful landholding farmers. The traditional positions of authority 
were undermined by the arrest of those who had served in the empire, many 
traditional institutions were dismantled, and traditional local governance was 
replaced by peasant associations. The Derg regime also aimed to end discrimination 
against craftsmen. 
 Although the Derg period was full of conflict and chaos, the fortunes of the 
craftsmen and traders reversed during and after the Derg regime. Freeman and 
Pankhurst (2003) show how the arrival in the country of new rulers (from the 
Italian period to the Derg), new religions (Protestantism in particular), and the new 
market and economic facilities induced by 20th-century urbanisation allowed 
marginalised groups such as craftsmen and traders to escape conditions that for 
centuries appeared unchangeable. Amborn (2009) explains how traders in the 
15 Which signifies “committee” in Amharic. 
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with sanctions and fines. The traders and middlemen in and around the major 
towns of Addis Ababa were dominated by Gurage. The Gurage are an ethnic group 
from Gurageland that was defeated by Amhara in 1889, after which many Gurage 
were enslaved and brought to Addis Ababa. Others migrated to Addis Ababa as 
free labourers in the early 20th century, which was facilitated by the fact that their 
agricultural production system of enset allowed male members to migrate to Addis 
for several months a year. The Gurage took up low-status occupations such as 
trade. Their expansion of trade activities to other towns was facilitated by the 
closely-knit character of Gurage social and cultural organisation. Their reputation 
as being astute in business matters and shrewd entrepreneurs has become legendary 
(Baker 1992). 
 The brief Italian occupation (1935–1941) changed little in Ethiopia; in 1941 
Haile Selassie was back on the throne as emperor. Some 40 years later, in 1974, 
Ethiopia experienced an enormous upheaval with the overthrow of emperor Haile 
Selassie and his feudal rule by the Marxist regime called the Derg.15 All banks and 
major industries were nationalised, a sweeping land reform programme was 
implemented that declared all land as the property of the state, and landholdings of 
more than 10 hectares were outlawed. Not a great deal is known about how the 
traders fared under the Derg (Watson 2006). According to Tadesse, institutions 
such as the fuld’o network went underground during Derg rule. The policies 
implemented by the Derg regime undermined the land-based power of indigenous 
elites in several ways. The land policies took away resources and power from 
wealthy and powerful landholding farmers. The traditional positions of authority 
were undermined by the arrest of those who had served in the empire, many 
traditional institutions were dismantled, and traditional local governance was 
replaced by peasant associations. The Derg regime also aimed to end discrimination 
against craftsmen. 
 Although the Derg period was full of conflict and chaos, the fortunes of the 
craftsmen and traders reversed during and after the Derg regime. Freeman and 
Pankhurst (2003) show how the arrival in the country of new rulers (from the 
Italian period to the Derg), new religions (Protestantism in particular), and the new 
market and economic facilities induced by 20th-century urbanisation allowed 
marginalised groups such as craftsmen and traders to escape conditions that for 
centuries appeared unchangeable. Amborn (2009) explains how traders in the 
15 Which signifies “committee” in Amharic. 
 
                                                        
30629 Meijerink.indd   25 26-10-14   10:37
26
Chapter 2
south-west also changed their own customs and traditions. As many artisanal 
traders became richer, several farmers wanted to join the artisanal trader’s class and 
its organisations. While this was previously difficult, the artisanal trader class started 
to open up for the farmer class not only professionally but also socially 
(intermarriages between the two classes even became frequent). 
 The Derg regime came to an end when its power and influence weakened 
and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) led by Meles Zenawe took over 
in in 1991. Since 1991, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF) has governed Ethiopia, dominated by the TPLF with Zenawe as 
Ethiopia’s Prime Minister (until his death in 2012). Although the TPLF movement 
was inspired by Marxism and Leninism, the Zenawe government has been highly 
pragmatic, adopting a global neo-liberal agenda: private investment has been 
encouraged and markets have been liberalised. The fortunes of traders have 
improved accordingly (Watson 2006). 
 There have been very few recent studies on traders’ ethnic roots and related 
social networks in current Ethiopian markets. Gabre-Madhin (2001) finds that in 
the Ethiopian grain markets there is a “striking” absence of ethnicity as a basis of 
agency relations. In her sample of traders, the proportion of traders with the same 
ethnic origin as their broker ranged between regions from 8% to 54%. Overall, 
only 26% of traders were from the same region as their brokers. As further 
confirmation, only 4% of traders revealed that they had “kinship” ties with their 
brokers. Informal discussions with oilseed traders (in 2008–2012) revealed a similar 
picture for sesame markets. Trade in sesame is relatively recent compared to grains. 
The data that was collected for this study in 2008–2012 on sesame traders in West 
Tigray and East Wellega shows that, on average, traders started their sesame trade 
business in 1999 (with standard deviation of 7.28 years). This may have opened up 
opportunities for new entrants into the trade profession. 
2.2 formal institutional environment 
2.2.1 ethiopia as a limited access order 
With a population of about 84 million people who inhabit a total land area of 1.1 
million km2, Ethiopia is the second most populous country in Africa (CSA 2011). It 
is characterised by a diverse cultural and linguistic population, who belong to over 
 
70 ethnic groups. Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic character is reflected in its constitution, 
which provides a form of government characterised by ethnic federalism on the 
part of formally self-governing regional states. The ruling political coalition, the 
EPRDF (Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front)16 has consolidated 
control since 2010 with the EPRDF officially winning 99.6% of the votes in the 
2010 parliamentary elections (Hagmann 2010). Abegaz (2011) therefore concludes 
that despite the form of a federal state structure and a multiparty system, post-1991 
Ethiopia remains a de facto centralised one-party state. A Chatham House report 
(Hagmann 2010) describes the structural aspects of the Ethiopian polity as: 
• top-down policy making from the federal level to the regions down to the 
level of woreda 
• state control of rural lands 
• absence of free media and public sphere limited to the capital and major 
cities 
• a monopolisation of development initiatives by the government 
• state control or oversight of civil society organisations 
 Human Rights Watch has observed that: 
“since the promulgation in 2009 of the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSO 
Law), which regulates nongovernmental organizations, and the Anti-Terrorism 
Proclamation, freedom of expression, assembly, and association have been 
increasingly restricted in Ethiopia. The effect of these two laws, coupled with the 
government’s widespread and persistent harassment, threats, and intimidation of 
civil society activists, journalists, and others who comment on sensitive issues or 
express views critical of government policy, has been severe”. (HRW 2013). 
 Ethiopia scores relatively low on governance indicators, collected by the World 
Bank (2013b; see Kaufmann et al. 2010 for methodology used) as illustrated in 
figure 4. It scores well below average for many of the six indicators (with the 
average being zero). 
16 The EPRDF is an alliance of four parties: the OPDO, which is based in the Oromia 
Region; the ANDM based in the Amhara Region; the SEPDF based in the Southern 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples Region; and the TPLF based in the Tigray Region. A 
total of about 4 million people are together members of the allied parties.[1] The EPRDF 
is led by a central committee as well as a Politbureau, whose members are selected every 
three years by a congress of the party. 
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Figure 4: World Bank governance indicators for Ethiopia (2012) 
 
Source: World Bank 2013b; see Kaufmann et al. 2010 for methodology used.  
 These World Bank indicators characterise Ethiopia’s governance as rather 
weak, although it approaches the average for all countries for government 
effectiveness. Other authors have used governance indicators to classify countries 
into limited or open access orders (see section 1.1.5 for a discussion of these). For 
instance, Levy (2013) uses two indicators for quality of state institutions: 
bureaucratic capability and quality of checks and balances. Ethiopia falls into the 
group with relatively strong bureaucracy but weak checks and balances institutions, 
which, according to Levy, aligns well with the definition of a basic limited access 
order. Gollwitzer Franke & Quintyn (2012) construct three composite indicators to 
quantify the three doorstep conditions discussed in section 1.1.5, which allow 
societies to transition from a limited to an open access order. I refer to their paper 
for the methodology and results, and only use their overall, combined doorstep 
indicator for Ethiopia. This indicator ranks the bottom 10 countries, which means 
that Ethiopia can be characterised as a limited access order society. 
2.2.2 agricultural policies 
Ethiopia has made considerable progress toward food security. Thirty years after 
the 1984 famine, per capita income has increased, poverty has fallen, and food 
security has improved. The agricultural sector has been a major contributor to 
Ethiopia’s overall growth performance, with the Ethiopian government investing in 
the agricultural sector to address economic problems and to promote growth in the 
country. Accordingly, the sector accounts for more than two-fifths of GDP and 
three-fourths of merchandise export earnings (Dorosh & Rashid 2012). Minten et 
 
al. (2012a) identify five important changes that have affected the functioning of 
Ethiopian agricultural markets. First, there has been considerable economic and 
income growth, which has led to changes in food demand with higher 
consumption levels and a shift to more preferred cereals and high-value products 
(e.g. meat, dairy products, and fruits). Second, increased urbanisation has led to 
larger rural–urban food marketing flows. Third, the Ethiopian government has 
invested in road infrastructure and a better organised transport sector, which have 
led to better logistics and significant declines in transportation costs. However, it 
should be noted that Ethiopia still has one of the lowest road densities in the 
world. Fourth, the increase of mobile phones has improved access to price 
information in commerce. Fifth, cooperatives, but especially private commercial 
farms (often privatised state farms), have started to emerge. 
 Behind much of this structural transformation of agricultural markets is the 
Ethiopian’s government active policy to improve the agricultural sector and 
markets (Engida et al. 2010). The Ethiopian government formulated the 
Agriculture-Led Development Industrialization (ADLI) Strategy in the mid-1990s, 
which aimed to modernise traditional smallholder agricultural production. ADLI 
was linked to the Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development Programme 
(PASDEP), which was implemented between 2005 and 2010 and aimed to achieve 
most of the targets in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The Growth 
and Transformation Plan (GTP) for 2010–2011 to 2014–2015, Ethiopia’s new five-
year plan, sets even higher growth and investment targets. 
 However, given Ethiopia’s poor record in lifting its people out of poverty, 
especially its farmers, and the fact that the country’s prevailing farming situation is 
characterised by low input productivity and scarce surpluses, it is questionable 
whether the government’s Agriculture Development-Led Industrialisation (ADLI) 
Policy has managed to yield sufficient surpluses to enable households to build their 
assets and improve resilience (Haile 2013). 
2.3 the ethiopian commodity exchange 
2.3.1 brief overview of commodity exchanges 
A commodity exchange is an open and organised market in which contracts of 
standardised quantities of certain commodities are traded by its members. Samples 
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of these commodities are physically examined and graded beforehand. The 
commodity-linked contracts are traded on the basis of rules and procedures laid 
down by the exchange. In developed countries, such exchanges typically act as a 
platform for trade in futures contracts, or standardised contracts for future delivery. 
By contrast, commodity exchanges in developing countries usually do not use 
future contracts but focus on cash or “spot” trade for immediate delivery, forward 
contracts on the basis of warehouse receipts, or the trade of farmers’ repurchase 
agreements (repos) (UNCTAD 2009). 
 Historically, commodity exchanges were established as private organisations 
to regulate and manage contractual relations between market participants. Their 
functions have included commodity measurement, contract enforcement, the 
policing of theft and fraud, and the mitigation of information asymmetries (Pirrong 
1995a). Because a commodity exchange regulates in great detail the activities of 
traders (what can be traded, when it can be traded, the terms of settlement, and so 
on), which are all laid down by the authorities of the exchange, it constitutes private 
law (Coase 1991). Commodity exchanges serve to decrease transaction costs and 
risks of traders. 
 The most well-known agricultural commodity exchange is the Chicago 
Board of Trade (CBOT), which was established in 1848 as a voluntary association 
of prominent Chicago grain merchants. After more than a century of trading 
exclusively in agricultural products such as corn and wheat, the CBOT broadened 
its transactions to include financial contracts (1975), futures contracts (1982), and 
futures-options contracts (1997) (Britannica 2014). 
 There are few successful commodity exchanges in Africa, with the exception 
of The SAFEX Agricultural Products Division of the JSE Exchange, South Africa. 
Established in 1988, it is the continent’s only commodity exchange trading in 
futures. The other commodity exchanges promoted and developed in Zambia, 
Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, and the regional internet-based exchange Agricultural 
Commodity Exchange for Africa (ACE) have been less successful (Robbins 2011). 
Rashid et al. (2010) provide a framework for understanding the impediments to the 
development of commodity exchanges in Africa. These include (i) limited size of 
formalised food markets, (ii) weak infrastructure and underdeveloped financial 
services to support the development of an exchange, and (iii) a general lack of or 
weak supportive legal and regulatory frameworks. However, Sitko and Jayne (2012) 
point out that understanding the full set of impediments hindering the 
 
development of commodity exchanges (and reasons for variations across countries) 
are more likely to emerge from country-specific analyses. This is in line with the 
review of commodity exchanges across the world by UNCTAD (2009) in which 
they find that commodity exchanges in emerging markets differ substantially due to 
differences in the market contexts they operate in. 
 The relative lack of success of African commodity exchanges did not 
discourage the Ethiopian government. On January 18, 2008, the exchange was 
officially opened by launching its first membership registration. The Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange (first ECEX then ECX) became operational in April 2008. 
The exchange included a trading floor in Addis Ababa, six warehouse delivery 
locations, and 20 electronic price tickers in major market towns. It opened for five 
commodities: coffee, sesame, maize, wheat, and pea beans. In January 2014, mung 
beans were introduced on the ECX as an optional commodity, with plans to make 
trade through the ECX mandatory later on. 
 Despite the fact that commodity exchanges are in general private law 
institutions, the ECX is a public–private enterprise with government ownership. 
The government of Ethiopia has been heavily involved in the regulation of the 
ECX. In 2010, it decreed that “any person involved in sesame transactions shall 
effect sesame transaction only at primary transaction centres (PTCs) and the 
Ethiopian Commodity Exchange” (The Council of Ministers Regulation No. 
178/2010). Buying or selling sesame directly from producers became illegal. 
 One of the problems the ECX encountered early on was the lack of trade. 
When the first survey of sesame traders was conducted in 2009 for this thesis, it 
quickly became apparent that traders hardly used the ECX. Most traders preferred 
to continue business as usual. Table 1 shows how little sesame was traded in the 
first year(s), before the ECX became mandatory. Informal interviews with traders 
conducted for this thesis, as well as those by Abera (2009), revealed that a major 
bottleneck was the tax levy of VAT imposed by the Revenue and Customs 
Authority, to be paid immediately after a transaction is performed in the ECX 
platform. Although the tax is expected to be repaid to the exporter, it would take a 
long time to refund this. Moreover, the 15% VAT payment during transaction is 
said to be massively tying up working capital that could have been used for 
expanding trading activity. Therefore, both the opportunity cost of capital, as well 
as the direct cost in the form of interest paid to the banks might have discouraged 
traders to use the ECX. The fact that the ECX enables the Ethiopian government 
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to tax traders (and exports) more easily was never made explicit, and Ethiopia’s 
government has always stressed that the ECX should lead to lower transaction 
costs, increased market transparency, and better price information for producers 
and traders. 
Table 1: Traded volume, value, and prices for sesame in the ECX’s early days 
 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 
Volume traded (tonnes) 230 250 178,853 
Lot size 46 50 37,838 
Average price (birr) 1,426 1,636 1,888.50 
(US$) 137 128 117 
Total value traded (mln birr)  3 4 3,698 
(mln US$) 0.315 0.320 228  
Note: 2008–2009 is the Ethiopian year 2001; a quintal is 100 kg. 
Exchange rate to dollar: 10.4 (2008–2009); 12.8 (2009–2010) 16.2 (2010–2011). (Source: ECX annual reports cited in Abera 2011)  
 Table 1 also shows how volumes of sesame traded via the ECX exploded 
once it became mandatory. In its fourth year of operation (2011–2012), the total 
traded volume for all crops reached 601,000 tonnes, consisting of coffee (39%), 
sesame (50%), and pea beans (11%) (ECX, 2012; Rashid and Negassa, 2011). In its 
fifth year (2012–2013), traded volume decreased to 552,000 tonnes (coffee (45%), 
sesame (40%), and haricot white beans (15%) with a value of 20 billion birr (or 
US$1.05 billion) (Press Release ECX, 9 August 201317). Trading maize via the ECX 
is not mandatory, and volumes of maize traded on the ECX have dwindled to 
almost zero. 
 A commodity exchange can only achieve its aims of market transparency, 
price discovery, and decreased transaction costs when most trade occurs via the 
exchange. Many African commodity exchanges are languishing because of a lack of 
trade (Sitko & Jayne 2012). This in contrast to the beginnings of, for instance, the 
CBOT, which was established by traders themselves. Making trade through the 
ECX mandatory was the only solution for the Ethiopian government. Although 
this decision to make the ECX mandatory was denunciated by many, including 
17 Available at http://www.ertagov.com/news/index.php/component/k2/item/1202-
ethiopias-commodity-exchange-traded-20-billion-birr-of-commodities-last-year Accessed 
30 April 2014. 
 
                                                        
traders who, in private, complained that the ECX was a costly affair, it probably 
saved the ECX from the slow death of other African commodity exchanges. 
2.3.2 nuts and bolts of the ecx 
Eleni Gabre-Madhin, one of the founders of the ECX, explains that the ECX aims 
to “build the needed institutions from the ground up for grading and certifying 
quality, issuing warehouse receipts, trading, relaying market information to all 
actors, enforcing contracts, and ensuring payment and delivery” (Gabre-Madhin 
2012, p. 6). The ECX was designed specifically to address the needs of smallholder 
farmers and small traders and would improve traditional informal agricultural 
markets by “adding technology and systems to bring more transparent, more 
efficient, and more reliable trading” (Gabre-Madhin, ibid). 
 The ECX is an open-outcry trading floor, resembling a standard ‘spot 
market’ exchange. An electronic database at ECX head office is connected to all 
ECX warehouses, and based on requests sent to the central depository, the ECX 
transfers ownership titles, issues delivery notices, and regularly makes position 
reports. Sesame is not physically traded at the ECX, but contracts are traded; the 
bought and sold sesame is stored in regional warehouses managed by the ECX (in 
Addis Ababa, Nazareth, Shashemene, Nekemte, Bure, and Humera). The ECX has 
specified seven different standard contracts for sesame, including grades based on 
foreign matter (maximum per cent by weight) and on colour (maximum per cent by 
weight). 
 The ECX consists of member traders, trading systems with central trading 
platforms (open outcry), a clearing and settlement system (warehouses and banks), 
and a grades and standard certification system. The overall functioning of the 
exchange is regulated by the Ethiopia Commodity Exchange Authority (ECEA). 
 ECX has two types of members who are allowed to trade on the ECX: 
Trading Members, who trade on their accounts, and Intermediary Members, who 
trade either on their own accounts or for clients (usually brokers). Membership may 
be “full” or “limited”, with limited membership restricting trade in certain 
commodities on either the buying or selling side. By the end of 2013, the ECX had 
325 full members, of which 24 were trading members and 301 were intermediary 
members (ECX website, April 2014). Memberships are auctioned, and the price of 
membership increased from 50,000 birr (US$5,100) in 2008 to 392,500 birr 
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(coffee), 191,300 birr (sesame) and 178,600 birr (pea bean) respectively in 2013 (or 
US$10,406, US$9,946, US$9,285) (Addis Fortune 2013; PCI 2014; ECX 2012). 
 The ECX has not (yet) introduced future contracts and forwards, and 
limiting the services only to spot exchange rules out speculation or (price) risk 
hedging; however, it now serves as a platform for price discovery and quality 
assurance (Woldehanna et al. 2010). Because it is usual for exporters to sell and sign 
a contract with foreign buyers before acquiring the crop from the local commodity 
market, traders run a high price risk. To avoid large financial losses, exporters will 
default on their contract when prices decrease. Several newspaper articles observed 
that default “is what Ethiopian exporters are becoming famous for” and “their 
hard-earned market credibility is at risk for the international sesame market” 
(Seyoum 2013; Seyoum 2014). A futures market would probably be a solution. 
 In 2012, the ECX was linked to 55 warehouses for coffee, sesame and pea 
beans, based in 17 regional locations that are main production areas. For sesame 
there are seven delivery locations: Humera, Metema, Gonder, Assossa, Bure, 
Nekemte, and Addis Ababa (ECX website October 2012). After classifying and 
grading, traders can deposit their commodities in these warehouses in return for a 
warehouse receipt. In the early days of the ECX, these receipts were used as a 
delivery instrument. In March 2011, the Warehouse Receipt Financing scheme was 
launched, allowing farmers, producers, and traders to access bank loans by pledging 
their warehouse receipts issued against commodities deposited in warehouses. The 
ECX uses electronic Warehouse Receipts (e-WRs) issued by the ECX Central 
Depository, facilitating both the transfer of title on the ECX and pledging the 
commodity as collateral for loans. Although the ECX reported in 2011 that farmers 
use the WRS, only a few large sesame traders use this system (Coulter 2012; ECX 
2011). Especially small farmers still face several hurdles, including the lack of 
involvement of local banks (IFC and ECX 2012). 
 Warehouse receipting is limited by the short expiry dates on e-WRs, which is 
two months from issue for sesame. This expiry date enables loans for up to 50 
days, discouraging stockpiling and speculation. The reason for the short expiry date 
is limited storage space at the warehouses, and the ongoing need for export 
revenues by the government. Sesame exporters also believe that a quick turnover is 
advantageous because demand is high in the winter months, when production takes 
place (Coulter 2012). In 2012, ECX warehouses still faced several capacity 
problems. Limited storage weighting capacity caused long delays with long queues 
 
of trucks waiting in front of warehouses. Because the sesame season is short 
(November–January), the strain on the delivery infrastructure for sesame is 
particularly large. 
 Modern storage facilities are established in and around Humera (Tigray 
Region), Metema, Gondar, Gendawuha, and Bure towns (Amhara Region), owned 
by private exporters, wholesalers, commercial farms, cooperatives, and unions, as 
well as public enterprises. However, no adequate storage facilities or seed cleaning 
plants are available in the sesame producing areas of Oromia and Benishangul 
Gumuz. Those without proper storage facilities use wood and mud houses 
(without cemented floors) to store the seeds. After the inclusion of sesame in the 
ECX market, warehouses of reasonable quality standards were rented by ECX in 
Addis Ababa Humera (Tigray Region), Metema, Gondar, Gendawuha and Bure 
towns (Amhara) (Abera 2011). The warehouses are insured against loss and damage 
of deposits. An Electronic Goods Received Note is issued for deposited 
commodities, which is electronically transmitted to the central depository. On the 
basis of this, an (electronic) warehouse receipt is created. With this receipt, traders 
may apply for a loan, which they can settle once the sesame has been sold. When 
the sesame is sold, the ECX central depository debits the seller’s account and 
automatically transfers title of ownership of the commodity to the buyer by issuing 
a Delivery Notice. This is called the warehouse receipt system or WRS. 
 Because of poor infrastructure (limited internet connectivity and inadequate 
road access, power failures, limited number of entrances, weighbridges, and parking 
space for trucks), the warehouse management system has encountered several 
problems, observed in a recent unpublished report (Coulter 2012). Traders 
encounter long delays and much paperwork, and there are reports of long tail-backs 
of trucks with delays of up to 10 days for sesame in Humera. Buyers of sesame 
complained of sub-standard produce: the quality of the sesame often bore little 
resemblance to the grades accorded by ECX, reflecting corruption in the sampling 
or grading process. In theory, buyers can request sampling at dispatch, but most go 
unreported. Two reasons were given for this. First, the buyers’ need to secure 
supplies quickly, which limits time for sampling and testing, and the opinion of 
buyers that they will not be able to challenge the ECX successfully as it means 
dealing with an all-powerful government institution. The ECX staff acknowledges 
that buyers are usually too busy to have their product re-graded upon dispatch. 
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 All farmers and traders are required to trade at a Primary Transaction 
Centre. A PTC is a fenced location with certified scales, a market information 
board, and local inspectors certifying goods traded at the PTC. Traders buying 
from PTCs (usually acrabis) must obtain a (woreda-specific)18 certificate of 
competence, and demonstrate that they own a warehouse within the woreda, a 
weighing scale, and a certain level of capital. The trader receives a certificate that 
allows him to deliver the sesame to an ECX warehouse to sell. This certificate is 
effectively a certificate of origin, which makes sense for coffee since its origin is 
important for its classification and pricing. However, because sesame has minimal 
or no woreda-specific characteristics to justify this form of certification, it appears 
to constitute an unnecessary control, which may encourage rent-seeking without 
any offsetting advantage (Coulter 2012). Coulter (ibid) describes a case where the 
inspector failed to arrive for two days; from which it was surmised that he was 
seeking a bribe. It is not known to what extent PTC regulation is enforced, or 
whether some traders still bulk sesame by buying from small producers and sell this 
at a PTC “in the name of a producer”. The 2012 survey suggests that some traders 
still buy directly from producers. 
 Cooperatives are required to follow the same procedure. This led to some 
disagreement between cooperatives and the civil administration, as the cooperatives 
market the product directly on behalf of their members, while these same members 
are required to sell their crops through the market centres, making the cooperatives 
compete with private traders for the same supplies (Coulter 2012). Only 15 
cooperatives have become a member of the ECX, and they are even less significant 
in their trading participation, accounting for just 2.2% of the 601,000 tonnes traded 
in 2012. Recently, the cooperatives have been permitted to bypass the ECX in 
exporting their products. Additionally, most of them happen to have limited 
financial capacity to compete with businesses for auctioned seats (Addis Fortune 
2013). 
 The ECX provides market information in various ways: through its website, 
electronic billboards in 250 markets (“price tickers”), media (radio, television, and 
newspapers), and mobile phones (through SMS and IVM services) (David-Benz et 
al. 2011; Tadesse 2010). However, it was reported that none of the price billboards 
(or tickers) installed functioned, even when electricity was present (Abera 2011). 
Given the low rate of telephone (fixed lines and mobile) and internet connections 
18 A woreda is a district or third-level administrative division in Ethiopia. 
 
                                                        
(CSA 2012), and especially electricity in rural areas, the market information 
provided through these media are not reaching (poor) farmers. Traders have 
benefited though, as most of them own mobile phones. 
2.4 sesame production and trade 
2.4.1 producing sesame: farmers 
Sesame (Sesamum indicum L.) is one of the oldest oilseed crops known, domesticated 
well over 3,000 years ago in Africa (Ram et al. 1990). The characteristics of sesame 
make it ideal for growing in the poor areas of Ethiopia (figure 5): “Sesame is a 
survivor crop. For 5,000 years it has been planted by subsistence farmers in areas 
that will not support the growth of other crops or under very difficult conditions 
with drought and/or high heat” (Langham 2007, p. 144). Sesame has been 
successfully produced on most soil types. Although yields improve dramatically as 
inputs increase, currently very little sesame is grown under high input conditions. 
Most of the sesame grown in the world is still harvested manually because 
traditional sesame capsules shatter during the drying stage before harvest (SESACO 
2012; Langham 2007). 
Figure 5: Proportion of cropped area with sesame and farmers’ survey areas 
 
Note: woredas with “no data” usually have insignificant or no production. 
(Adapted from CSA et al. 2006) 
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Although sesame was mentioned as being grown in Ethiopia by Marco Polo in the 
13th century, it seems to have disappeared from Ethiopian agriculture until recently. 
Sesame production has become a significant crop again in the early 1990s. It first 
shows up in the FAO database in 1993 with almost 30,000 hectares of sesame 
harvested and little over 19,000 tonnes of sesame production. Some 20 years later, 
the area harvested has grown more than tenfold to around 337,500 hectares. 
Farmers all over Ethiopia grow sesame (figure 5), but most sesame is grown in the 
north-east, which is where the two farmers’ surveys were held. By 2010, sesame 
production had increased to over 350,000 tonnes (figure 6). Production fell in 2011 
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market value than untreated seeds (Wijnands et al. 2009). 
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major factors determining time of planting. Therefore, planting dates virtually 
depend on the onset of rainfall and length of the growing season. Recommended 
dates of planting for rain-grown sesame is mostly between mid-June to mid-July. 
Flowering starts 35 to 45 days after planting and continues for 75 to 85 days for 
early types, and some varieties take 150 days to mature (SESACO 2012). The 
length of the growing season for sesame cultivars planted in Ethiopia varies and 
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all seeds) timely harvesting and stacking is essential. When sesame is harvested, the 
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the seeds. However, in the field, the fallen seed is lost. 
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Although sesame was mentioned as being grown in Ethiopia by Marco Polo in the 
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Sesame production has become a significant crop again in the early 1990s. It first 
shows up in the FAO database in 1993 with almost 30,000 hectares of sesame 
harvested and little over 19,000 tonnes of sesame production. Some 20 years later, 
the area harvested has grown more than tenfold to around 337,500 hectares. 
Farmers all over Ethiopia grow sesame (figure 5), but most sesame is grown in the 
north-east, which is where the two farmers’ surveys were held. By 2010, sesame 
production had increased to over 350,000 tonnes (figure 6). Production fell in 2011 
and 2012 due to adverse climate conditions. 
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2.4.2 trading sesame: traders, intermediaries, and cooperatives 
In 2006, Kindie (2007) mapped how 167,702 quintals of sesame in the Metema 
woreda was traded through a network of various traders (figure 8). The figure is 
illustrative of the fact that the sesame value chain by no means represents a neat 
chain, but resembles more an intricate network of various traders. 
 Although sesame trading required a formal license, sesame traders usually 
had a general trading license, as they would trade also in other oil crops. In 
addition, due to the absence of enforcement or controlling institutions, many 
traders preferred to operate without licensing. It is therefore not known how many 
traders trade in sesame. 
 The figure shows that sesame markets do not represent a neat value chain, 
but resemble more a network as defined by Easton (1992, see also Ghauri et al. 
2003). A network may be defined in three ways: (1) the exchange dimensions in 
two or more connected relationships and the bond; or (2) social relationships that 
link loosely connected organisations; or (3) a total pattern of relationships within a 
group of organisations. The sesame network fits all three definitions. These 
definitions also fit nicely into the concept of social network capital (see section 
1.1.4). 
 
Figure 7: Example of value chain of 167,702 quintals of sesame in Metema woreda 
 
Figures in parenthesis are volumes in quintals handled by each market participant. 
Note * sesame circulation among assemblers, 14,154 quintals retained at processors & miller. ** 
Sesame circulation among wholesalers. 
(Adapted from Kindie 2007) 
 
 Figure 7 does not show how sesame is traded at various geographically 
dispersed locations. Figure 8 shows the main sesame market locations as well as 
market access in Ethiopia in terms of hours of travel to the nearest market, 
illustrating the vast distances traders travel to bring sesame from remote areas to 
the main markets. The orange dots indicate the markets where traders were 
interviewed for this thesis, which are the main markets where these farmers bring 
their produce (see figure 8). The different markets are visited by different traders 
(village collectors, wholesalers, exporters and intermediaries, brokers, and selling 
and buying agents). Together, these traders make it possible for sesame to be 
transported from remote areas in Ethiopia (with over 20 hours of travel time) to 
Addis Ababa, as well as to export destinations such as China, Israel, and Turkey. 
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Figure 8: Major sesame market towns and travel time to nearest market 
 
(Adapted from CSA et al. 2006) 
Note: travel times shown in this map are based on a model that considers the average time it 
takes by motor vehicle on roads of different types, considering terrain steepness as a modifying 
factor. Off-road travel is considered to be by foot or mule and is modelled on the basis of 
dominant land cover type, as well as local terrain steepness. Because of varying local conditions 
and changes in the road network, the estimated travel times may differ from actual travel times in 
some locations but, on average, will offer a good approximation.  
 Assemblers or (village) collectors are the first link between farmers and 
other traders. These traders buy small amounts from a large number of farmers, 
either directly or at village markets. They are usually found in remote markets, 
where sesame production areas are found (see figure 8). Other traders travel to 
those village markets after sesame is harvested (October to mid-January; generally, 
trade decreases by February, when traders return home). Wholesale markets are 
located at regional (capital) cities (Humera, Gondar, and Nekemte) and Addis 
Ababa. This is also where exporters are located, although most are in Addis Ababa. 
Sesame exporters are the last marketing chain link in the domestic trade. They are 
relatively well equipped with the necessary capital, facilities and knowledge. 
Exporters usually buy from wholesalers, but some also buy from assemblers or 
even (large-scale) farmers. Exporters sell to foreign importers. The bulk (98%) of 
international sesame trade is shipped through Djibouti or Sudan, which have, 
unlike Ethiopia, a port. 
 Transport of sesame from the producing regions to the port of export, port 
Sudan and Djibouti, is mainly done by truck. The distance between the producing 
 
regions and Djibouti is about 1,000–1,500 kilometres (Abera 2011). As figure 8 
shows, several sesame growing areas are located over 10 hours of travel from 
nearby markets. These distances illustrate the difficulties that traders face in terms 
of crossing large distances, with associated information problems and risks. 
 Due to the small quantities to be sold and the lack of an efficient market 
information system, middlemen play an important role. The short season of a 
producer’s supply of sesame to the market also leads to the involvement of many 
intermediaries in sesame marketing (Kindie 2007). 
 Brokers are intermediaries who bring together potential buyers and sellers 
and play an important role in the process of arbitrage sesame markets, in particular 
for non-resident wholesalers, agents, and exporters trying to gain a foothold in the 
sesame market (Kindie 2007). Brokers do not trade and therefore take no price 
risks; they mainly provide market information, as they are well informed on the 
functioning of the local markets and the stocks available. Brokers work for a 
commission, either a flat rate or percentage of the selling price commission. 
Brokers usually do not specialise solely in the sesame trade; rather, they combine 
sesame with other commercial activities. Commission agents operate on behalf of 
large traders (wholesalers and exporters) who provide them with required capital 
and a predetermined commission. Like brokers, they know the local markets well 
and usually combine different commissions, as well as engage in other commercial 
activities. Buying and selling agents are intermediaries who have specific orders 
from larger traders (wholesalers or exporters), but who differ from brokers and 
consignment agents because their remuneration depends on price margins; they 
may run a price risk. 
 Several cooperatives are also involved in sesame marketing. The Ethiopian 
government has been actively promoting the establishment of new cooperatives in 
recent years. Cooperatives have existed for a long time in Ethiopia but still face a 
number of difficulties. The main problem is that by being tied to the government, 
cooperatives are managed in a top-down manner, do not have an independent 
voice, are not able to serve their members adequately, and cannot speak on behalf 
of the wider interests of their constituencies (Francesconi & Heerink 2011; 
Rahmato 2002; Spielman et al. 2009), which may explain why participation rates are 
relatively low in Ethiopia (Bernard et al. 2008). However, cooperatives do provide a 
variety of services, related to agricultural production (e.g. supplying agricultural 
inputs and credit) and commercialisation (aggregating and selling sesame). Farmers 
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do not have to be a member to access these services. When cooperatives buy from 
farmers, they do so against prices that have been decided upon by the cooperative 
management for a certain period. Cooperatives offer on average slightly higher 
prices (Bernard et al. 2008) and more stable prices (Francesconi 2009) that lag 
behind market prices, which means that if prices increase, farmers might be better 
of selling to traders in the market. Cooperatives usually sell to traders including 
wholesalers (see figure 7). 
2.4.3 sesame prices 
Producer prices are difficult to come by. The Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia 
(CSA) publishes producer price indices for oilseeds, but the producer prices for 
sesame are published irregularly (only a few months for 2012 and 2013 were 
available when checked). The different data compiled from various sources by the 
author are shown in figure 9. It shows that sesame prices have increased 
substantially over the past years. However, consumer price inflation was also high 
in Ethiopia: 33% in 2011 and in 23% in 2012 (World Bank 2014). Before the ECX, 
price discovery was not based on forces of demand and supply and did not reflect 
current international market prices (Abera 2009). 
Figure 9: Producer and retail prices for sesame 2000–2013 (nominal prices in birr per 
kilogram) 
 
Note: CSA2011 are producer prices provided by CSA in 2011; CSA2014 are producer prices 
provided by CSA in 2014; CSA2014retail are retail prices provided by CSA in 2014. 
CSA price data compiled by author from CSA data, available at CSA website 
http://www.csa.gov.et/ Accessed 28 April 2014. 
 
 Retail prices (for brown sesame) are better recorded (shown in figure 10 by 
market). The retail prices follow the producer prices and may serve as a close 
 
enough proxy. The figure shows that prices vary between locations: prices may be 
twice as high in the same month, depending on the location, which means there are 
opportunities for arbitrage. One would expect the market price information system 
of the ECX to facilitate arbitrage. However, this might not always be the case. 
Bassolet and Lutz (1999) find that the market information system introduced in 
Burkina Faso in 1992 did not lead to significant arbitration. The figure also reveals 
that prices show considerable fluctuation, with prices dropping at the end of the 
year during harvesting and increasing mid-year. Prices are highest in Addis Ababa, 
which is to be expected as this is not a production area but a final destination. 
Prices generally increased in 2013, but so did consumer price inflation in Ethiopia. 
Figure 10: Retail prices for sesame in main markets (2008–2013) in birr per kilogram 
 
Source: Compiled by author from CSA data, available at CSA website http://www.csa.gov.et/. 
Accessed 28 April 2014. June and July of 2013 are missing. 
 
 Figure 11 shows the prices sesame exporters received (free on board or 
FOB value). In terms of Ethiopian birr as well as US dollars, the prices steadily 
increased from 2004 to 2014. However, there are reports that the Ethiopian price 
of sesame is losing its competitive edge. Exporters are reported to buy at high 
prices from the local market, expecting the prices to rise in the future. Exports 
slipped in 2013 (figure 12) because exporters were storing sesame, waiting for 
prices to rise (Seyoum 2014). In addition, with the stringent government policy on 
foreign exchange (Coulter 2012), many exporters trade in sesame to earn foreign 
exchange that allows them to import and sell goods in Ethiopia (such as tractors). 
Their import business makes up for potential losses on sesame export.19 
19 Personal comment by Francesco Cecchi, 2010. 
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do not have to be a member to access these services. When cooperatives buy from 
farmers, they do so against prices that have been decided upon by the cooperative 
management for a certain period. Cooperatives offer on average slightly higher 
prices (Bernard et al. 2008) and more stable prices (Francesconi 2009) that lag 
behind market prices, which means that if prices increase, farmers might be better 
of selling to traders in the market. Cooperatives usually sell to traders including 
wholesalers (see figure 7). 
2.4.3 sesame prices 
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(CSA) publishes producer price indices for oilseeds, but the producer prices for 
sesame are published irregularly (only a few months for 2012 and 2013 were 
available when checked). The different data compiled from various sources by the 
author are shown in figure 9. It shows that sesame prices have increased 
substantially over the past years. However, consumer price inflation was also high 
in Ethiopia: 33% in 2011 and in 23% in 2012 (World Bank 2014). Before the ECX, 
price discovery was not based on forces of demand and supply and did not reflect 
current international market prices (Abera 2009). 
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year during harvesting and increasing mid-year. Prices are highest in Addis Ababa, 
which is to be expected as this is not a production area but a final destination. 
Prices generally increased in 2013, but so did consumer price inflation in Ethiopia. 
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FOB value). In terms of Ethiopian birr as well as US dollars, the prices steadily 
increased from 2004 to 2014. However, there are reports that the Ethiopian price 
of sesame is losing its competitive edge. Exporters are reported to buy at high 
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Figure 11: Export prices (FOB) of sesame 2004–2010 and 2012–2013 in birr (left) and US$ 
(right) per kilogram 
 
Note: 2011 not available. 
Source: Compiled by author from Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority. Data available 
from http://www.erca.gov.et/ (accessed 22 April 2014). 
 
 The top three export destinations in 2013 were China, Israel, and Turkey. 
Greece and the Netherlands are the two most important European destinations 
(numbers 7 and 10 respectively)20. Sesame exports have almost doubled from 2008 
to 2009, from 131 million kg to 256 million kg (figure 12). This may be due to 
better accounting practices, as production did increase though it did not double 
(see figure 6). 
Figure 12: Export of sesame 2008–2013 (in kilograms) 
 
Source: SITA database (until 2010) and data compiled by author from Ethiopian Revenues and 
Customs Authority. Data available from http://www.erca.gov.et/ (accessed 22 April 2014). 
 
20 Ethiopian Revenues and Customs Authority. Data available from 
http://www.erca.gov.et/ (accessed 22 April 2014). 
 
                                                        
 When the export prices are compared to the national retail prices for the 
past two years (figure 13), it seems as if the gap between the two is increasing, 
although price data is too scant to draw firm conclusions. 
Figure 13: Export price compared to national retail price of sesame 2012–2013 (in birr per kg) 
 
Source: Export prices: data compiled by author from Ethiopian Revenues and Customs 
Authority. Data available from http://www.erca.gov.et/ (accessed 22 April 2014); Retail prices: 
2011–2013 Compiled by author from CSA data, available at CSA website 
http://www.csa.gov.et/ (accessed 28 April 2014). 
2.5 conclusion 
This chapter sets the stage for the following chapters by describing the formal and 
informal institutional environment, as well as the formal institutional arrangement 
of the ECX. Figure 1 shows why these elements are important for understanding 
how the ECX has influenced the informal institutional arrangements between 
farmers and traders, which is analysed in the following chapters. This chapter also 
provides basic information on how and where sesame is grown and traded in 
Ethiopia, which enables a better understanding of farmers and traders’ marketing 
behaviour. 
 The informal institutional environment consists of the norms, culture, and 
social capital in a society, which are shaped by history. The brief historical overview 
of markets, traders, and farmers in Ethiopia reveals that the occupation of trader 
has carried little respect in traditional Ethiopian society. By contrast, farming was 
seen as a highly valued occupation. During the Marxist era, trade was again 
disdained, albeit for different reasons. Although the liberal course taken by the 
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Ethiopian government in the past decades has stimulated markets and trade, traders 
are still often regarded with suspicion. This has repercussions on the relationship 
between farmers and traders, as is detailed in chapter 3. 
 With respect to the formal institutional environment, it is important to note 
that although Ethiopia officially became a democracy in 1991, it has remained a de 
facto centralised one-party state. It fits the description of a “limited access order” 
society, as outlined in chapter one: it has a de-facto non-democratic political 
system, few organisations (predominantly associated with the state), a small and 
centralised government, as well as a “predominance of social relationships 
organized along personal lines, including privileges, social hierarchies, laws that are 
enforced unequally, insecure property rights, and a pervasive sense that not all 
individuals are equal” (North et al. 2009, p. 12). This context is important when 
assessing the functioning of the ECX, which is basically under government control. 
Ethiopia has pursued an active policy of stimulating the agricultural sector, of 
which the ECX has become an important element.  
 The formal institutional arrangement of the ECX was modelled on the 
Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT), established in the United States in the 19th 
century. An important difference is that the CBOT was established by the traders 
themselves, while the ECX was established by the government. Just as other 
commodity exchanges in Africa have languished, the ECX did not get off to a good 
start; few traders brought their goods to the exchange, compelling the Ethiopian 
government to make the ECX mandatory for important cash crops (coffee and 
sesame). The ECX does provide important services to the sesame market, which is 
the aim of all commodity exchanges: improving commodity measurement, contract 
enforcement, the policing of theft and fraud, and the mitigation of information 
asymmetries. Increased transparency may, however, not be in the interest of 
traders, which may be why they “voted with their feet” and chose to use their 
customary social networks instead of the ECX to trade sesame. This is further 
explored in chapters five and six. The ECX consists of more than a centralised 
trading place; it also includes primary transaction centres and warehouses linked to 
major markets. These decentralised elements of the ECX provide important 
services not only to traders but also to farmers, who stand to benefit from 
increased transparency. This is further explored in chapters three and four.  
 Sesame has enjoyed a long history in Ethiopia. It is a profitable crop that 
can be grown in areas where there are limited possibilities for other cash crops. 
 
This means it is a suitable as well as profitable crop for many poor small-scale 
farmers. It has become more profitable over the years, with sesame prices rising 
steeply since 2000, although price data is somewhat patchy. This has induced even 
more farmers to start growing sesame, resulting in a rise in production. In the past 
few years sesame production has declined, the reasons for which are not very clear. 
Although adverse climate conditions are usually mentioned, it could also be that 
sesame production in Ethiopia has run out of steam. The increase in sesame 
production also led to an increase in various types of traders buying and selling 
sesame, with several providing intermediary services (such as brokers, and selling 
and buying agents). Sesame is bulked by small traders who operate upstream, 
buying small amounts from farmers. There is no neat “chain”, but more of a 
network of traders, who traverse large distances from remote village markets to 
regional wholesale markets and Addis Ababa.  
 The mandatory nature of ECX has had a profound logistical effect on 
sesame, forcing it to be traded at primary transaction centres and stored in 
warehouses, before it is transported to its final overseas destinations. But the nature 
of the ECX has also had a profound effect on the way sesame is traded between 
farmers and traders and among traders. The following chapters will explore how in 
more detail. 
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abstract 
Trust is a prerequisite for well-functioning markets. In Ethiopia’s sesame markets, 
this trust is lacking: most farmers view traders as opportunistic and only few engage 
in long-term relational trading with trusted traders. This chapter addresses the 
question why. Based on data collected in Ethiopia in 2009, I find that a lack of 
market information is linked to negative perceptions of traders’ trustworthiness; 
without information, farmers find it difficult to verify traders’ trustworthiness. I 
proceed by analysing the relationship between these negative perceptions and 
market participation, finding tentative evidence that farmers who have a more 
negative perception of traders tend to participate less in markets, selling to fewer 
market outlets. The policy implications are that by investing in market information 
and increasing transparency through certifying weighing equipment and setting 
quality grades and standards, trust between farmers and traders can be fostered. 
 
 
key words 
Market participation, market information, small-scale farmers, transaction risks, 
perceptions, opportunistic behaviour, traders, relational trading. 
 
 
  
 
3.1 introduction 
Small-scale farmers in Ethiopia, as in other developing countries, operate in 
markets characterised by large price fluctuations, poor communications and 
transport, cash-and-carry exchange, lack of standards, small transactions, weak 
institutions, and limited access to supporting services (e.g. finance). Transaction 
costs are typically high in such markets because farmers expend time and incur 
costs in searching for information and trade partners. Moreover, transaction costs 
are further increased by large distances to markets (Fafchamps & Minten 2001a; 
Gabre-Madhin 2001). Traders are usually better informed about market conditions 
than farmers, introducing asymmetric information and the possibility of 
opportunistic behaviour by traders (Williamson 1998). Such opportunistic 
behaviour may manifest itself as traders offering low prices, misrepresenting the 
weight of produce, or misinforming farmers about quality standards, all of which 
introduce an element of risk for farmers in transacting with traders (Pokhrel & 
Thapa 2007; Porter et al. 2007; Poulton et al. 2006; Svensson & Yanagizawa 2010). 
Such transaction risks are an important, but often neglected, element of marketing 
(Shepherd 2005). 
 Marketing by small-scale farmers in developing countries is a widely studied 
topic of research. To date, only a small part of literature has examined the role of 
transaction risks emanating from possible opportunistic behaviour by traders. Most 
studies on such transaction risks are in the strand of literature that explains why 
and how long-term relational trading develops between two trading parties, by 
developing theoretical models or applying these models to various agricultural 
markets (Fafchamps 2004; Haji 2010; Hayami & Kawagoe 2001; Porter et al. 2007; 
Tadesse & Shively 2013). This literature finds that by selling to a trustworthy trader, 
farmers are able to reduce the transaction costs of searching for trading partners or 
for market information. In addition, farmers may reduce transaction risks such as 
obtaining a low price or being cheated otherwise by opportunistic traders. Through 
repeated interaction, farmers learn whether a trader is trustworthy or not. 
Reputation effects arise when farmers share information about the trustworthiness 
of traders (Greif 2006). 
 However, long-term relationships between farmers and traders are rare in 
Ethiopia’s sesame markets: in the 2009 survey, only 8% of farmers stated they 
always sold to the same trader. The majority of respondents indicated that they sold 
sesame in parts and to different market outlets: to traders who visit them, on 
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nearby and faraway markets, and to cooperatives. One would expect that selling all 
of one’s sesame quickly to a trusted trader would offer various benefits. It would 
enable the farmer to generate cash quickly, reduce the transaction costs of 
obtaining price information, find and negotiate with a trader, and reduce the 
transaction risk of selling to an untrustworthy trader. 
 Especially for a crop such as sesame, which is a particular crop in several 
ways, there are potential benefits to selling to one trusted trader. Sesame has one 
growing season and at the end needs to be harvested in a very short time span; at 
some point in the ripening process sesame capsules will split and disperse the 
sesame seeds, at which point harvesting is no longer possible. Having little or no 
storage, most farmers need to sell the harvested sesame fairly quickly. In addition, 
farmers are usually cash constrained and wish to sell at least part of their harvested 
produce as quickly as possible to generate some cash. 
 Why then, did relational contracting not occur more often in Ethiopia? Dixit 
(2004) postulates that this type of contracting, or self-governance in stable groups, 
requires a good information network as well as credible multilateral punishment 
strategies. In this chapter I focus on the first requirement by examining an 
important assumption in the relational contracting literature, which is that by 
repeatedly selling to one trader, a farmer learns about the trustworthiness of the 
trading partner, gradually building up trust. However, if farmers do not have 
reliable market information, which Dixit (ibid) terms “observable information”, 
with which they can assess truthfulness of the information provided by traders, 
farmers cannot not determine accurately the trustworthiness of traders. Although 
market information is crucial to marketing (Vaidya et al. 2013), little research has 
been done on how market information, or a lack thereof, affects relations between 
market agents, as most literature has focused on the effect of market information 
on prices (arbitrage), and farmer agricultural practices (Aker 2011; Myers et al. 
2010). 
 The aim of this chapter is to examine how (a lack of) market information 
influences the perceptions of farmers about opportunistic behaviour of traders. I 
hypothesise that a lack of information may inhibit relational contracting. This 
chapter also investigates how the perceived risk of dealing with traders who might 
not provide truthful information influences farmers’ marketing behaviour, taking 
into account other factors that may influence marketing behaviour. 
 
 The results show that there is a link between the lack of market information, 
negative perceptions of farmers about the possible opportunistic behaviour and 
market participation. Farmers who lacked market information were more likely to 
have a negative perception of the trustworthiness of traders. Farmers who had a 
negative perception about traders’ trustworthiness were more likely to limit the 
number of market outlets. Although market diversification may reduce price risk, it 
seems that the perceived transaction risk of dealing with opportunistic traders 
negates this advantage. These results provide a deeper understanding of why 
informal institutions such as long-term trust relationships may not develop. 
 The policy implications of the findings are that by investing in market 
information and transparency (improved measuring equipment, standards, and 
grades), policy makers and donors can improve trust relations and increase market 
participation by farmers. This finding also substantiates Ethiopia’s recent 
establishment of the ECX. The ECX aims to improve farmers’ access to market 
information, which should enable them to make a more accurate assessment of the 
transaction risks they face, thereby helping them to reduce the transaction costs 
linked to marketing diversification. 
 After the introduction, this chapter reviews the literature and provides a 
conceptual framework. Section 3.3 provides an overview of the survey data, 
highlighting marketing decisions of farmers. Section 3.4 discusses the methods used 
and section 3.5 provides the results. The final section presents conclusions. 
3.2 literature review and conceptual framework 
As explained above, this chapter analyses two issues. First, whether market 
information affects the perceptions of farmers about the opportunistic behaviour 
of traders and what other factors are associated with these perceptions, and second, 
whether trust perceptions and market information affect farmers’ market 
participation and what other what factors are associated with market participation. I 
discuss these in separate sections. 
3.2.1 perceptions about opportunistic behaviour 
Many studies have highlighted the importance of trust in trade relations in trade 
and cooperation (Arrow 1972; Dasgupta 2009; Gambetta 2000b). Das and Teng 
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(2004) provide an extensive overview. Trust plays an important role in 
coordination, information, and enforcement (see chapter one). One problem in the 
literature is that trust is often not defined, or in terms that are “vague, abstract, and 
hard to interpret” (Glaeser et al. 2000). Das and Teng (2004) find that the literature 
has generally not differentiated between trust as various personal and situational 
characteristics, trust as a perception, or trust as behaviour that results from the 
previous two. In addition, trust perceptions can refer to the individual’s 
‘‘responsibility’’ (goodwill or intentions) and or ‘‘competence’’ (ability to do so) 
(Barber 1983; Creed & Miles 1996; Nooteboom 1996). The literature on trust has 
also been criticised for neglecting to link trust perceptions to behaviour (Putnam 
1997, p. 53; Glaeser et al. 2000). This has led to a growing body of literature that 
uses experiments to analyse trust and respondents’ behaviour outside the 
experiment (see Qin & Bulte 2010; Bouma et al. 2008). A useful framework is one 
proposed by Das and Teng (2004), which distinguishes between the various types 
of trust. According to them, trust consists of several elements: 
1. Trust propensity: or “trust antecedent”, personality characteristics that 
make a person “trusting” and “trustworthy”. 
2. Subjective trust: a belief, attitude, or expectation concerning the likelihood 
that the actions or outcomes of another individual, group, or organisation 
will be acceptable or will serve the actor’s interest. This can be defined in 
terms of the assessment of probability that the other party will perform as 
expected. There are two subcategories: 
a) Goodwill trust: intention to perform according to agreement 
b) Competence trust: ability to perform according to agreement 
3. Behavioural trust: or the behavioural manifestation of trust, defined as the 
behavioural results of having subjective trust in someone (i.e. as relying on, 
or being vulnerable to, another party).  
 This paper focuses on goodwill trust: the intention of traders to perform 
according to agreement.21 Part of behavioural trust is also accounted for by 
analysing how trust perception influences traders’ marketing behaviour (see section 
3.2.2). 
 Several authors have also highlighted the fact that measuring trust is fraught 
with difficulties (Ashraf et al. 2006; Gambetta 2000a; Glaeser et al. 2000; Goudge & 
21 The survey also included questions about competence trust perceptions, but when these 
were analysed, they did not provide in any meaningful results.  
 
                                                        
Gilson 2005; Miller & Mitamura 2003; Sapienza et al. 2013). Most empirical 
research on trust has used attitudinal survey questions (e.g. from the General Social 
Survey (GSS) or the World Values Survey (WVS)), or has used experiments such as 
trust games (Glaeser et al. 2000). The attitudinal survey questions on trust have 
been criticised as being too general to be useful (Glaeser et al. 2000). Experimental 
measures of trust do not measure expectations or perceptions, but behaviour. It is 
somewhat surprising therefore that, as far as I know, little empirical trust research 
in the economics literature has used measured perceptions (with the exception of 
Kostov & Davidova 2012), despite the ubiquitous use of, for instance, Likert scales 
to measure perceptions and attitudes in social science research (Maeda 2014). 
 Perceptions do play a central role in the theoretical literature. In game theory 
as well as in New Institutional Economics, perceptions, or beliefs of economic 
agents, are key to explaining behaviour. The importance of beliefs in institutional 
arrangements is emphasised by Aoki (2001; 2007) and Greif (2006), who define 
institutions as collectively recognised rules and symbols plus behavioural beliefs (or 
expectations) of agents about other players’ choices and intentions. Agents base 
their behaviour on these beliefs, which may be updated by short-term experience 
(i.e. observing the behaviour of other players) and information (Rasmusen 2007; 
North et al. 2009).  
 Information is thus key to forming beliefs about other players’ intentions. 
This brings us back to the main question of this chapter: how (a lack of) market 
information influences the perceptions of farmers about the opportunistic 
behaviour of traders. The literature on information is extensive and includes several 
seminal papers that focus on the problems of incomplete and asymmetric 
information (Akerlof 1970; Stigler 1961; Stiglitz 1985). Information is incomplete 
and asymmetric when one party has more information that another party does not 
possess. For instance, traders usually have better information about the supply, 
demand, and price of a product, while farmers may have better information about 
the availability and characteristics of the product they are offering for sale.  
 However, other factors that may also influence perceptions also need to be 
taken into account. As mentioned above, short-term experiences may also influence 
beliefs. In a way, short-term experiences are a form of information on other 
players’ behaviour. Studies in behavioural economics have highlighted the fact that 
long-term experiences, in the form of exposure to certain environments or 
institutions, may create framing and priming effects that also influence the 
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perception, interpretation, and hence, the meaning of facts (Fehr & Hoff 2011; but 
see also North et al. 2009 on beliefs). Finally, studies have found that personal 
characteristics (such as gender or age) may also play a role in shaping beliefs 
(Palmeira et al. 2012; Riedl et al. 2010). This may link up with “trust propensity” in 
Das and Teng’s (2004) framework.  
 This provides me with four categories of factors that influence farmers’ 
perceptions: (i) information, (ii) short-term experiences with traders, (iii) exposure 
to certain environments or institutions, and (iv) personal characteristics. I do note, 
though, that perceptions of farmers (or their beliefs) may not necessarily represent 
an accurate assessment of a particular situation. The fact that many farmers have a 
negative perception about traders’ behaviour does not mean that traders behave, in 
fact, opportunistically. Various studies have shown that traders do not make 
excessive profits, or seek to misinform farmers, of which they are often accused 
(Batt 2003; Lyon 2000; Pokhrel & Thapa 2007; Porter et al. 2007; Sitko & Jayne 
2014). In Ethiopia, sesame prices offered to farmers in 2009 were quite high 
relative to sesame export prices.22 It should therefore not be assumed that farmers 
are always able to correctly assess economic factors, such as prices, or transaction 
costs and social factors, such as the trustworthiness of traders. Williamson (1979) 
emphasises that it is costly to distinguish opportunistic from non-opportunistic 
behaviour ex ante when there is incomplete and asymmetric information in 
combination with bounded rationality; this complicates the assessment of 
trustworthiness, and increases the transaction risks involved in any transaction 
between farmers and traders. 
3.2.2 market participation 
Although the literature on marketing participation by small-scale farmers is 
extensive, most research is on what factors determine whether and how much 
surplus a farmer sells (e.g. Barrett 2008; Bellemare & Barrett 2006; Renkow et al. 
2004). These studies usually do not specify the different types of market outlets 
22 Prices peaked during the survey, and were at some point 1.3 times higher than export 
prices (obtained from the Customs Office). Investigation showed that a shortage of 
foreign exchange induced exporters to pay a premium on export commodities to earn 
foreign exchange, which they needed to import goods such as tractors. They were willing 
to make less profit on export commodities because they earned substantially on imported 
commodities. After this peak, local prices remained high compared to export prices. 
 
                                                        
farmers sell to, and in general tend to ignore small-scale traders who buy directly 
from farmers (assemblers) (Sitko & Jayne 2014). Little research has been done on 
market participation in terms of the diversification of market outlets (but see 
Bathfield et al. 2013; Fletcher & Terza 1986; Hodina 1970).  
 Increasing the number of different market outlets may be seen as a 
diversification strategy, which could be rational when daily fluctuating sesame prices 
and different prices are being offered in different markets.23 Typically, farmers are 
exposed to various risks, emanating from the nature of the agricultural production 
process, weather variability, and typical price inelastic short-run supply and demand 
responses (Myers et al. 2010). Farmers have devised various strategies to minimise 
these risks. The diversification of assets, income, or activities is a well-known 
strategy to reduce risk in many African economies (Barrett et al. 2001; Diao et al. 
2010) and most studies on diversification have focused on livelihood 
diversification, such as non-farm employment or crop diversification (Chavas & Di 
Falco 2012; Twine 2013; Woldenhanna & Oskam 2001), while little attention has 
been given to diversification strategies in marketing. Marketing diversification may 
reduce price risk, but will increase transport and transaction costs.  
 Lutz (1994) describes a similar situation for Burkina Faso, where in 1990, no 
market information system existed and farmers had to search for information about 
market conditions. Farmers could gather information on local markets which they 
visited regularly, or travel to markets further away, which were visited less regularly 
by members of the household or other inhabitants of the village. Because quantities 
handled were often small and of small value, the costs of a journey to visit these 
outlets and gather information constituted an entry barrier. Traders faced the same 
type of problem. For both farmers and traders information costs consisted mainly 
of transport costs (taxi) and the opportunity cost of labour. Transport costs could 
be significant, especially when only small quantities were traded daily. Fluctuating 
prices posed a problem in Burkina Faso as well, as they often led to missed 
profitable exchange. In such a case information costs became a loss that had to be 
recovered from future transactions. For most traders surveyed by Lutz, gathering 
23 In forestry, the reservation price strategy is recommended when prices fluctuate (Brazee 
& Mendelsohn 1988). The seller determines a reservation price each day (which decreases 
over time), and when a trader offers a price higher than this reservation price, the seller 
sells all produce to this buyer. This assumes that the farmers can store their produce and 
wait until their reservation price is met. This assumption is not applicable in the Ethiopian 
sesame case, as sesame farmers cannot store their sesame for a long period of time.  
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information on alternative outlets was costly, because of limited turnover and 
because of the risk of such a loss. 
 Farmers therefore make a trade-off between transaction risks and 
transaction costs. Dorward (2001) argues that actors are willing to incur transaction 
costs to reduce transaction risks. Farmers, for instance, will incur transaction costs 
by searching for and obtaining information about prices offered by different traders 
to reduce transaction risks. However, not at all costs; there is a point where 
marginal transaction costs are equal to the marginal utility of risk reduction (Kirsten 
et al. 2009). If farmers face price risks but also the transaction risk of dealing with 
many opportunistic traders, the transaction costs needed to lower both risks may 
become too high. In this case, the farmer may decide increasing market outlets is 
not worth the transaction costs involved. I expect therefore that the negative 
perceptions of farmers about traders’ behaviour are associated with decreased 
market participation. Several studies have found that trust fosters market 
participation (Georgarakos & Pasini 2011; Guiso et al. 2008 for stock markets; Qin 
& Bulte 2010 for labour markets), but market participation may also foster trust 
(Henrich et al. 2004); which way the causal relationship goes is thus subject to 
debate. There may be a virtuous circle relationship, whereby market participation 
and trust are mutually reinforcing forces. 
 Various studies that analyse what motivates farmers to choose a particular 
market outlet (such as contract farming and cooperatives) find that various 
economic factors play a role, such as transaction costs (Alene et al. 2008; Barrett 
2008; Blandon et al. 2009; Escobal & Cavero 2012; Jari et al. 2011; Omamo 1998; 
Shiimi et al. 2012), prices (Wollni & Zeller 2007), uncertainties associated with local 
markets, such as price instability (Guo et al. 2007; Masakure & Henson 2005), or a 
lack of market information (Wollni & Zeller 2007). Studies also show that personal 
characteristics such as age, education, or wealth play a role (Barham & Chitemi 
2008; Barrett 2008; Bernard et al. 2007). Finally, research highlights the importance 
of social factors such as stable farmer–trader relationships characterised by trust 
(Abebe et al. 2013; Batt & Rexha 2000; Ganesan 1994; Ganesan & Hess 1997; 
Masuku & Kirsten 2004; Morgan & Hunt 1994; Nicholson et al. 2001; Schipmann 
& Qaim 2011; Qin & Bulte 2010). As was outlined in the introduction, these social 
factors explain why farmers may choose to sell to one preferred supplier: instead of 
selling to various different traders or outlets: long-term, tied relationships may 
reduce transaction costs and risks (Fafchamps 2010; Tadesse & Shively 2013). 
 
 Based on this literature, I include four categories of variables to explain 
market participation. First, personal factors such as age, gender, education, and 
wealth. Second, I include typical economic factors such as prices, revenues, 
transport and transactions costs, as well as market information. Third, I include 
social factors. Finally, I include the perceptions held by farmers about the 
opportunistic behaviour of traders, which is an addition to the existing literature on 
marketing decisions by farmers. To my knowledge, the analysis by Kostov and 
Davidova (2012) is the only one that takes into account farmers’ perceptions in 
their participation in output markets, although their analysis focuses on different 
perceptions than farmers’ perceptions of traders. Because perceptions (or beliefs) 
inform behaviour, the variables included in the two analyses (on perceptions and 
on marketing decisions) are similar. To consistently link up with the analysis on 
perception, I use the same variables. 
3.3 data: market transactions in ethiopian sesame markets 
I examine the Ethiopian sesame markets because they are characterised by a high 
degree of transaction risk. In addition, sesame is one of the main export sectors in 
Ethiopia and a key provider of income and employment (Wijnands et al. 2009; 
2011). Sesame is produced in several areas in Ethiopia but West Tigray, North 
Gondar, and East Wellega are predominant. Two main but different sesame 
growing areas of Ethiopia were selected (West Tigray and East Wellega) to have 
sufficient variety in the data. The agro-ecological conditions in East Wellega allow 
farmers to grow a larger variety of crops in East Wellega; by contrast in West 
Tigray, farmers grow predominantly sesame, alongside a limited number of staple 
crops for home consumption. East Wellega is relatively close to Addis Ababa, 
while West Tigray is located at a considerable distance from Addis Ababa in the far 
north-west corner of Ethiopia. Finally, farmers in West Tigray have experienced 
hardships, such as ethnic conflicts and drought, more often than their colleagues in 
East Wellega. 
 The fieldwork for this study was done in January 2009, before all sesame 
was transacted through the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (or ECX), which 
became obligatory by law in 2010. Although the ECX already existed in 2009, it 
was barely functioning at the time: only a few large traders used it and there was no 
market information system in place. From December 2008 to January 2009, 1,382 
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farmers were interviewed: 891 farmers in 5 villages in West Tigray and 491 farmers 
in 12 villages in East Wellega. The chosen villages were randomly selected, after 
which farmers were randomly chosen. The number of East Wellega villages 
included in the survey is higher and the number of farmers lower, because fewer 
farmers cultivate sesame in this region. The survey questionnaire used may be 
found online, see appendix 3. 
 Sesame is Ethiopia’s second main agricultural export commodity (after 
coffee), in terms of earnings and a key provider of income and employment 
(Wijnands et al. 2009; 2011). Ethiopia’s exports constitute around a fifth of world 
sesame exports. Sesame is grown mainly for export markets and little value is added 
in Ethiopia (Wijnands et al. 2009). In the past decade, the area under production 
has grown eightfold to 316,000 ha (FAO 2014). Opportunities for sesame export 
have not been fully exploited yet because of inefficient marketing (Wijnands et al. 
2009). Sesame markets at the time of the survey were mostly characterised by cash-
and-carry exchange: goods were inspected and weighed on the spot and delivery 
took place against instant payment in cash, as in many agricultural markets in 
developing countries. Different market agents fulfilled various market functions; 
assemblers or village collectors bought sesame from farmers at their farm or at 
local markets, selling to wholesalers in main markets, who sold it to exporters. 
Many traders made use of intermediaries such as selling and buying agents or 
brokers. 
3.3.1 market outlets 
Farmers in the two surveys in West Tigray and East Wellega, sold their sesame at 
various market outlets (table 2). The totals exceed 100% because typically, farmers 
sold their sesame to more than one outlet; most often on local markets (in West 
Tigray 89.1% of farmers, in East Wellega 77%), followed by selling to traders who 
visited farmers at their farm. Farmers usually visited distant markets to get a higher 
price. This option was not open to all farmers as it requires transport. Sesame 
prices vary not only in time, but also geographically. There have been several 
studies on the temporal and spatial arbitrage of Ethiopian cereal prices (Getnet et 
al. 2005; Tadesse & Guttormsen 2011), which find there was scope to improve 
spatial market performance. No similar studies have been done for sesame prices, 
but retail price data for different markets (CSA 2013) shows varying sesame prices 
 
between markets; for instance, in August 2012 the highest price (Tigray) was 2.3 
times the lowest price (Benishangul). In local markets, prices will be more aligned, 
of course, but for farmers, even small differences will be important, which is 
probably why they visited multiple outlets at different times. 
Table 2: Sesame market outlets per region 
 West Tigray East Wellega 
  Count % Count % 
Cooperative 416 46.7 36 7 
Local Market 794 89.1 377 77 
Distant markets 248 27.8 59 12 
Traders at farm gate 448 50.3 206 42 
Other (not specified) 19 2.1 40 8 
N 891   491   
 
 Farmers also sold part of their sesame to cooperatives. In the sample, just 
over 30% of farmers sold to cooperatives, with a large regional difference because 
fewer cooperatives exist in East Wellega. The Ethiopian government has been 
actively promoting the establishment of new cooperatives in recent years. 
Cooperatives have existed for a long time in Ethiopia but still face a number of 
difficulties. The main problem is that by being tied to the government, cooperatives 
are managed in a top-down manner, do not have an independent voice, are not able 
to serve their members adequately, and cannot speak on behalf of the wider 
interests of their constituencies (Francesconi & Heerink 2011; Rahmato 2002; 
Spielman et al. 2009), which may explain why participation rates are relatively low 
in Ethiopia (Bernard et al. 2008). However, cooperatives do provide a variety of 
services related to agricultural production (e.g. supplying agricultural inputs and 
credit) and commercialisation (aggregating and selling sesame). Farmers do not 
have to be a member to access these services. When cooperatives buy from 
farmers, they do so against prices that have been decided upon by the cooperative 
management for a certain period. Cooperatives offer on average slightly higher 
prices (Bernard et al. 2008) and more stable prices (Francesconi 2009) that lag 
behind market prices, which means that if prices increase, farmers might be better 
off selling to traders in the market. Cooperatives sell to large traders such as 
wholesalers or exporters. 
 Only 8.2% of farmers reported selling to the same trader (table 3), with even 
fewer reporting a long-term contracting relationship with one trader. Selling to the 
same trader was not always by choice: some 40% who sold sesame to the same 
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trader answered that there are no other traders. Around 67% stated they have a 
long-term relationship. Almost 60% said it is because they trusted the trader and 
over 53% stated that the trader offered the farmer a good price. Note that there are 
regional differences, with more farmers in West Tigray indicating that they have 
little choice (54.4% against 8.6%). 
Table 3: Reasons for farmers to sell to the same trader or different traders 
  West Tigray East Wellega 
  Count  % Count % 
Sell to the same sesame trader 79 8.9 35 7.1 
Of those who sell to the same trader, farmers gave the following reasons: 
There are always the same traders 43 54.4 3 8.6 
I have a long-term relation with the trader 45 57.0 31 88.6 
I trust the trader 39 49.4 29 82.9 
The trader gives me a good price 39 49.4 21 60.0 
Other (not specified) 1 1.3 2 5.7 
Sell to many different traders 793 89.0 456 92.9 
Of those who sell to different traders, farmers gave the following reasons: 
Traders come at different times 626 78.9 135 29.6 
I sell to the trader who offers me the best 
price 745 93.9 400 87.7 
It does not matter which trader I sell to 529 66.7 413 90.6 
The farmer cannot choose 332 41.9 162 35.5 
Other (not specified) 38 4.8 20 4.4 
N 872  491  
3.3.2 perceptions 
Figure 14 shows the distribution of different farmers’ perceptions about the various 
aspects of buyers’ behaviour. Most farmers have “very negative perceptions” about 
various elements of buyers’ behaviour. Farmers with negative perceptions far 
outweigh those who have favourable perceptions about traders. Interestingly, 
farmers have relatively favourable perceptions about buyers to provide them with 
market information: fewer farmers have a very negative perception and more 
farmers have a very positive one. That said, farmers do not think that buyers will 
provide them with accurate price information; the sum of the farmers who have a 
very negative and negative perceptions is the highest for all five. 
 
Figure 14: distribution of different perceptions of farmers about the various aspects of traders’ 
behaviour in transactions in East Wellega and West Tigray 
 
 
3.3.3 market information 
At the time of the survey in 2009, no reliable market information system existed in 
Ethiopia and farmers had generally little market information on prices, price trends, 
or quality standards. Most sesame farmers obtained market information from 
friends, family, and neighbours. Mobile phones were, and still are, extremely scarce. 
In 2008, 2.42% of the Ethiopian population had bought a mobile SIM card, which 
increased to 4.89% in 2009 (Calandro et al. 2010). Most of these were probably 
sold in urban areas, as Ethiopia has not reached 20% of households connected to 
the electricity grid. Radio is the most widely used information source, with 41% of 
households in Ethiopia using this medium (Stork et al. 2013). For price 
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information, newspapers or radio are not always useful, because such information 
is often out-of-date or not location specific (David-Benz et al. 2012). Ethiopian 
sesame farmers’ information problems were compounded by several factors. 
Sesame prices often fluctuated daily, and different prices could be obtained in 
different markets (see previous section on market outlets); the survey shows that 
the highest price received was over six times that of the lowest price received.24  
 In a situation with no reliable market information it is difficult for farmers 
to distinguish between trustworthy and untrustworthy traders by identifying 
“trustworthy” price offers. With highly fluctuating prices, this distinction is more 
difficult to make. In addition, as most sesame farmers lacked information on grades 
of sesame quality, which are associated with different price levels, traders could 
offer lower prices by qualifying the sesame on offer as inferior. Furthermore, many 
farmers lacked weighing equipment to accurately measure the quantity of sesame, 
allowing traders to offer lower prices by rigging the weight of the produce. 
 It is conceivable that the information obtained from friends, family, and 
neighbours could have helped to assess whether the price offered was fair, 
especially when a friend, family member, or neighbour sold at the same time at the 
same market, as several authors have found (Islam & Grönlund 2010; Lwoga et al. 
2011; McCullough & Matson 2011). However, because the quality and weight often 
differs from farmer to farmer, the price information received from others may not 
have been completely comparable and again not useful as a yardstick. One could 
also argue that farmers could have obtained market information by negotiating with 
many traders, as Tadesse and Shively (2013) do. However, farmers in the sample 
indicated that traders in a particular market usually offered similar prices. To obtain 
information from different markets, sesame farmers would need to travel to 
different markets (from small local markets to larger faraway markets, usually 
located in the regional capital) and/or meet traders who collect produce directly 
from farmers. Collecting market information in this manner would have entailed 
high transaction costs in terms of finding traders and bargaining with them, as well 
as transport costs in terms of time and money spent on travel. In addition, with 
highly fluctuating prices, collecting market information first and then deciding to 
sell to the highest bidder may not be the most efficient strategy as prices may have 
24 The lowest price received was 395 birr/quintal; the highest 2520 birr/quintal (the 
standard deviation was 427.66; exchange rate of 10.5 birr = 1 euro). The lowest price 
received a year earlier was 350 birr/quintal and the highest was 2000 birr/quintal (standard 
deviation 161.86; exchange rate 10.88 birr=1 euro). 
 
                                                        
changed again by the time the farmers reach the market with their produce, or 
traders may have moved on. 
3.4 methods 
3.4.1 measuring perceptions 
I have added the five measurements of perception (figure 14) to construct a new 
“perceptions” variable that captures the overall farmers’ perception of traders’ 
behaviour. This variable was tested to ensure that the “validity of empirical 
behavioural research hinges on ensuring the reliability of the measures on which 
research conclusions are based” (Duhachek & Iacobucci 2004). I used Cronbach’s 
alpha and confirmatory factor analysis to determine overall construct reliability, 
setting the cut-off point at the usual value of 0.70 (Nunnally 1978).25 To simplify 
the analysis, I combined the middle scales of the 5-scale Likert score of the new 
“perceptions” variable into one neutral perception” category, thereby obtaining 
three categories: negative perceptions, neutral perceptions, and positive 
perceptions. 
3.4.2 analysing farmers’ perceptions through ordered probit modelling 
To analyse the factors associated with farmers’ perceptions about opportunistic 
traders, I use an ordered response model. Ordered probit models have come into 
fairly wide use as a framework for analysing such responses (Greene & Hensher 
2010). A farmers’ perception about traders is unobserved and represented by the 
25 Cronbach’s alpha measures how well a set of items (or variables) measures a single 
unidimensional latent construct (Bland and Altman 1997). Cronbach's alpha for the five 
elements of perceptions exceeds the cut-off point with a score of 0.76, indicating that the 
five elements all measure the same latent “perception about behaviour” variable. Factor 
loadings were used to determine whether each item contributed significantly to the joint 
“perception” factor with the cut-off point at the usual value of 0.3. All measures loaded on 
one factor and well above the cut-off point (all were above 0.62). Loading the measures on 
more than one factor did not achieve an improvement. We also tested whether the scores 
on the Likert scale suffered from “scale usage heterogeneity”. Rossi et al. (2001) caution 
that respondents often vary in their usage of the scale, which they have termed scale usage 
heterogeneity: common patterns include using only the middle of the scale or using the 
upper or lower ends. We tested the respondents’ scoring on the Likert scale for 
perceptions and found that scale usage heterogeneity did not apply. 
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latent variable Bi*. To model how Bi* varies with personal characteristics xi I 
specify the linear relationship: Bi* = xi'β + εi (1) 
 If we assume that εi is NID(0,σ2), the above setting corresponds to an 
ordered probit model, where Bi* is a latent variable representing the ith individual's 
beliefs about traders, β is a vector of coefficients associated with selected 
explanatory variables, x is a matrix containing farmers’ information for the selected 
variables and a dummy for region, and ε is the error term. The survey design was 
clustered: villages or kebeles were randomly selected after which individuals were 
selected within clusters. This means that there may be common effects across 
villages, and I use the option cluster in Stata, where the village (kebele) is the 
subgroup indicator, to produce standard errors which are corrected both for 
heteroskedasticity and the grouped structure (Deaton 1997). I use the conceptual 
framework’s four categories of factors that influence beliefs in the analysis of 
farmers’ perceptions: short-term experiences with traders, information, exposure to 
certain environments or institutions, and personal characteristics. 
 First, I include short-term experiences with traders through several variables 
representing recent transactions with traders. I include the most recent price 
received (in the 2008–2009 season), as well as revenues. I also include the price 
received a year ago (2007–2008 season), because farmers may have used this as a 
reference price to judge the most recent price received. I included whether the 
quality or quantity of sesame was reflected in the price offered by traders, as well as 
two variables indicating the availability of traders: whether they arrived at expected 
times or not, and whether the farmers felt they could choose a trader. 
 Second, to capture access to information, I include a variable that indicates 
whether farmers had access to market information. I also include variables 
indicating how easy it was to get to different markets, because this is linked to the 
ease of collecting information. Therefore this thesis also includes transport costs, as 
well as costs in terms of the time it took to travel to the nearest market (in 
minutes), and whether the farmers had the means to transport sesame to markets. 
 Third, to capture exposure to certain environments or institutions, I include 
a dummy for the two regions. I include crop diversity (number of crops a farmer 
cultivated) to also reflect this. Another implication of crop diversity is that farmers 
growing different crops will also meet other traders than sesame traders (although 
not all crops are grown for the market). Exposure to certain events linked to living 
 
in different environments such as loss of livestock, drought, food shortages, ethnic 
conflict, or health problems are also included. Farmers exposed to hardship in 
Ethiopia may have encountered positive experiences such as help from the 
community after the hardship and have a more positive perception of humanity. 
The literature on the effects of hardships presents a mixed verdict, but there is 
some evidence that individuals who have experienced hardships (such as violence) 
behave more altruistically (Voors et al. 2012). Finally, I include personal 
characteristics such as age, gender, education, and the size of land owned. 
3.4.3 taking into account endogeneity 
Perceptions about the opportunistic behaviour of traders were measured after 
farmers had sold sesame to traders, reducing the likelihood of endogeneity. 
However, endogeneity issues may still play a role, as negative perceptions about 
traders may have existed before and during the transactions, affecting the 
explanatory variables, as well as having a “self-fulfilling prophecy” effect. It is quite 
conceivable that possessing market information is endogenous. Farmers who have 
a negative perception about traders’ opportunistic behaviour are probably more 
likely to obtain market information. Those who have a positive perception about 
traders may not bother to obtain such information. As this is a crucial variable in 
the analyses, I use two approaches to control for endogeneity. First, I use the 
instrumental variables estimator (IV) approach to account for endogeneity. For the 
instrument, I assume that farmers who are inherently inquisitive will collect market 
information but do not necessarily have a more negative perception of traders. To 
measure this trait, which cannot be measured directly, a dummy variable was 
composed from two other variables that are related to obtaining information. I use 
a semi-ordered bivariate probit model (see appendix 1 for more information and 
results). Finding a suitable instrument remains problematic. Although the 
instrument seems sufficiently strong, I also apply a relatively new method 
developed by Lewbel (2012), which identifies structural parameters in models with 
endogenous or mismeasured regressors. The identification comes from having 
regressors uncorrelated with the product of heteroskedastic errors. Lewbel’s 
method also allows us to assume that other variables may be endogenous, such as 
the price recently received for sesame (see appendix 2 for more information on the 
approach and results). 
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received a year ago (2007–2008 season), because farmers may have used this as a 
reference price to judge the most recent price received. I included whether the 
quality or quantity of sesame was reflected in the price offered by traders, as well as 
two variables indicating the availability of traders: whether they arrived at expected 
times or not, and whether the farmers felt they could choose a trader. 
 Second, to capture access to information, I include a variable that indicates 
whether farmers had access to market information. I also include variables 
indicating how easy it was to get to different markets, because this is linked to the 
ease of collecting information. Therefore this thesis also includes transport costs, as 
well as costs in terms of the time it took to travel to the nearest market (in 
minutes), and whether the farmers had the means to transport sesame to markets. 
 Third, to capture exposure to certain environments or institutions, I include 
a dummy for the two regions. I include crop diversity (number of crops a farmer 
cultivated) to also reflect this. Another implication of crop diversity is that farmers 
growing different crops will also meet other traders than sesame traders (although 
not all crops are grown for the market). Exposure to certain events linked to living 
 
in different environments such as loss of livestock, drought, food shortages, ethnic 
conflict, or health problems are also included. Farmers exposed to hardship in 
Ethiopia may have encountered positive experiences such as help from the 
community after the hardship and have a more positive perception of humanity. 
The literature on the effects of hardships presents a mixed verdict, but there is 
some evidence that individuals who have experienced hardships (such as violence) 
behave more altruistically (Voors et al. 2012). Finally, I include personal 
characteristics such as age, gender, education, and the size of land owned. 
3.4.3 taking into account endogeneity 
Perceptions about the opportunistic behaviour of traders were measured after 
farmers had sold sesame to traders, reducing the likelihood of endogeneity. 
However, endogeneity issues may still play a role, as negative perceptions about 
traders may have existed before and during the transactions, affecting the 
explanatory variables, as well as having a “self-fulfilling prophecy” effect. It is quite 
conceivable that possessing market information is endogenous. Farmers who have 
a negative perception about traders’ opportunistic behaviour are probably more 
likely to obtain market information. Those who have a positive perception about 
traders may not bother to obtain such information. As this is a crucial variable in 
the analyses, I use two approaches to control for endogeneity. First, I use the 
instrumental variables estimator (IV) approach to account for endogeneity. For the 
instrument, I assume that farmers who are inherently inquisitive will collect market 
information but do not necessarily have a more negative perception of traders. To 
measure this trait, which cannot be measured directly, a dummy variable was 
composed from two other variables that are related to obtaining information. I use 
a semi-ordered bivariate probit model (see appendix 1 for more information and 
results). Finding a suitable instrument remains problematic. Although the 
instrument seems sufficiently strong, I also apply a relatively new method 
developed by Lewbel (2012), which identifies structural parameters in models with 
endogenous or mismeasured regressors. The identification comes from having 
regressors uncorrelated with the product of heteroskedastic errors. Lewbel’s 
method also allows us to assume that other variables may be endogenous, such as 
the price recently received for sesame (see appendix 2 for more information on the 
approach and results). 
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3.4.4 analysing market participation through GLM modelling 
To analyse whether farmers’ negative perceptions about opportunistic behaviour of 
traders lead to decreased market participation, I conduct two analyses: (i) the 
relationship between perceptions and (ii) the number of market outlets (see table 
2). 
 I use a Poisson regression to model the number of market outlets. A 
Poisson regression is used to model count data, assuming the response variable has 
a Poisson distribution. Poisson models are generalised linear models (GLMs) with 
the logarithm as the (canonical) link function (i.e. log link function), and the 
Poisson distribution function as the assumed probability distribution of the 
response (Greene, 2008). To model how the number of outlets Y varies with the 
independent variables x, I specify the relationship: 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿�𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸(𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌|𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥)� = 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼 +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽′𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 (2) 
 The model used is slightly underdispersed. When applying the standard 
Poisson model to underdispersed data, the efficiency of parameter estimates 
remains reasonably high, yet their standard errors are overestimated. However, the 
consensus is not to correct for underdispersion (Zuur et al. 2009) because for linear 
predictor point estimates and the prediction of values, underdispersion rarely is a 
problem. However, tests and intervals may be unnecessarily conservative. 
 Based on the literature discussed in section 3.2, I include four categories of 
variables. First, personal factors such as age, education, and wealth (proxied by area 
of land owned). Second, I include typical economic factors such as recent price, 
whether price includes quality and quantity of sesame, price received last year, 
recent revenues, availability of market information, travel time to nearest market, 
and whether farmers have means of transport. I also include whether farmers grow 
different crops besides sesame. Third, I include social factors such as whether 
farmers feel they can choose which trader to sell to, and whether traders arrive at 
unexpected times. Finally, I include the perceptions held by farmers about the 
opportunistic behaviour of traders. I included predicted values for perceptions 
about traders (pfit2 for neutral and pfit3 for favourable perceptions) obtained in 
the ordered probit model rather than the measured values of perception to measure 
the effect of perception. I did this because the measured values of perception were 
obtained after farmers sold their sesame to avoid endogeneity problems. The 
 
prediction is based on variables exogenous to marketing choices, which means that 
price and revenues were left out. 
3.5 results 
The results are discussed in two sections. First, I present the results that help 
explain the negative perceptions of farmers on traders’ behaviour. Then I present 
the results on the farmers’ marketing behaviour. 
3.5.1 negative perceptions of farmers 
Table 4 presents the variables with expected signs, means and standard deviation. 
The four categories of factors that influence beliefs in the analysis of farmers’ 
perceptions are included: market information, short-term experiences with traders, 
exposure to certain environments or institutions, and personal characteristics. 
Table 4: Variables included in the model 
Independent variable Exp. sign Mean s.e. 
Market information 
NoMrktInfo No access to market 
information  
- 0.24 0.127 
NoTransp No access to transport  - 0.15 0.147 
TravelTime Minutes it takes to travel to 
nearest market 
- 55.15 0.001 
Recent experience with traders 
TraderUnexp The reason for selling to 
different traders – They come 
at different times 
- 0.66 0.123 
NoTraderChoice The reason for selling to 
different traders – The farmer 
cannot choose 
- 0.37 0.115 
PriceQual Mechanism of negotiating 
price with traders – Price 
offered is based on quality of 
sesame 
+ 0.64 0.110 
PriceQuant Mechanism of negotiating 
price with traders – Price is 
based on quantity of sesame 
one has 
+ 0.04 0.275 
PriceDiff Price received for sesame one 
year ago (2007–2009), scaled  
- 0.52 0.006 
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3.4.4 analysing market participation through GLM modelling 
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about traders (pfit2 for neutral and pfit3 for favourable perceptions) obtained in 
the ordered probit model rather than the measured values of perception to measure 
the effect of perception. I did this because the measured values of perception were 
obtained after farmers sold their sesame to avoid endogeneity problems. The 
 
prediction is based on variables exogenous to marketing choices, which means that 
price and revenues were left out. 
3.5 results 
The results are discussed in two sections. First, I present the results that help 
explain the negative perceptions of farmers on traders’ behaviour. Then I present 
the results on the farmers’ marketing behaviour. 
3.5.1 negative perceptions of farmers 
Table 4 presents the variables with expected signs, means and standard deviation. 
The four categories of factors that influence beliefs in the analysis of farmers’ 
perceptions are included: market information, short-term experiences with traders, 
exposure to certain environments or institutions, and personal characteristics. 
Table 4: Variables included in the model 
Independent variable Exp. sign Mean s.e. 
Market information 
NoMrktInfo No access to market 
information  
- 0.24 0.127 
NoTransp No access to transport  - 0.15 0.147 
TravelTime Minutes it takes to travel to 
nearest market 
- 55.15 0.001 
Recent experience with traders 
TraderUnexp The reason for selling to 
different traders – They come 
at different times 
- 0.66 0.123 
NoTraderChoice The reason for selling to 
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cannot choose 
- 0.37 0.115 
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Independent variable Exp. sign Mean s.e. 
Price Most recent price received for 
sesame (in January of 2009), 
scaled  
+ 1.25 0.486 
Rev Revenue (most recent price x 
quantity sold), scaled 
+ 23.54 0.002 
Environmental and institutional factors 
CropDiv Number of crops + 2.25 0.108 
Drought Experienced severe drought + 0.62 0.123 
EthnConfl Experienced ethnic conflict + 0.03 0.301 
FoodShort Experienced food shortage + 0.64 0.122 
HealthProb Experienced health problem + 0.58 0.107 
LstLoss Experienced loss of livestock + 0.43 0.112 
PriceFail Experienced crop price failure + 0.74 0.122 
Personal characteristics 
Age Age +/- 44.46 0.005 
Edu Education +/- 1.39 0.086 
Gender Gender +/- 1.08 0.177 
Land Size of land +/- 4.78 0.010 
Region West Tigray or East Wellega  +/- 0.87 0.357 
 
 In presenting the ordered probit results, I report the marginal effects of the 
continuous variables (table 5). The results (significance levels) taking into account 
endogeneity are presented in appendix 3.. They are similar to those of the ordered 
probit results. The marginal effects are the estimated change in the probability of 
having a positive perception about traders (“negative perception”, “neutral 
perception” and “positive perception”) given a marginal increase in the value of the 
relevant regressor while holding all other regressors at their mean value. These 
marginal effects therefore represent the estimated impact that each regressor has on 
the probability that an “average” farmer will have a negative, neutral, or positive 
perception about traders. Note that to evaluate the effect of dummy variables, I 
need to compare the probabilities when the variable takes its two different values (0 
or 1) with those that occur with the other variables held at their sample means 
(Greene 2008). 
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Independent variable Exp. sign Mean s.e. 
Price Most recent price received for 
sesame (in January of 2009), 
scaled  
+ 1.25 0.486 
Rev Revenue (most recent price x 
quantity sold), scaled 
+ 23.54 0.002 
Environmental and institutional factors 
CropDiv Number of crops + 2.25 0.108 
Drought Experienced severe drought + 0.62 0.123 
EthnConfl Experienced ethnic conflict + 0.03 0.301 
FoodShort Experienced food shortage + 0.64 0.122 
HealthProb Experienced health problem + 0.58 0.107 
LstLoss Experienced loss of livestock + 0.43 0.112 
PriceFail Experienced crop price failure + 0.74 0.122 
Personal characteristics 
Age Age +/- 44.46 0.005 
Edu Education +/- 1.39 0.086 
Gender Gender +/- 1.08 0.177 
Land Size of land +/- 4.78 0.010 
Region West Tigray or East Wellega  +/- 0.87 0.357 
 
 In presenting the ordered probit results, I report the marginal effects of the 
continuous variables (table 5). The results (significance levels) taking into account 
endogeneity are presented in appendix 3.. They are similar to those of the ordered 
probit results. The marginal effects are the estimated change in the probability of 
having a positive perception about traders (“negative perception”, “neutral 
perception” and “positive perception”) given a marginal increase in the value of the 
relevant regressor while holding all other regressors at their mean value. These 
marginal effects therefore represent the estimated impact that each regressor has on 
the probability that an “average” farmer will have a negative, neutral, or positive 
perception about traders. Note that to evaluate the effect of dummy variables, I 
need to compare the probabilities when the variable takes its two different values (0 
or 1) with those that occur with the other variables held at their sample means 
(Greene 2008). 
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 The main variable in the analyses, market information (NoMrktInfo) is 
highly significant: farmers who see the lack of market information as a big problem 
tend to have more negative perceptions about traders, both in East Wellega and 
West Tigray, with a larger effect in East Wellega. Travel time is not significant. Not 
having transport is significant in Tigray though; farmers who lack transport are 
more likely to have negative perceptions about traders. It is not significant in East 
Wellega, probably due to the fact that the farmers live in an area that is more well-
connected and has better infrastructure. 
 Regarding recent experiences with traders, table 5 shows that price is 
significant in both regions; and the marginal effects show that an increase in price 
increases the probability of positive perceptions. The effect is relatively large 
(0.505), indicating that recent experience with a trader who offered a good price is 
associated with a more favourable perception of traders. Revenue (Rev) has the 
same effect as price but is not significant in East Wellega. The price received one 
year ago (PriceDiff) has the opposite effect: an increase in the price one year ago 
decreases the probability of positive perceptions, but only very slightly. It is 
significant in both regions. This may be an indication that the price received a year 
ago may be used by farmers as a reference price for this year’s price. If prices 
received this year are higher than last year’s, the farmer may be inclined to think 
that he or she received a “good” price this year, and have a more positive 
perception of traders. Having experienced a “failure in prices” (i.e. very low prices) 
increases the probability of having a positive perception, which is somewhat 
counterintuitive, but the effect might be similar to having received low prices in 
previous years; if the most recent prices received are relatively higher (and they 
were in 2008), this may improve the perceptions about traders’ trustworthiness. 
Traders arriving at unexpected times (TraderUnexp) lowers the probability of 
positive perceptions, as I assumed it would. It is only significant in West Tigray. 
Farmers who think quality is taken into account in pricing (PriceQual) have a 
higher likelihood of having positive perceptions, but only in West Tigray. In West 
Tigray the white Humera type is sold, and quality is an important attribute. In East 
Wellega, the brown Wellega type is sold, and quality is less important. Farmers who 
think quantity taken into account in pricing (PriceQuan) have a higher likelihood of 
having positive perceptions, but only in East Wellega, where farmers tend to sell 
smaller amounts than in West Tigray. 
 
 Regarding environmental and institutional factors, the regional differences 
are substantial in this category. Having experienced food shortages is significant in 
East Wellega and reduces the probability of having positive perceptions about 
traders. Drought is significant and also reduces the probability of having positive 
perceptions about traders. Loss of livestock is significant in both regions and 
increases the probability of have positive perceptions. Ethnic conflict is not 
significant. It is interesting to note that hardships that have affected a whole 
community all reduce the probability of having positive perceptions. Individual 
hardships seem to have the opposite effect. Finally, crop diversification is 
significant; the more crops farmers grow, the more likely they are to have a 
favourable perception of traders, as predicted. However, it is only significant when 
the data is combined for the two regions; no region-specific effects are found. 
 Personal characteristics are not significant but are when the data is split. 
Some are significant for either region, such as age for farmers in West Tigray (as 
age increases, farmers are slightly more likely to have negative perceptions) and 
land for East Wellega (larger land owners are slightly more likely to have negative 
perceptions). The effects are very small though. As no female farmers were 
interviewed in East Wellega, gender is omitted. 
 The results for the semi-ordered bivariate probit model that takes into 
account the possible endogeneity of market information are very similar to those 
reported in table 5 (see appendix 1). When I use Lewbel’s approach (2012), I again 
assume that market information is endogenous, but also run the analysis assuming 
that price is endogenous and that market information and price are endogenous 
(see appendix 2). The main result is that market information remains a significant 
factor in explaining trust perceptions. Also the related variable of having transport 
remains significant. Travel time becomes significant and negatively correlated with 
trust perceptions, although the effect is small. 
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3.5.2 do negative perceptions of farmers lead to less market participation? 
In this section, I explore whether negative perceptions of farmers about the 
possible opportunistic behaviour of traders leads to less market participation by 
selling at fewer market outlets (and vice versa). The results are shown in table 6. 
Table 6: Summary of results for GLM using a Poisson distribution and link log with dependent 
variable number of outlets (with clustering for village (kebele)) 
 
Coefficient s.e. 
 Perceptions 
pfit2 0.275 (0.069) *** 
pfit3 0.305 (0.134) ** 
Personal characteristics 
Region -0.152 (0.152) 
 Gender -0.120 (0.062) * 
Age -0.006 (0.002) *** 
Education 0.029 (0.014) ** 
Land 0.001 (0.003) 
 Economic factors 
NoMrktInfo 0.067 (0.074) 
 NoTransp -0.090 (0.081) 
 TravelTime 0.001 (0.000) *** 
CropDiv -0.026 (0.042) 
 PriceDiff -0.004 (0.003) 
 Price 0.253 (0.181) 
 PriceFail 0.052 (0.043) 
 PriceQual 0.127 (0.063) ** 
PriceQual -0.150 (0.151) 
 Rev 0.001 (0.001) 
 Social factors 
TraderUnexp 0.199 (0.065) *** 
NoTraderChoice -0.357 (0.057) *** 
_cons 0.562 (0.236) ** 
Deviance = 279.6 
Pearson = 282.4 
AIC = 3.094568 
BIC = -3601.984 
Log pseudolikelihood = -942.221 
Std. Err. adjusted for 15 clusters in kebele, standard errors 
in parentheses 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
 An important result is that the fitted values for trust perceptions (pfit2 and 
pfit3, see methodology section) are indeed significant. Farmers who have neutral or 
positive perceptions are more likely to increase the number of market outlets, as 
 
hypothesised. Those who perceive the risk of dealing with opportunistic traders as 
being low diversify market outlets. I assume this is to reduce price risk. I also tested 
this model with the original trust scores, which were also significant, but weak. I 
tested whether the pfit2 and pfit3 are different with a Wald test, which confirmed 
that they are. 
 With respect to personal characteristics, age, gender, and education are 
significant. Younger, male, and well-educated farmers are more likely to increase 
the number of market outlets. Two economic factors are significant. First, if 
farmers feel that quality is taken into account in pricing, they tend to increase 
market outlets. This can be explained by the fact that farmers want to get the best 
price for their sesame. Second, travel time is significant, but the effect is small. 
Farmers who live in remote areas tend to increase market outlets, which means 
they are willing to incur higher transaction costs to reduce transaction risks (i.e. to 
get a higher price). Interestingly, market information is not significant. There may 
be two opposing forces at play: farmers who have good price information will 
travel to markets where they know they can obtain a higher price; farmers who 
have no market information may travel to markets to obtain market information. 
Both social factors are significant. Farmers who feel they have no choice of trader 
tend to decrease market outlets: for them all traders are the same and therefore it 
does not make sense to expend transaction costs to sell at various market outlets. 
The farmers who say traders arrive at unexpected times sell to more market outlets; 
farmers apparently choose not wait for traders to show up but visit traders 
themselves. 
3.6 discussion and conclusions 
I have set out to explore how negative perceptions of farmers about opportunistic 
behaviour of traders are linked to various possible explanatory variables and assess 
the role of these perceptions in farmers’ market participation. These findings shed a 
different light on the literature, which argues that through trust relationships 
between a farmer and trader and reputation effects, trust is generalised, facilitating 
trade and market development. Tadesse and Shively (2013), for instance, find that 
farmers in Ethiopian grain markets face various transaction risks, mainly driven by 
a lack of market information. By repeatedly transacting with the same trader, 
farmers are able to reduce transaction costs related to searching for information. 
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These findings help explain why farmers, such as the sesame farmers in the study, 
may not choose to engage in repeated transactions. I have highlighted the important 
role of market information, in line with Dixit (2004), who puts forward that 
relational contracting is only possible when quality information is present. 
 I conclude therefore that a lack of market information, and the fact that 
sesame prices are influenced by various factors that introduce a high degree of 
subjectivity, make it difficult for farmers in Ethiopia to determine what a “fair” 
price was for an amount of sesame of a certain quality. Farmers lacked an objective 
“yardstick” to assess the price offered by traders, complicating the assessment of 
traders’ trustworthiness. Past studies have suggested that distrust becomes a chosen 
strategy of stakeholders when there is an expectation of opportunistic behaviour 
from other stakeholders (Baba 1999). Without the possibility of “updating” their 
beliefs about traders, farmers in Ethiopia seemed to have been locked into a default 
distrust of traders, inhibiting the development of relational contracting. 
 Instead of engaging in long-term, relational contracting, sesame farmers in 
Ethiopia sell their produce at different outlets. I see this as a strategy that reduces 
transaction risks but increases transaction costs (in line with Dorward 2001). I 
argue that farmers who face the transaction risks of uncertain and fluctuating prices 
as well as the transaction risk of dealing with many opportunistic traders, decide to 
limit their market participation: what is the point of traveling to various market 
outlets if you are going to be cheated anyway? Farmers who consider the 
transaction risk of dealing with opportunistic traders as low may choose to expend 
costs to diversify market outlets in order to reduce price risk. 
 This line of reasoning would predict that if good and timely market 
information is available to farmers, their trust perceptions of traders would 
improve. Whether this would then lead to relational contracting is undetermined. 
The results show that there is a virtuous circle relationship, whereby market 
participation and trust are mutually reinforcing forces: increasing trust through 
increased market transparency is likely to lead to more market participation and 
diversification of market outlets. However, improved market information is likely 
to have other effects as well. Better market information tends to lead to converging 
prices (Aker 2010; Jensen 2010), reducing price risk and therefore the need to sell 
at various market outlets. In this case, more trust might lead to relational 
contracting, as this would reduce transaction costs. It has also been found that 
 
improved market information induces the market participation of farmers in 
remote areas (Muto & Yamano 2009), which would negate relational contracting. 
 This leads us to the more philosophical question of whether personal trust 
relationships are the only way to institutional development or whether this needs 
rethinking. Although personalised trust relationships bring several benefits to both 
farmers and traders, such exclusive relationships are also restrictive. Perhaps there 
are other “pathways” to market development. Dixit (2004) proposes that when a 
community is too large or the information network and the system of social norms 
and sanctions are too weak, and formal state law is unavailable, an arbitrator may 
solve coordination and information problems. The ECX, which became mandatory 
for sesame trade after the survey, shares many characteristics of such an arbitrator. 
It may be seen as a “specialised industry arbitrator which may interpret information 
at lower cost, making more information verifiable and allowing more complete 
contracting” (Dixit 2004, p. 49). Whether the ECX has, indeed, taken up this 
function is for follow-up research. 
 Several policy implications can be drawn from this chapter. Investing in 
market information and increasing transparency through certifying weighing 
equipment and setting quality grades and standards is important not just to improve 
the bargaining position of farmers, as is often put forward, but also to foster trust 
between farmers and traders. When there is more trust, transaction risks and costs 
will decrease, improving trade. The ECX has been established in Ethiopia to fulfil 
this role. Further research will need to show that if it has achieved the goal of 
improving market information and setting standards, for example, then it has 
indeed led to more trust between farmers and traders, exemplified by more 
favourable perceptions. 
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Chapter 4
abstract 
This chapter examines whether the newly established Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange through its affiliated Primary Transaction Centres (PTCs) has led to 
improved market transparency. I hypothesise that market transparency will lead to 
reduced transaction costs for farmers. This chapter builds on an earlier study, 
which hypothesised that better market information leads to increased trust between 
farmers and traders. This chapter finds that the ECX has been successful in 
increasing market transparency and decreasing transaction costs. It argues that 
traders are behaving less opportunistically as a result of market transparency, and 
this has improved farmers’ trust perceptions about traders and even slightly 
increased relational contracting and significantly increased credit relations. 
 
 
keywords: market transparency, ethiopian commodity exchange, farmers, trust 
 
 
  
 
4.1 introduction 
The ECX was established in 2008 to solve various problems in Ethiopian’s 
agricultural markets, in which both farmers and traders faced high transaction costs 
(Gabre-Madhin 2012). Ethiopia’s sesame markets resemble those of many other 
African agricultural markets, which are characterised by a plethora of small traders. 
There are many intermediaries and most transactions are low value. The 
participants in agricultural markets – farmers, traders, firms, and government 
agencies – all face difficulties arising from underlying and related problems of poor 
communications and transport, lack of standards, weak institutions, and limited 
access to supporting services (e.g. finance) (Gabre-Madhin 2003; Dorward et al. 
2006; Barrett 1997). As a result, markets do not serve producers or consumers well: 
high margins and poor price integration reduce farm gate prices, raise consumer 
prices, and increase uncertainty for all (Dorward et al. 2006). Their inefficiency is a 
major constraint to agricultural development, which would benefit farmers, small 
traders, and consumers. 
 The ECX aims to solve these problems in various ways, explained in chapter 
two. Renkow & Slade (2013, p. 51) find “a remarkably wide array of opinions about 
the ECX’s impacts on traders and farmers – some sanguine, others not” and state 
that a comprehensive external review is “sorely needed”.26 This chapter is by no 
means such a review, but it does contribute to a better understanding of the impact 
of the ECX (through the PTCs) on sesame farmers, after two years of mandatory 
operation. This chapter presents the farmers’ viewpoints on the claimed benefits of 
the ECX, such as whether market transparency has increased and transaction costs 
have decreased. This chapter also provides some insights on the area of 
institutional change. The ECX can be seen as a major institutional change in the 
sesame markets of Ethiopia. Being the first of its kind in Africa, there is little 
understanding of how such a major institutional change impacts markets that are 
mostly governed by informal institutions and social network capital. 
 This chapter examines whether the ECX has fulfilled its expected 
arbitrator’s role in increasing transparency through the establishment of Primary 
Transaction Centres. In doing so, the ECX should reduce transaction costs and 
26 They also remark that such a review is unlikely as baseline data do not exist with which to 
evaluate the farm-level impacts of trading through the exchange on price discovery, price 
transmission, and transactions costs. 
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abstract 
This chapter examines whether the newly established Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange through its affiliated Primary Transaction Centres (PTCs) has led to 
improved market transparency. I hypothesise that market transparency will lead to 
reduced transaction costs for farmers. This chapter builds on an earlier study, 
which hypothesised that better market information leads to increased trust between 
farmers and traders. This chapter finds that the ECX has been successful in 
increasing market transparency and decreasing transaction costs. It argues that 
traders are behaving less opportunistically as a result of market transparency, and 
this has improved farmers’ trust perceptions about traders and even slightly 
increased relational contracting and significantly increased credit relations. 
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4.1 introduction 
The ECX was established in 2008 to solve various problems in Ethiopian’s 
agricultural markets, in which both farmers and traders faced high transaction costs 
(Gabre-Madhin 2012). Ethiopia’s sesame markets resemble those of many other 
African agricultural markets, which are characterised by a plethora of small traders. 
There are many intermediaries and most transactions are low value. The 
participants in agricultural markets – farmers, traders, firms, and government 
agencies – all face difficulties arising from underlying and related problems of poor 
communications and transport, lack of standards, weak institutions, and limited 
access to supporting services (e.g. finance) (Gabre-Madhin 2003; Dorward et al. 
2006; Barrett 1997). As a result, markets do not serve producers or consumers well: 
high margins and poor price integration reduce farm gate prices, raise consumer 
prices, and increase uncertainty for all (Dorward et al. 2006). Their inefficiency is a 
major constraint to agricultural development, which would benefit farmers, small 
traders, and consumers. 
 The ECX aims to solve these problems in various ways, explained in chapter 
two. Renkow & Slade (2013, p. 51) find “a remarkably wide array of opinions about 
the ECX’s impacts on traders and farmers – some sanguine, others not” and state 
that a comprehensive external review is “sorely needed”.26 This chapter is by no 
means such a review, but it does contribute to a better understanding of the impact 
of the ECX (through the PTCs) on sesame farmers, after two years of mandatory 
operation. This chapter presents the farmers’ viewpoints on the claimed benefits of 
the ECX, such as whether market transparency has increased and transaction costs 
have decreased. This chapter also provides some insights on the area of 
institutional change. The ECX can be seen as a major institutional change in the 
sesame markets of Ethiopia. Being the first of its kind in Africa, there is little 
understanding of how such a major institutional change impacts markets that are 
mostly governed by informal institutions and social network capital. 
 This chapter examines whether the ECX has fulfilled its expected 
arbitrator’s role in increasing transparency through the establishment of Primary 
Transaction Centres. In doing so, the ECX should reduce transaction costs and 
26 They also remark that such a review is unlikely as baseline data do not exist with which to 
evaluate the farm-level impacts of trading through the exchange on price discovery, price 
transmission, and transactions costs. 
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risks. Improved market transparency is also expected to improve farmers’ 
perceptions about the opportunistic behaviour of traders. Chapter three 
hypothesises that these negative trust perceptions impeded the development of 
long-term trust relationships between farmers and traders. It finds that higher trust 
perceptions were linked to a larger number of market outlets, thus also impeding 
the likelihood of developing (long-term) trust relationships. If trust perceptions 
indeed have improved, and the number of market outlets has been limited through 
the new PTC law, the likelihood of farmers developing a trust relationship with 
traders may have increased. 
 The chapter addresses the following main research questions: 
1. Is the ECX (through its PTCs) improving market transparency (prices, 
grades, and measurement)? 
2. Did increased market transparency decrease transaction costs for farmers? 
3. Did market transparency have a positive knock-on effect on farmers’ 
perceptions about the opportunistic behaviour of traders? 
4. Are there more (long-term) trust relationships between farmers and traders? 
 After this introduction, section 4.2 reviews the literature and provides a 
theoretical background. Section 4.3 discusses the methodology used in the chapter. 
Section 4.4 presents data on market outlets and market information. Section 4.5 
discusses the results on transaction costs, trust perceptions, and relational 
contracting. Section 4.6 presents conclusions. 
4.2 literature review and conceptual framework 
An economy lacking well-functioning, government-provided legal institutions or 
organisations to protect property rights and enforce contracts needs to develop its 
own alternative modes of economic governance (Dixit 2004). One of those 
alternatives is self-enforcing governance through repeated interaction. By 
interacting with each other repeatedly, parties build up trust, lowering transaction 
costs and risks. If they value the future, then the prospect of a long-term collapse 
of the relationship can control the temptation to obtain a short-term gain. There is 
extensive literature on the role of long-term trust relationships through repeated 
action (Dasgupta 2009; Fehr et al. 1996; Greif 2005; Haji 2010; Fafchamps 2010; 
Dixit 2003). 
 
 Such relational contracting does not always develop automatically. Chapter 
three shows that only a very small fraction of farmers in Ethiopia’s two main 
sesame producing areas have a long-term trust relationship with traders. Most 
farmers prefer to sell their sesame at different market outlets (at different times). 
On the one hand, farmers generally had little trust in traders. On the other hand, 
farmers who had more trust in traders tended to sell to more outlets. Both factors 
thus impeded relational contracting. 
 Dixit (2004) argues that relational contracting is not always possible, as many 
economic activities require dealing with different partners at different times. An 
alternative governance mode is the stable membership of a whole large group. Self-
governance in such a group requires that if any one person cheats his current 
partner, the news is conveyed to others in the group who might be the cheater’s 
future partner. Such reputational effects may deter opportunistic behaviour, but 
require good information networks and credible multilateral punishment strategies, 
which is only possible in a stable and cohesive group that is not too large. Self-
governance (within communities) may therefore be infeasible when the community 
is too large or the information network and the system social norms and sanctions 
are too weak, and formal state law is unavailable, either because the state is too 
weak or lacks resources. These requirements do not always exist. For example, 
Fafchamps (2004) finds no evidence of reputational effects in various African 
markets. 
 Dixit (ibid) posits that a private arbitrator may provide a solution in such 
cases. This arbitrator may consist of a private individual or group who offers 
services for a fee to a group. Dixit proposes to think of this as a “private 
government” established to serve just this one function, as opposed to the broader 
institution we call the government, which performs a multitude of functions: “Even 
through the participants in the economic transactions may not meet the same 
partners repeatedly, each of them can have a repeated interaction with the person 
or organization that provides the governance, so an honest equilibrium of this kind 
is logically conceivable” (Dixit 2004, p. 13). 
 A commodity exchange may be seen as such a “private government”, as 
commodity exchanges historically have served as private organisations that govern 
contractual relations between market participants. Their functions have included 
commodity measurement, contract enforcement, the policing of theft and fraud, 
and the mitigation of information asymmetries (Pirrong 1995a). The Ethiopian 
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risks. Improved market transparency is also expected to improve farmers’ 
perceptions about the opportunistic behaviour of traders. Chapter three 
hypothesises that these negative trust perceptions impeded the development of 
long-term trust relationships between farmers and traders. It finds that higher trust 
perceptions were linked to a larger number of market outlets, thus also impeding 
the likelihood of developing (long-term) trust relationships. If trust perceptions 
indeed have improved, and the number of market outlets has been limited through 
the new PTC law, the likelihood of farmers developing a trust relationship with 
traders may have increased. 
 The chapter addresses the following main research questions: 
1. Is the ECX (through its PTCs) improving market transparency (prices, 
grades, and measurement)? 
2. Did increased market transparency decrease transaction costs for farmers? 
3. Did market transparency have a positive knock-on effect on farmers’ 
perceptions about the opportunistic behaviour of traders? 
4. Are there more (long-term) trust relationships between farmers and traders? 
 After this introduction, section 4.2 reviews the literature and provides a 
theoretical background. Section 4.3 discusses the methodology used in the chapter. 
Section 4.4 presents data on market outlets and market information. Section 4.5 
discusses the results on transaction costs, trust perceptions, and relational 
contracting. Section 4.6 presents conclusions. 
4.2 literature review and conceptual framework 
An economy lacking well-functioning, government-provided legal institutions or 
organisations to protect property rights and enforce contracts needs to develop its 
own alternative modes of economic governance (Dixit 2004). One of those 
alternatives is self-enforcing governance through repeated interaction. By 
interacting with each other repeatedly, parties build up trust, lowering transaction 
costs and risks. If they value the future, then the prospect of a long-term collapse 
of the relationship can control the temptation to obtain a short-term gain. There is 
extensive literature on the role of long-term trust relationships through repeated 
action (Dasgupta 2009; Fehr et al. 1996; Greif 2005; Haji 2010; Fafchamps 2010; 
Dixit 2003). 
 
 Such relational contracting does not always develop automatically. Chapter 
three shows that only a very small fraction of farmers in Ethiopia’s two main 
sesame producing areas have a long-term trust relationship with traders. Most 
farmers prefer to sell their sesame at different market outlets (at different times). 
On the one hand, farmers generally had little trust in traders. On the other hand, 
farmers who had more trust in traders tended to sell to more outlets. Both factors 
thus impeded relational contracting. 
 Dixit (2004) argues that relational contracting is not always possible, as many 
economic activities require dealing with different partners at different times. An 
alternative governance mode is the stable membership of a whole large group. Self-
governance in such a group requires that if any one person cheats his current 
partner, the news is conveyed to others in the group who might be the cheater’s 
future partner. Such reputational effects may deter opportunistic behaviour, but 
require good information networks and credible multilateral punishment strategies, 
which is only possible in a stable and cohesive group that is not too large. Self-
governance (within communities) may therefore be infeasible when the community 
is too large or the information network and the system social norms and sanctions 
are too weak, and formal state law is unavailable, either because the state is too 
weak or lacks resources. These requirements do not always exist. For example, 
Fafchamps (2004) finds no evidence of reputational effects in various African 
markets. 
 Dixit (ibid) posits that a private arbitrator may provide a solution in such 
cases. This arbitrator may consist of a private individual or group who offers 
services for a fee to a group. Dixit proposes to think of this as a “private 
government” established to serve just this one function, as opposed to the broader 
institution we call the government, which performs a multitude of functions: “Even 
through the participants in the economic transactions may not meet the same 
partners repeatedly, each of them can have a repeated interaction with the person 
or organization that provides the governance, so an honest equilibrium of this kind 
is logically conceivable” (Dixit 2004, p. 13). 
 A commodity exchange may be seen as such a “private government”, as 
commodity exchanges historically have served as private organisations that govern 
contractual relations between market participants. Their functions have included 
commodity measurement, contract enforcement, the policing of theft and fraud, 
and the mitigation of information asymmetries (Pirrong 1995a). The Ethiopian 
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Commodity Exchange, established in 2008 and obligatory for all sesame trade in 
2010, aims to fulfil these functions. It aims to provide market information, increase 
transparency, and enforce contracts through the establishment of “Primary 
Transaction Centres” (PTCs) where farmers and (certified) traders meet and trade, 
and where price and quality information is given and certified weighing equipment 
is used. The conclusion is that the ECX can be seen as fulfilling an arbitrator’s role 
in Ethiopia’s sesame markets, reducing transaction costs and risks. 
4.3 methodology 
To measure the before and after situation in a more rigorous way, a panel dataset as 
well as a control group should be used; however, this was not possible. The same 
kebeles (villages) in two regions (West Tigray and East Wellega) were selected in 
2009 and 2012, but different farmers were interviewed. Pooled cross-section data 
collected in 2009 and in 2012 is therefore used instead. In both surveys, farmers 
were selected randomly, and the combined dataset includes 2,132 farmers. A 
difference-in-difference type of assessment would need a control group, but there 
is no control group because all sesame farmers are more or less affected by the 
ECX. I use the two different regions to approach a difference-in-difference 
estimation; the kebeles in West Tigray are more affected by the ECX with the ECX 
warehouse close by in Humera, while the kebeles in East Wellega are less affected 
by the ECX with the ECX warehouse further away in Nekemte. Also, not all 
kebeles in East Wellega have a PTC. I assume that if there is an ECX warehouse 
close by, there will be better market information (ECX warehouses are directly 
linked to the ECX and have price tickers). Nonetheless, I have exercised caution in 
interpreting the results, as it is difficult to construct a counter-factual and to isolate 
the effects of the ECX from other possible influences (Shadish et al. 2002). 
 The villages in West Tigray and East Wellega are different in two main ways. 
The first difference is in the degree of specialisation. The farmers in West Tigray 
mostly specialise in sesame, as the agro-ecological environment does not allow 
much crop variety. Sesame is the main cash crop, in addition to which farmers 
cultivate staple cereals such as sorghum. The agro-ecological environment in East 
Wellega allows more variety, and farmers grow various crops, of which sesame is 
one. West Tigray farmers therefore may be seen as sesame specialists and are 
therefore more likely to be affected by the ECX and PTC. The second difference is 
 
the proximity to the ECX and PTCs. Although the villages in West Tigray are 
located in the remote north-west corner of Ethiopia, they all have a PTC and are 
relatively close (7 km to 50 km) to the main ECX warehouse in Humera. By 
contrast, villages in East Wellega are located 20km to 75 km from the main ECX 
warehouse in Nekemte and only 4 out of 12 villages have a PTC located in the 
village. The expectation is that the ECX and linked PTCs have a larger effect on 
farmers in West Tigray than in East Wellega. I use the same methodology as in 
chapter five, comparing different indicators for the two years using t-tests. 
 To check whether distance to the main ECX warehouse has an effect on 
trust perceptions, I run a regression model controlling for other factors. Because 
trust perceptions are ordinal (with values 1 to 5), I have used an ordered logit 
model, which is more suitable than an ordered probit model. Ordered logit and 
probit models have come into fairly wide use as a framework for analysing ordered 
responses (Greene & Hensher 2010). A farmer’s perception of traders is 
unobserved and represented by the latent variable Bi*. To model how Bi* varies 
with personal characteristics xi linear relationship is specified: Bi* = xi'β + εi (1) 
 If it is assumed that εi is NID(0,σ2), the above setting corresponds to an 
ordered logit model, where Bi* is a latent variable representing the ith individual's 
beliefs about traders, β is a vector of coefficients associated with selected 
explanatory variables, x is a matrix containing farmers’ information for the selected 
variables, and ε is the error term. Because survey design was clustered (villages were 
randomly selected after which individuals were selected within these clusters), there 
may be village common effects. The option “cluster” was therefore used in Stata, 
with village (kebele) as the subgroup indicator, to produce standard errors which 
are corrected both for heteroskedasticity and the grouped structure (Deaton 1997). 
4.4 data 
4.4.1 market outlets 
On average, farmers sold to fewer different marketing outlets in 2012, which is 
likely due to the fact they were required to sell at PTCs. They also changed the type 
of market outlets (table 7). In 2012, over half of farmers (55%) sold to PTCs. 
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Commodity Exchange, established in 2008 and obligatory for all sesame trade in 
2010, aims to fulfil these functions. It aims to provide market information, increase 
transparency, and enforce contracts through the establishment of “Primary 
Transaction Centres” (PTCs) where farmers and (certified) traders meet and trade, 
and where price and quality information is given and certified weighing equipment 
is used. The conclusion is that the ECX can be seen as fulfilling an arbitrator’s role 
in Ethiopia’s sesame markets, reducing transaction costs and risks. 
4.3 methodology 
To measure the before and after situation in a more rigorous way, a panel dataset as 
well as a control group should be used; however, this was not possible. The same 
kebeles (villages) in two regions (West Tigray and East Wellega) were selected in 
2009 and 2012, but different farmers were interviewed. Pooled cross-section data 
collected in 2009 and in 2012 is therefore used instead. In both surveys, farmers 
were selected randomly, and the combined dataset includes 2,132 farmers. A 
difference-in-difference type of assessment would need a control group, but there 
is no control group because all sesame farmers are more or less affected by the 
ECX. I use the two different regions to approach a difference-in-difference 
estimation; the kebeles in West Tigray are more affected by the ECX with the ECX 
warehouse close by in Humera, while the kebeles in East Wellega are less affected 
by the ECX with the ECX warehouse further away in Nekemte. Also, not all 
kebeles in East Wellega have a PTC. I assume that if there is an ECX warehouse 
close by, there will be better market information (ECX warehouses are directly 
linked to the ECX and have price tickers). Nonetheless, I have exercised caution in 
interpreting the results, as it is difficult to construct a counter-factual and to isolate 
the effects of the ECX from other possible influences (Shadish et al. 2002). 
 The villages in West Tigray and East Wellega are different in two main ways. 
The first difference is in the degree of specialisation. The farmers in West Tigray 
mostly specialise in sesame, as the agro-ecological environment does not allow 
much crop variety. Sesame is the main cash crop, in addition to which farmers 
cultivate staple cereals such as sorghum. The agro-ecological environment in East 
Wellega allows more variety, and farmers grow various crops, of which sesame is 
one. West Tigray farmers therefore may be seen as sesame specialists and are 
therefore more likely to be affected by the ECX and PTC. The second difference is 
 
the proximity to the ECX and PTCs. Although the villages in West Tigray are 
located in the remote north-west corner of Ethiopia, they all have a PTC and are 
relatively close (7 km to 50 km) to the main ECX warehouse in Humera. By 
contrast, villages in East Wellega are located 20km to 75 km from the main ECX 
warehouse in Nekemte and only 4 out of 12 villages have a PTC located in the 
village. The expectation is that the ECX and linked PTCs have a larger effect on 
farmers in West Tigray than in East Wellega. I use the same methodology as in 
chapter five, comparing different indicators for the two years using t-tests. 
 To check whether distance to the main ECX warehouse has an effect on 
trust perceptions, I run a regression model controlling for other factors. Because 
trust perceptions are ordinal (with values 1 to 5), I have used an ordered logit 
model, which is more suitable than an ordered probit model. Ordered logit and 
probit models have come into fairly wide use as a framework for analysing ordered 
responses (Greene & Hensher 2010). A farmer’s perception of traders is 
unobserved and represented by the latent variable Bi*. To model how Bi* varies 
with personal characteristics xi linear relationship is specified: Bi* = xi'β + εi (1) 
 If it is assumed that εi is NID(0,σ2), the above setting corresponds to an 
ordered logit model, where Bi* is a latent variable representing the ith individual's 
beliefs about traders, β is a vector of coefficients associated with selected 
explanatory variables, x is a matrix containing farmers’ information for the selected 
variables, and ε is the error term. Because survey design was clustered (villages were 
randomly selected after which individuals were selected within these clusters), there 
may be village common effects. The option “cluster” was therefore used in Stata, 
with village (kebele) as the subgroup indicator, to produce standard errors which 
are corrected both for heteroskedasticity and the grouped structure (Deaton 1997). 
4.4 data 
4.4.1 market outlets 
On average, farmers sold to fewer different marketing outlets in 2012, which is 
likely due to the fact they were required to sell at PTCs. They also changed the type 
of market outlets (table 7). In 2012, over half of farmers (55%) sold to PTCs. 
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Farmers could also sell directly to the ECX, but only if they were able to sell 50 
quintals or more. In East Wellega 1% of farmers sold directly to the ECX, while in 
West Tigray this number was just below 9%. As a result of the mandatory PTCs, 
the number of farmers selling to collectors halved in 2012 (from 47.3% to 26%), 
which is a significant and large difference. It is notable that collectors are still being 
used, despite the fact that this is officially no longer allowed. On average, farmers 
sell less often to a local nearby or faraway market, although local markets are still 
the main market outlet. In East Wellega, more farmers sell to local markets, which 
is probably due to the fact that often PTCs are missing in their villages. Farmers 
indicate that they sell more often to cooperatives and in East Wellega slightly more 
often through contract farming (usually with an exporter). Exporters may 
circumvent the ECX if they own a farm, which they often combine with buying 
from neighbouring farmers through contract farming. 
 Farmers were also asked about their preferred marketing outlets. The three 
right-hand columns in table 7 show that, again, there are major regional differences, 
but the primary transaction centres set up by the ECX are generally not favoured 
by farmers in either region. Instead, farmers in East Wellega prefer to sell at local 
markets, which increased in number in 2012, while farmers in Tigray prefer to sell 
to cooperatives, which also increased in number in 2012. 
Table 7: Market outlets used and preferred 
 
Market outlet used Preferred market outlet 
 2009 2012 
Diffe-
rence 2009 2012 Difference 
Primary Transaction Centre 
West Tigray   0.56 
 
   0.06   
East Wellega   0.53 
 
   0.11   
Collectors who visit farmers at home 
West Tigray 0.50 0.24 -0.26*** 0.05 0.02 -0.03*** 
East Wellega 0.42 0.28 -0.14*** 0.13 0.05 -0.08*** 
Local markets 
West Tigray 0.89 0.75 -0.14*** 0.39 0.31 -0.08*** 
East Wellega 0.77 0.87 0.10*** 0.23 0.46 0.23*** 
Faraway markets 
West Tigray 0.28 0.21 -0.07*** 0.19 0.09 -0.1*** 
East Wellega 0.12 0.04 -0.08*** 0.13 0.04 -0.09*** 
 
 
Market outlet used Preferred market outlet 
 2009 2012 
Diffe-
rence 2009 2012 Difference 
Cooperatives 
West Tigray 0.47 0.75 0.29*** 0.31 0.46 0.15*** 
East Wellega 0.07 0.20 0.13*** 0.43 0.27 -0.16*** 
Contract farming 
West Tigray 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03** 
East Wellega 0.17 0.23 0.06** 0.05 0.06 0.01 
Data shows share of farmers who answered yes 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
4.4.2 market information 
The ECX provides market information in various ways (David-Benz et al. 2011; 
Tadesse 2010). It publishes (high and low) daily market prices and amounts traded 
on the ECX for each grade and type of crop (coffee, maize, sesame, and white pea 
bean, for example) on its website. In addition, it has electronic billboards in 250 
markets, linked to the prices of ECX. It provides a radio bulletin three times a day 
and a television bulletin twice a day. It disseminates information through 
newspapers and newsletters and has an SMS and IVM service for mobile phones. 
 Although progress has been made in getting Ethiopia connected in terms of 
telecommunications, it still lags behind many African countries. Mobile 
telecommunications grew from only almost 5% of the population in 2008–2009 to 
a little over 20% in 2011–2012. Even fewer people have a fixed telephone line, and 
this declined from 1.09% in 2008–2009 to 0.96% in 2011–2012. In 2008–2009 
almost 0.1% of Ethiopia’s population had an internet subscription, which grew to 
0.26% in 2011–2012 (CSA 2012). Actual users are slightly higher: for 2012 it was 
calculated that almost 1.5% used the internet (ITU 2014). At the same time, 
although 85.2% of the urban population had access to electricity as of 2011, only 
4.8% of the rural population did (REEGLE 2014). While most traders own a 
mobile phone, hardly any farmers have one. 
 Table 8 shows that on average farmers rated limited access to market 
information less of a problem than in 2009, although the decrease is not large. On a 
scale from 1 to 5, market information was still seen as a medium problem with an 
average score of 3.1. There is a marked difference between East Wellega and West 
Tigray: in West Tigray, farmers feel that the lack of market information has become 
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Farmers could also sell directly to the ECX, but only if they were able to sell 50 
quintals or more. In East Wellega 1% of farmers sold directly to the ECX, while in 
West Tigray this number was just below 9%. As a result of the mandatory PTCs, 
the number of farmers selling to collectors halved in 2012 (from 47.3% to 26%), 
which is a significant and large difference. It is notable that collectors are still being 
used, despite the fact that this is officially no longer allowed. On average, farmers 
sell less often to a local nearby or faraway market, although local markets are still 
the main market outlet. In East Wellega, more farmers sell to local markets, which 
is probably due to the fact that often PTCs are missing in their villages. Farmers 
indicate that they sell more often to cooperatives and in East Wellega slightly more 
often through contract farming (usually with an exporter). Exporters may 
circumvent the ECX if they own a farm, which they often combine with buying 
from neighbouring farmers through contract farming. 
 Farmers were also asked about their preferred marketing outlets. The three 
right-hand columns in table 7 show that, again, there are major regional differences, 
but the primary transaction centres set up by the ECX are generally not favoured 
by farmers in either region. Instead, farmers in East Wellega prefer to sell at local 
markets, which increased in number in 2012, while farmers in Tigray prefer to sell 
to cooperatives, which also increased in number in 2012. 
Table 7: Market outlets used and preferred 
 
Market outlet used Preferred market outlet 
 2009 2012 
Diffe-
rence 2009 2012 Difference 
Primary Transaction Centre 
West Tigray   0.56 
 
   0.06   
East Wellega   0.53 
 
   0.11   
Collectors who visit farmers at home 
West Tigray 0.50 0.24 -0.26*** 0.05 0.02 -0.03*** 
East Wellega 0.42 0.28 -0.14*** 0.13 0.05 -0.08*** 
Local markets 
West Tigray 0.89 0.75 -0.14*** 0.39 0.31 -0.08*** 
East Wellega 0.77 0.87 0.10*** 0.23 0.46 0.23*** 
Faraway markets 
West Tigray 0.28 0.21 -0.07*** 0.19 0.09 -0.1*** 
East Wellega 0.12 0.04 -0.08*** 0.13 0.04 -0.09*** 
 
 
Market outlet used Preferred market outlet 
 2009 2012 
Diffe-
rence 2009 2012 Difference 
Cooperatives 
West Tigray 0.47 0.75 0.29*** 0.31 0.46 0.15*** 
East Wellega 0.07 0.20 0.13*** 0.43 0.27 -0.16*** 
Contract farming 
West Tigray 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.03** 
East Wellega 0.17 0.23 0.06** 0.05 0.06 0.01 
Data shows share of farmers who answered yes 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
4.4.2 market information 
The ECX provides market information in various ways (David-Benz et al. 2011; 
Tadesse 2010). It publishes (high and low) daily market prices and amounts traded 
on the ECX for each grade and type of crop (coffee, maize, sesame, and white pea 
bean, for example) on its website. In addition, it has electronic billboards in 250 
markets, linked to the prices of ECX. It provides a radio bulletin three times a day 
and a television bulletin twice a day. It disseminates information through 
newspapers and newsletters and has an SMS and IVM service for mobile phones. 
 Although progress has been made in getting Ethiopia connected in terms of 
telecommunications, it still lags behind many African countries. Mobile 
telecommunications grew from only almost 5% of the population in 2008–2009 to 
a little over 20% in 2011–2012. Even fewer people have a fixed telephone line, and 
this declined from 1.09% in 2008–2009 to 0.96% in 2011–2012. In 2008–2009 
almost 0.1% of Ethiopia’s population had an internet subscription, which grew to 
0.26% in 2011–2012 (CSA 2012). Actual users are slightly higher: for 2012 it was 
calculated that almost 1.5% used the internet (ITU 2014). At the same time, 
although 85.2% of the urban population had access to electricity as of 2011, only 
4.8% of the rural population did (REEGLE 2014). While most traders own a 
mobile phone, hardly any farmers have one. 
 Table 8 shows that on average farmers rated limited access to market 
information less of a problem than in 2009, although the decrease is not large. On a 
scale from 1 to 5, market information was still seen as a medium problem with an 
average score of 3.1. There is a marked difference between East Wellega and West 
Tigray: in West Tigray, farmers feel that the lack of market information has become 
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a larger problem, while in East Wellega farmers feel it has become a smaller 
problem, which is a counter-intuitive result, as the expectation was that market 
information would have improved more in West Tigray. 
Table 8: t-test results for marketing problems 
Woreda 2009 2012 Difference  
Limited access to market information 
All 3.45 3.15 -0.30 *** 
East Wellega 4.49 3.24 -1.26 *** 
West Tigray 2.78 3.05 0.28 *** 
Note: scores are 1 = very small problem to 5=very large problem 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 To understand this counter-intuitive result, I delve a bit deeper into market 
information sources and needs of farmers. Table 9 shows what sources of market 
information farmers consulted in 2012 and how they rate the trustworthiness of 
this information (from 1 to 5). 
Table 9: Source of market information per region (share of farmers who indicate they consult 
this source) and trustworthiness of information 
 Source of information Trustworthiness of information* 
  
East 
Wellega 
West 
Tigray All 
East 
Wellega 
West 
Tigray All 
Family & friends 0.70 0.69 0.69 3.5 3.8 3.6 
Neighbours 0.74 0.64 0.69 3.3 3.3 3.3 
Radio 0.65 0.39 0.52 3.4 3.1 3.2 
Local 
collector/trader 0.52 0.50 0.51 3.1 3.6 3.3 
Traders in the city 0.17 0.49 0.33 2.4 3.0 2.7 
Staff/board member 
of coop 0.24 0.25 0.25 2.4 3.0 2.7 
News papers 0.07 0.36 0.21 1.9 2.9 2.4 
ECX market info 0.06 0.31 0.18 1.8 2.8 2.3 
Local official & 
leaders 0.12 0.17 0.14 2.9 3.5 3.2 
Data shows share of farmers who said yes 
* 1 = not trustworthy; 5 = very trustworthy 
 
 Most farmers still rely on family, friends, and neighbours for their main 
source of information. They also rate the information from family and friends 
 
relatively highly. Interestingly, farmers in West Tigray rate the information received 
from local collectors and traders as fairly trustworthy as well (second highest score). 
The ECX does not score highly, despite its aim to be the go-to price information 
system. Farmers were also asked to rank the importance of information source. 
Family, friends, and neighbours were ranked highest, while the ECX was ranked 
lowest, also in West Tigray, where farmers rated the trustworthiness of ECX 
market information as relatively high. This means that market information from the 
ECX is not readily available or accessible. 
 Table 10 shows the different types of market information farmers search 
for. Again, there are various differences between the regions. 
Table 10: Types of market information searched for by farmers (share of farmers) 
 East Wellega 
West 
Tigray All 
Getting to know different buyers in 
market 0.72 0.46 0.59 
Quality standard  0.59 0.51 0.55 
Daily prices at farm gate  0.83 0.24 0.54 
Daily prices at market 0.51 0.31 0.41 
Decision to grow sesame 0.15 0.63 0.39 
Market trends 0.26 0.50 0.38 
Data shows share of farmers who said yes 
 
 In East Wellega, farmers are mostly interested in daily (farm-gate and 
market) prices, and getting to know different buyers in the market. By contrast, in 
West Tigray, farmers are less interested in prices and seek information that will help 
them decide whether and how much sesame to grow, which is in line with the fact 
that farmers in West Tigray specialise in sesame cultivation. 
 On average, information on quality standards rank second in table 10 (and 
higher than price information). The survey data also show that farmers feel they 
have better information on quality standards. In 2009, 78% of farmers in West 
Tigray indicated they had a lack of information on quality (in 2012 this was 51%). 
In East Wellega, the share of farmers declined from 80% to 41%. Not only do 
farmers state that they have better information on quality, they also indicate that 
traders’ behaviour has changed. Traders more often take into account quality when 
offering a price: in West Tigray, all farmers stated in 2012 that quality is taken into 
account (up from 60% in 2009) while 86% of farmers in East Wellega stated the 
same (up from 43%). Both results are significant in a t-test (at 1% significance 
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lowest, also in West Tigray, where farmers rated the trustworthiness of ECX 
market information as relatively high. This means that market information from the 
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 Table 10 shows the different types of market information farmers search 
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 In East Wellega, farmers are mostly interested in daily (farm-gate and 
market) prices, and getting to know different buyers in the market. By contrast, in 
West Tigray, farmers are less interested in prices and seek information that will help 
them decide whether and how much sesame to grow, which is in line with the fact 
that farmers in West Tigray specialise in sesame cultivation. 
 On average, information on quality standards rank second in table 10 (and 
higher than price information). The survey data also show that farmers feel they 
have better information on quality standards. In 2009, 78% of farmers in West 
Tigray indicated they had a lack of information on quality (in 2012 this was 51%). 
In East Wellega, the share of farmers declined from 80% to 41%. Not only do 
farmers state that they have better information on quality, they also indicate that 
traders’ behaviour has changed. Traders more often take into account quality when 
offering a price: in West Tigray, all farmers stated in 2012 that quality is taken into 
account (up from 60% in 2009) while 86% of farmers in East Wellega stated the 
same (up from 43%). Both results are significant in a t-test (at 1% significance 
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level). This suggests that market transparency with respect to quality standards has 
increased substantially, which is an important result, as lack of good quality sesame 
was seen as a major problem for many years (Mheen-Sluijer & Cecchi 2011; 
Gelalcha 2009; Wijnands et al. 2009). 
 With respect to quantity, transparency seems to have improved as well. 
Farmers indicate that traders more often take into account quantity when offering a 
price. In West Tigray, 99% of farmers indicated this was the case in 2012, up from 
a mere 1.1% in 2009. In East Wellega, the share of farmers stating this increased 
from 20% to 71%. both differences are significant at the 1% level when tested with 
a t-test. 
4.5 results 
The data section reveals that around half of the farmers sell their sesame to the 
PTCs, where quality standards and certified weighing equipment are enforced, 
although farmers feel that price information has not improved much. This section 
explores whether transaction costs, trust perceptions, and relational contracting 
have improved as well. 
4.5.1 transaction costs 
As expected, transaction costs have decreased significantly (Table 11). A notable 
difference is that the time it takes to discuss price, quality etc. with traders has 
almost halved. On average, the transaction costs have decreased with 23%, or 24 
minutes per transaction. One notable exception is that for farmers in West Tigray 
the time to meet a buyer has not decreased significantly; apparently the farmers in 
West Tigray were already well-connected to traders and markets. 
Table 11: t-test results for transaction costs (in minutes) 
 2009 2012 Difference  
Meeting the buyer 
All 60.10 51.03 -9.07 *** 
West Tigray 48.75 47.31 -1.45  
East Wellega 80.68 54.60 -26.08 *** 
 
 2009 2012 Difference  
Discussing price, quality etc. with trader 
All 16.05 8.70 -7.35 *** 
West Tigray 15.40 10.80 -4.60 *** 
East Wellega 17.21 6.67 -10.55 *** 
Inspecting sesame 
All 11.67 7.51 -4.16 *** 
West Tigray 12.30 9.65 -2.65 *** 
East Wellega 10.53 5.46 -5.07 *** 
Weighing 
All 8.77 6.70 -2.07 *** 
West Tigray 9.82 8.82 -1.00 * 
East Wellega 6.85 4.66 -2.20 *** 
Payment 
All 7.53 5.41 -2.12 *** 
West Tigray 8.72 6.47 -2.25 *** 
East Wellega 5.36 4.39 -0.98  
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
4.5.2 trust perceptions 
This chapter hypothesised that the ECX as an “honest broker” would increase 
farmers’ trust perceptions of traders. Table 12 seems to confirm this hypothesis. 
On average, the trust perceptions for the potentially different types of 
opportunistic behaviour (using faulty scales, not providing correct price or market 
information, colluding to keep prices down) have all improved. The largest 
improvement is in “honesty with scales”, signifying that the required used of 
certified scales by traders has had an effect. Trust perceptions have improved more 
in West Tigray than in East Wellega. 
Table 12: t-tests for average trust perceptions in 2009 and 2012 
 2009 2012 Difference  
Honesty with scales 
All 1.95 2.81 0.86 *** 
West Tigray 1.96 3.43 1.47 *** 
East Wellega 1.93 2.21 0.28 *** 
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farmers’ trust perceptions of traders. Table 12 seems to confirm this hypothesis. 
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opportunistic behaviour (using faulty scales, not providing correct price or market 
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improvement is in “honesty with scales”, signifying that the required used of 
certified scales by traders has had an effect. Trust perceptions have improved more 
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 2009 2012 Difference  
Price information 
All 1.86 2.54 0.68 *** 
West Tigray 1.99 3.03 1.04 *** 
East Wellega 1.63 2.06 0.43 *** 
Market information 
All 2.05 2.75 0.70 *** 
West Tigray 2.32 3.14 0.82 *** 
East Wellega 2.26 2.53 0.27 *** 
Buyers collusion 
All 2.30 2.83 0.53 *** 
West Tigray 2.21 2.99 0.78 *** 
East Wellega 1.74 2.52 0.78 *** 
Note: scores are 1 = very low trust to 5=very high trust 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 Figure 15 shows the distribution of trust perceptions: the most marked 
difference is that the proportion of farmers who have very negative perceptions 
(around score 1) has decreased most. 
Figure 15: Trust perceptions of farmers about traders’ opportunistic behaviour (averaged) 
 
Note: 0= not available; 1 = very low trust, 5 = very high trust. Averages were taken of scores on 
“honesty with scales”, “giving price information”, “buyers’ collusion” and “giving market 
information”. 
 
 An ordered logit was conducted to test whether other factors such as 
personal characteristics contribute to trust perceptions. The results in table 13 show 
 
that year is positively and significantly linked to higher trust perceptions. Distance 
from a PTC is significantly and negatively correlated with trust perceptions, as was 
also found in chapter three. With regard to personal characteristics, female farmers 
have a more positive outlook on traders’ behaviour, as do older traders. Marital 
status (compared to married) is correlated with different trust perceptions. It is not 
clear why this effect exists. 
Table 13: Ordered logit models for trust perceptions in 2012, controlling for personal 
characteristics (clustered by kebele) 
Variable Honesty with 
scales 
Giving price 
information 
Buyers 
collusion 
Giving 
market 
information 
Year 0.429 *** 0.422 *** 0.266 *** 0.367 *** (0.071)   (0.056)   (0.059)   (0.045)   
Distance 
from PTC 
-0.009 * -0.014 ** -0.006 * -0.009 * 
(0.005)  (0.006)  (0.003)  (0.005)  
Personal characteristics 
Gender 
(1=female) 
0.398 *** 0.444 *** 0.312 * 0.110   
(0.126)   (0.155)   (0.159)   (0.107)   
Age 0.013 ** 0.021 *** 0.013 *** 0.016 *** 
 (0.006)   (0.006)   (0.005)   (0.004)   Education 0.008   -0.002   0.028   0.003   
  (0.017)   (0.018)   (0.012)   (0.020)   
Marital status 
Divorced 0.004   0.225   0.446 *** 0.715 *** 
 (0.139)   (0.217)   (0.117)   (0.241)   Separated 0.351   -0.347   0.363   0.457   
 (0.798)   (0.431)   (0.450)   (0.391)   Single -0.658 ** -0.358   0.424   0.150   
 (0.264)   (0.279)   (0.209)   (0.254)   Widower 0.017   -0.018   0.043   0.079   
 (0.156)   (0.097)   (0.221)   (0.175)   /cut1 862.152   848.800   535.805   737.661   
 (141.685)   (112.917)   (118.935)   (91.269)   /cut2 862.864   849.942   536.676   738.453   
 (141.684)   (112.949)   (118.972)   (91.271)   /cut3 864.009   851.312   538.019   739.674   
 (141.808)   (113.068)   (119.075)   (91.274)   /cut4 865.000   852.456   539.367   740.955   
 (141.901)   (113.163)   (119.129)   (91.292)   
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
4.5.3 relational contracting 
Table 14 shows that there are some signs that relational contracting is increasing in 
West Tigray and East Wellega, albeit slightly, with the largest shift in West Tigray. 
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4.5.3 relational contracting 
Table 14 shows that there are some signs that relational contracting is increasing in 
West Tigray and East Wellega, albeit slightly, with the largest shift in West Tigray. 
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Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that only licenced traders may buy from 
farmers in the PTCs, reducing the number of traders, especially collectors who 
used to buy directly at the farm. This is indicated by the answer “there are always 
the same traders in the market”. However, farmers who sell to the same trader also 
indicate it is not only by necessity, but also because they trust particular traders, 
who offer them a good price, and with whom they have started a (long-term) 
relationship. Fewer farmers in West Tigray observe that traders are coming at 
different times, although not in East Wellega. More farmers feel that they have a 
choice in selecting which trader to sell to, and that it does matter which trader you 
sell to. For slightly more farmers, the price traders offer is the reason to sell to 
different farmers. 
Table 14: Reasons for selling to the same trader or different traders 
 2009 2012 Difference  
Farmers sell sesame to same trader or different (1=same 2=different) 
West Tigray 1.91 1.64 -0.27 *** 
East Wellega 1.93 1.89 -0.04 ** 
Reasons for selling to the same trader: 
Always the same traders in the market 
West Tigray 0.05 0.16 0.11 *** 
East Wellega 0.01 0.03 0.02 ** 
I trust the trader 
West Tigray 0.04 0.13 0.09 *** 
East Wellega 0.06 0.08 0.02  
Trader gives me a good price 
West Tigray 0.04 0.25 0.21 *** 
East Wellega 0.04 0.05 0.01  
I have a (long-term) relationship 
West Tigray 0.05 0.17 0.12 *** 
East Wellega 0.06 0.09 0.03  
Reasons for selling to different traders 
Traders come at different times 
West Tigray 0.78 0.52 -0.26 *** 
East Wellega 0.30 0.47 0.17 *** 
I sell to the one who offers me a good price 
West Tigray 0.93 0.94 0.01 *** 
East Wellega 0.88 0.94 0.06 ** 
It does not matter which trader you sell to 
West Tigray 0.66 0.23 -0.43 *** 
East Wellega 0.91 0.42 -0.49 *** 
Farmer has no choice which trader to sell to 
West Tigray 0.41 0.16 -0.26 *** 
East Wellega 0.36 0.08 -0.28 *** 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 As trust is important in extending and receiving credit, it is noteworthy that 
the survey also indicates that an increasing number of farmers received credit from 
traders. In 2012, 30% and 26% of farmers in West Tigray and East Wellega 
respectively had received credit, up from 8% and 5% of farmers in 2009. 
4.5.4 attribution 
 The results should be interpreted with some care, as there may be several 
attribution problems. Other factors may have influenced the results but are difficult 
to determine without a counterfactual at hand or a proper control group. A study 
by Minten et al. (2014) on structural transformation in cereal markets in Ethiopia 
may serve as a comparison. Cereal markets are not impacted by the ECX. Although 
officially maize and wheat may be traded on the ECX, the trade of these products 
has virtually stopped d; unlike coffee or sesame, the ECX has not been made 
mandatory. 
 Minten et al. (2014) find that the use of mobile phones by intermediaries 
(e.g. brokers) and traders has increased to almost 100%. Although telephone 
communications through fixed lines existed prior to the introduction of mobile 
phones, Minten et al. find that mobile phone technology has improved the ease of 
access to communications. This must have had an impact on the availability of 
market information. However, most farmers in Ethiopia, especially small farmers in 
remote rural areas, still lack telephones, fixed or mobile (CSA). This unequal 
distribution should lead to an increase in asymmetric problems, potentially 
increasing farmers’ negative perceptions of traders. Minten et al. report that farmers 
have better market information, presumably from primary transaction centres. 
 With respect to transport costs and time, they report that the Ethiopian 
government has embarked on a large road investment programme, and as a result 
all-weather surfaced roads are either in the process of being built or have already 
been built between the capitals of all regions. However, the rate of progress 
between 2009 and 2012 is not that significant. In an earlier paper Minten et al. 
(2012b) report on the time required to travel by truck between wholesale markets 
and Addis Ababa; although this has decreased in a decade from on average 10 to 8 
hours, between 2009 and 2011 it has remained stable. The number and capacity of 
trucks has increased, contributing to better transport of goods. More larger trucks 
(FSR; able to carry about 7–8 tonnes) compared to smaller ones (Isuzu; carrying 
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Part of the explanation may lie in the fact that only licenced traders may buy from 
farmers in the PTCs, reducing the number of traders, especially collectors who 
used to buy directly at the farm. This is indicated by the answer “there are always 
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choice in selecting which trader to sell to, and that it does matter which trader you 
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East Wellega 0.06 0.08 0.02  
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East Wellega 0.30 0.47 0.17 *** 
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Farmer has no choice which trader to sell to 
West Tigray 0.41 0.16 -0.26 *** 
East Wellega 0.36 0.08 -0.28 *** 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 As trust is important in extending and receiving credit, it is noteworthy that 
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market information. However, most farmers in Ethiopia, especially small farmers in 
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 With respect to transport costs and time, they report that the Ethiopian 
government has embarked on a large road investment programme, and as a result 
all-weather surfaced roads are either in the process of being built or have already 
been built between the capitals of all regions. However, the rate of progress 
between 2009 and 2012 is not that significant. In an earlier paper Minten et al. 
(2012b) report on the time required to travel by truck between wholesale markets 
and Addis Ababa; although this has decreased in a decade from on average 10 to 8 
hours, between 2009 and 2011 it has remained stable. The number and capacity of 
trucks has increased, contributing to better transport of goods. More larger trucks 
(FSR; able to carry about 7–8 tonnes) compared to smaller ones (Isuzu; carrying 
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about 5–6 tonnes) are being used. However, the difference between 2009 and 2012 
is not very large (approximately 5% more large trucks). 
 Minten et al. (2014) find there has been a marked improvement in market 
integration (i.e. the degree to which cereal prices move together across markets 
throughout Ethiopia) over the past decade: in the aggregate, 33% more markets 
were integrated in 2011 than in 2001. Even though this is a real improvement, it 
does not mean there has been a marked improvement between 2009 and 2012. In 
addition, Minten et al. (2012b) report that while spatial margins have on average 
declined over time between markets, these differences between markets still vary 
significantly. I conclude therefore that the change in market integration and price 
variability has not changed significantly enough between 2009 and 2012 to make a 
large difference to farmers. 
4.6 discussion and conclusions 
Chapter three argues that without reliable price information, which could function 
as a “yardstick” to assess traders’ trustworthiness, farmers will generally distrust 
traders. It was expected that if reliable price information was to be made available, 
and more generally, if market transparency would be improved, farmers’ trust 
perceptions of traders would improve. The results seem to contradict this 
expectation: farmers in West Tigray believe that price information has deteriorated, 
yet have significantly improved their perceptions of traders. The reverse is true in 
most of East Wellega, where farmers state that price information has improved, yet 
their perceptions of traders’ trustworthiness have not improved as much. 
 Delving a bit deeper into this apparent paradox, two things become clear. 
First, farmers in different locations seek different types of market information, and 
the market price is not always the most important. Farmers in West Tigray 
specialise in sesame and for them information that will help them decide how much 
sesame to cultivate is much more important. Second, most farmers do not use the 
information provided by the ECX (through PTCs). Nor do they rate the reliability 
of the information very highly either. This may be due to the fact that the ECX 
relies heavily on mobile phones and internet, which most farmers lack. It does 
convey market information at main ECX sites, such as Humera and Nekemte, but 
this is not very convenient for farmers. The market information system of the ECX 
 
may therefore not yet function as a “yardstick” that farmers can use to assess the 
trustworthiness of traders. 
 However, market information is only one, albeit an important, element of 
market transparency. The results show that market transparency also increased in 
terms of quality grades and weighing equipment, more in West Tigray than in East 
Wellega, as expected. This seems to have led to lower transaction costs: farmers 
indicate that they spent less time discussing the price and quality of sesame, and 
less time inspecting and weighing. Therefore, farmers are not necessarily using 
price information as a “yardstick” to assess traders, but instead may be using the 
increased market transparency as a yardstick, and as a result have improved their 
trust perceptions of traders.  
 There may be a second effect of market transparency, also hypothesised in 
chapter three, that it makes traders behave less opportunistic (though we should be 
careful in putting too much weight on “opportunistic”). It may be that traders did 
not take into account quality grades and used weighing equipment because they 
themselves did not know, or lacked the proper facilities. This corresponds with 
findings by Cecchi and Melesse (2014) on formal and informal (customary) dispute 
resolution institutions in Ethiopia. Although few participants use the formal 
dispute resolution institution, the fact that participants have this option already 
shifts pre-existing norms linked to customary dispute resolution institutions (see 
also Aldashev et al. 2012b; Aldashev et al. 2012a). 
 A surprising result therefore is that although the PTCs seem to provide 
benefits in terms of market transparency and decreased transaction costs, farmers 
indicate that the PTCs are their least favoured market outlet. The survey results 
offer no clues why this is the case, nor did informal discussions clarify this. The 
mandatory character of the PTCs, as well as the fact that they are government run, 
may be part of the reason. Past experiences, especially under the Derg regime, have 
tarnished farmers’ confidence in government-run organisations such as 
cooperatives (see for instance Francesconi & Heerink 2011; Rahmato 2002; 
Spielman et al. 2009). This is clearly an area for further research. 
 Increased market transparency combined with improvements in traders’ 
behaviour seem to have changed relations between farmers and traders. Slightly 
more farmers indicate that they are establishing (long-term) trust relationships with 
traders, and many more farmers are obtaining credit from traders. 
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themselves did not know, or lacked the proper facilities. This corresponds with 
findings by Cecchi and Melesse (2014) on formal and informal (customary) dispute 
resolution institutions in Ethiopia. Although few participants use the formal 
dispute resolution institution, the fact that participants have this option already 
shifts pre-existing norms linked to customary dispute resolution institutions (see 
also Aldashev et al. 2012b; Aldashev et al. 2012a). 
 A surprising result therefore is that although the PTCs seem to provide 
benefits in terms of market transparency and decreased transaction costs, farmers 
indicate that the PTCs are their least favoured market outlet. The survey results 
offer no clues why this is the case, nor did informal discussions clarify this. The 
mandatory character of the PTCs, as well as the fact that they are government run, 
may be part of the reason. Past experiences, especially under the Derg regime, have 
tarnished farmers’ confidence in government-run organisations such as 
cooperatives (see for instance Francesconi & Heerink 2011; Rahmato 2002; 
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 Increased market transparency combined with improvements in traders’ 
behaviour seem to have changed relations between farmers and traders. Slightly 
more farmers indicate that they are establishing (long-term) trust relationships with 
traders, and many more farmers are obtaining credit from traders. 
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abstract 
We explore whether the creation of the ECX and its formal monitoring and 
enforcement institutions has affected the role of social capital and trust in the 
Ethiopian segment of the sesame value chain. Consistent with a simple theoretical 
marketing model, the panel data suggest that this is indeed the case. Trade in 
sesame is increasingly governed by formal rather than informal institutions, and in 
response traders appear to have broadened their trading network, relying more 
frequently on traders with whom they do not have social relations, and they have 
reduced the provision of credit that cements personalised relationships. They also 
have lower levels of trust in the intentions and capabilities of their trading partners, 
and attach less weight to trust. Policy-makers should therefore be aware that 
expanding formal institutions may invite the erosion of norms and informal rules in 
the same or adjacent domains of human interaction (possibly with ambiguous 
welfare implications). 
 
 
keywords: Market integration, trust, informal exchange 
 
 
  
 
5.1 introduction 
The quality of institutions, broadly defined, is widely regarded as a key determinant 
of economic performance. There is little consensus about which specific 
dimensions of the institutional framework matter most for development, and even 
less about the mechanisms driving institutional change over time (but see Kingston 
& Caballero 2009). The institutional framework is broad, encompassing formal and 
informal institutions. The distinction between formal and informal institutions is 
akin to the distinction between the formal and informal economy (e.g., Hart 1973), 
which ultimately revolves around whether or not economic activities are beyond 
the purview of the state (Habib-Mintz 2009 for a discussion of the evolution of 
thinking about informality). In the words of Roberts (1994, p. 8): “all markets are 
regulated ... the issue is the balance between formal regulation based, ultimately, on 
the state, and informal regulation based on personal relations such as those of 
kinship, friendship or co-ethnicity”. As explained in chapter one, formal 
institutions are centrally designed and enforced, and informal ones are subject to 
self-governance by economic agents (Dixit 2004; Williamson 2009). Thus defined, 
formal and informal institutions co-exist in all economies. It is increasingly 
recognised that the nature of the interaction between formal and informal 
institutions matters for economic outcomes (e.g. Boettke et al. 2008; Williamson 
2009). Formal and informal institutions may provide substitute mechanisms to 
govern (economic) transactions. If so, an exogenous expansion of the realm of 
formal institutions may have implications for informal arrangements, and the type 
of game-theoretic equilibria that can be sustained. Caselli (1997) and Dixit (2004) 
have demonstrated that this may have unforeseen welfare consequences. 
 Commodity exchanges are one particular “type” of formal institution that 
has gained prominence in African policy circles. While African agricultural markets 
have become increasingly liberalised, resulting in greater private investment and 
increased levels of regional trade and market integration (Mason et al. 2011; Smale 
et al. 2011), price volatility of food staples remains high and traditional forms of 
exchange still involve relatively high transaction costs (Sitko & Jayne 2012). Such 
marketing challenges may be tackled via commodity exchanges – platforms that 
bring together buyers and suppliers. According to Gabre-Madhin and Goggin 
(2005), commodity exchanges stimulate market transparency and price discovery, 
and attenuate collusion, (speculative) bubbles, and price volatility. They may also 
lower transaction costs by increasing the range of trading partners, by providing 
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monitoring and enforcement of standards and contracts, and by tackling conflicts 
via arbitration services (Sitko & Jayne 2012). In light of these expected benefits, it is 
no surprise that donors and national governments are promoting and facilitating 
the emergence of commodity exchanges across the African continent (albeit with 
mixed results, see Sitko & Jayne 2012). 
 In this chapter, we examine the effects of the emergence of a commodity 
exchange on informal marketing institutions.27 Specifically, we explore how the 
ECX affected the structure of the sesame supply chain within Ethiopia, and probe 
the consequences for transaction patterns and trust within this chain. Broadly 
speaking, we analyse how the emergence of a formal trading structure affects 
various measures of structural and cognitive social capital within the sesame trade 
sector (key components of informal institutions governing the domestic trade in 
sesame). To guide the analysis, we present a theoretical model proposed by Ahlerup 
et al. (2009), which arrives at the testable hypothesis that social capital and formal 
institutions are substitutes to guide economic behaviour. Earlier studies of social 
capital in Africa confirm the important economic role of social capital in early 
stages of development, supporting the view that social capital matters most when 
formal institutions are weak (e.g. Narayan & Pritchett 1999; Bigsten et al. 2000; 
Fafchamps & Minten 2002; Stiglitz 2001; see also chapter one). In the empirical 
analysis we ask whether the expansion of a formal institution – the creation of the 
ECX – has substituted for informal institutions. 
 This chapter is organised as follows. In section 5.2 we provide background 
information about the main differences of the “before and after” situation of the 
ECX. In section 5.3 we sketch a simple model highlighting the effect of formal on 
informal marketing institutions, and derive several testable hypotheses. Most 
importantly, since formal and informal institutions provide substitute mechanisms 
to govern the flow of sesame from producer to exporter, the model predicts that 
the ECX will substitute for social capital in the trading sector. In section 5.4 we 
introduce the data and discuss the methodology. We use a simple identification 
strategy, based on a comparison of pre- and post-ECX characteristics combined 
with differences in exposure to the ECX for different types of traders. Results are 
provided in section 5.5, supporting the view that the creation of the ECX and its 
27 Informal institutions may, of course, also have an effect on formal institutions; informal 
institutions may affect the way the formal rules linked to the Ethiopian Commodity 
Exchange are applied. However, this is not the focus of this chapter. 
 
                                                        
monitoring and enforcement apparatus has reduced the role of social capital in the 
sesame value chain – consistent with the idea of formal institutions substituting 
informal ones. Section 5.6 presents the robustness analysis and section 5.7 presents 
conclusions. 
5.2 sesame trade before and after the ecx 
Chapter two provides detailed background information on the ECX. In this 
section, we review the main differences of the “before and after the ECX” situation 
in the sesame trade, which is used in this paper. Before the ECX was created, 
farmers would typically sell to (visiting) traders. These traders “bulked” sesame into 
larger quantities for selling at larger regional wholesale markets, in Addis Ababa, or 
directly to exporters. Large farmers could also sell to cooperatives or exporters. In 
2010, after the government of Ethiopia decreed that “any person involved in 
sesame transactions shall effect sesame transaction only at primary transaction 
centres (PTCs) and the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange” (Government of 
Ethiopia 2010), buying or selling sesame directly from farmers became illegal. 
Farmers must now sell at a PTC and traders must buy at a PTC. A PTC is a fenced 
location with certified scales, a market information board, and local inspectors 
certifying goods traded at the PTC. 
 In the ECX contracts for sesame, quality is measured by foreign matter 
(impurities) colour contrast. In pre-ECX days, prices were mainly based on 
quantity, and farmers and traders blended different seed types. This decreased the 
overall quality and value of the seeds. The ECX was supposed to improve sesame 
quality by grading at warehouses, but various observers have noted that the actual 
quality of sesame may bear little resemblance to grades accorded by the ECX 
(Coulter 2012; Van den Broek 2012). There are rumours that traders can bribe 
grading officials to upgrade their produce, so that low-grade sesame is delivered to 
traders who paid for a higher grade. 
 The very short supply season (November to January) invites the 
involvement of various agents in sesame marketing. Broadly speaking, two 
categories of sesame trader exist in Ethiopia: (i) those who buy and sell on their 
own account (wholesalers, assemblers, suppliers, and exporters) and (ii) those who 
perform an intermediary function and are contracted by the first category of traders 
(selling or buying agents and brokers). Buying and selling agents differ from 
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brokers because their remuneration depends on price margins; they may run a price 
risk. With the establishment of the ECX, brokers were obliged to be officially 
registered with the ECX, which greatly reduced their numbers. 
 For this study, we interviewed buying and selling traders and have not 
included intermediaries. More specifically, in what follows we distinguish between 
exporters and other traders (wholesalers, assemblers, and suppliers). The reason for 
this distinction is that exporters trade fully within the ECX system – buying sesame 
deposited at an ECX warehouse and selling to foreign importers (see figure 16, 
which also illustrates the sesame trade before the introduction of the ECX). In 
contrast, other traders have one foot in the ECX system and the other one in the 
traditional system. That is, they trade with ECX warehouses, but may also buy from 
other traders (and sometimes farmers) or sell to other traders. Such transactions are 
arguably still governed by informal institutions, hence we speculate that “other 
traders” are less affected by the formal institutions of the ECX than exporters. We 
return to this issue in section 5.4. 
Figure 16: Stylised representation of the before–after establishment of the ECX 
 
5.3 a theoretical model 
In this section, we sketch a simple model that shows the interaction between social 
capital (and trust) and formal institutions in the process of value generation within 
the (sesame) value chain. This model is based on Ahlerup et al. (2009), but rather 
than analysing how an exogenous change in the level of social capital affects 
economic performance (and specifically how this impact is mediated by the quality 
of formal institutions – as in Ahlerup et al. 2009), we seek to examine the impact of 
a shock in terms of the quality of formal institutions, such as the sudden provision 
 
of arbitrage, monitoring, and enforcement services via the ECX. We use the term 
shock in this case because the ECX became mandatory overnight in September 
2010, when the Ethiopian government mandated that all sesame destined for 
export be traded across the exchange floor. 
 We closely follow the model of Ahlerup et al. (2009), using the same 
sequential, principal agent supply game with a representative supplier (S) and 
demander (D), and an outside agency that may be accessed for arbitrage services 
(A). The model is simple in that we ignore outside options beyond the trade 
opportunity analysed in the game, and reputation effects or other dynamic effects 
do not play a role. The stages of the game are depicted in figure 17. 
Figure 17: The extensive form of the principal agent supply game 
 
 
 In the demand stage, the demander decides whether or not to purchase a 
certain quantity, valued at k, of the commodity (sesame) that is traded. If the 
demander chooses not to purchase the sesame the game ends, and payoffs for both 
parties equal zero: 
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u D = u S = 0. In case the demander decides to purchase the sesame valued at k, 
the game enters the delivery stage. 
 In the delivery stage, the supplier decides whether to offer the specified 
quantity and quality of sesame, or to renege and offer an inferior package. In the 
former case, payoffs are defined as follows: u D = πD + s D and u S = πS + s S. In 
these expressions, πi denotes the standard gains from trade for agent i and si 
denotes a non-monetary social benefit associated with being an honest trader 
(where i = S,D). This is a social reward, or moral satisfaction stemming from 
generalised trust and trustworthiness, and is associated with the level of social 
capital (see below). We may think of si not as an innate characteristic of traders, but 
as a payoff that is specific to pairs of traders, conditional on prior experiences (i.e. 
as a function of past “investments”). That is, within a round of the game, si may be 
treated as a parameter, but across rounds these social rewards may change, 
becoming more or less important (something we do not model explicitly here, but 
discuss below). Obviously, si, πi > 0. The socially optimal outcome of honest trade 
does not eventuate, however, when the supplier reneges. In that case the game 
enters the arbitrage stage. 
 In the arbitrage stage, the demander decides whether to take the supplier to 
an arbitrage agency to enforce the initial contract, or not. If the demander accepts 
the inferior package without accessing arbitrage, the payoffs are defined as follows: u D = – k + s D and u S = πD + πS. In words, if the demander accepts the package 
he foregoes the full value of the sesame. Hence, without loss, we assume here the 
value of the inferior package that was offered equals zero; the analysis is easily 
augmented to capture the case where the value of the inferior package equals αk, so 
that the loss for the demander is only (1-α)k. The demander retains the social 
reward from being an honest trader. The supplier in this case captures the full 
benefit from the trade, but of course does not enjoy the non-monetary social 
reward (sS = 0). In contrast, when the demander decides to seek arbitrage, the 
game enters the ruling stage. 
 In the ruling stage, the arbitrage agency rules in favour of the demander, or 
not. The exogenous probability of enforcing the contract, or a measure of the 
quality of formal institutions in what follows, is given by β. In case the agency 
supports the demander, and enforces the initial contract, the payoffs are defined as u D = πD + s D and u S = πS – d. In words, the demander is fully compensated, and 
in addition enjoys the social reward. The supplier enjoys the regular benefit from 
 
trade, but has to pay a fine d, which is the cost of running the arbitrage case. With 
probability (1-β) the arbitrage agency does not rule in favour of the demander, in 
which case the demander pays the fee so that payoffs are defined as: u D = – k – d 
+ sS and u S = πD + πS. 
 With these payoffs, the optimal strategies for the agents are readily derived. 
The sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the game, and associated best response 
strategies, are described as follows. 
 In the demand stage, the demander should demand if any of the following 
three conditions is satisfied: (1) L = s D + β(πD + k + d) – k – d ≥ 0, (2) s D – k ≥ 0, or (3) producer will be honest. If none of these conditions is satisfied, the 
demander should not purchase any sesame. Note that high levels of social capital, 
represented by large realisations of s D, are conducive to trade. The same is true for 
the quality of formal institutions, β, or the probability that deviations from honest 
behaviour will be punished by the arbitrage agency down the line – s D and β are 
substitute mechanisms to increase the probability of engaging in trade. 
 In the delivery stage, the producer should be honest if F = s S + β(πD + d) - πD ≥ 0. Otherwise he should renege and offer the inferior package. Social capital, 
here entering via the term s S, again is conducive to honest trade, and so is the 
formal institutions parameter β. Social capital and formal institutions are substitute 
mechanisms to discipline potentially cheating suppliers. 
 In the arbitrage stage, the demander should not seek arbitrage services if 
both s D – k ≥ 0 and β(πD + k + d) – d ≤ 0. Else he should seek arbitrage. 
 We can use this model to probe the consequences of an exogenous shock in 
the quality of institutions (β), such as due to the new arbitrage and enforcement 
services made available by the ECX. Examining the optimal responses in the 
demand and delivery stage, it is obvious that raising β increases the probability of 
honest trading behaviour: ∂L/∂β > 0 and ∂F/∂β > 0. The probability that 
improving enforcement arbitrage “tilts” the balance such that the equilibrium 
outcome of the game switches from no trade (or reneging) to honest trade is 
decreasing in the level of social capital. By design, formal institutions and social 
capital provide substitute mechanisms to foster honest behaviour. For sufficiently 
large values of social capital, relative to monetary payoff parameters k, d and πD, 
improving the quality of formal institutions does not matter (i.e. both L>0 and 
F>0, even for really low values of β). 
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  If formal institutions are poor or absent (i.e., β≈0), trade will not occur 
unless social capital levels are sufficiently high. In the formal institutional vacuum 
of the pre-ECX era, trade beyond the “flea-market” or cash-and-carry types of 
exchange could only occur in the presence of trustworthiness and social rewards 
(si). Maintaining trust and trustworthiness requires investment in social relations, as 
was documented for the case of Ethiopian sesame trading by Cecchi and Bulte 
(2013). It also poses natural limits on the expansion of trade levels and trade will 
only occur within a small circle of trustworthiness (see Tabellini (2008) for a formal 
treatment of “distance” as a factor explaining trustworthy behaviour). However, the 
availability of formal arbitrage conditions (β>0) alters the rules of the game, 
enabling the transition from personalised to anonymous exchange within a broad 
set of (potential) “strangers”. 
 This has two types of implications for the role of social capital in governing 
exchange, and on the equilibrium level of social capital in the value chain. First, 
formal institutions enable transacting between traders that heretofore would never 
engage in trade (because of low levels of trust and associated social rewards), so 
new trading pairs with low levels of si enter the market. Second, and somewhat 
beyond the simple model sketched above, the availability of formal enforcement 
reduces the importance of social capital, potentially rendering on-going investments 
in social capital redundant. If so, social capital erodes or si falls, even among pre-
existing trading pairs. A new equilibrium emerges characterised by more trading 
pairs but, on average, lower levels of social capital between interacting parties. 
Formal institutions will gradually substitute for informal ones.28 
 In what follows, we try to test this hypothesis using various proxies of social 
capital among sesame traders in Ethiopia, collected before and after the 
introduction of the ECX. 
28 The model presented here explains how social capital and formal institutions are 
substitutes in promoting honest trade. This is an artefact of the way the model has been 
developed – more complex specifications of the model can be envisaged, including ones 
where formal enforcement and social capital may be complements. For example, one may 
develop a model where socially-based exchanges serve as the basis for formally-based 
exchanges, or where the quality of formal enforcement depends on its mapping on existing 
informal institutions (as in Williamson, 2009). In the latter case, formal enforcement β 
enters as a function β(s), with β`(s)>0. 
 
                                                        
5.4 data and methodology 
5.4.1 data 
We collected data during interviews with sesame traders in 2010 and 2012 – just 
before and after the introduction of the ECX. There are inherent (practical) 
difficulties in interviewing traders in developing countries (e.g. Barrett 1988; Scott 
1995). Traders are often mobile, and may be reluctant to disclose information 
about their turnover and profits. Moreover, a complete list of traders (the sampling 
frame) usually is not available – and it was not available for the population of 
Ethiopian sesame traders. Hence we could not select a random subsample of 
traders for the interviews. Instead, we visited 41 markets in 5 sesame producing 
regions (Gonder, Humera, Metema, Nekemte, and Addis Ababa), and tried to 
interview all traders present. To avoid selection bias (e.g. certain traders are only 
present at certain times of the day) we tried to visit most markets at different times 
of the day (morning, afternoon, and evening). Overall, 70% of the traders 
participated in the survey. An overview, broken down by type, of the participating 
traders is provided in the top panel of table 15. We also report information on the 
subsample of traders for which we have been able to collect data during both 
rounds of interviewing (the “panel subsample”). 
 Total participation in the first (second) survey amounted to 194 (196) 
traders, and the panel subsample amounts to 105 traders. We believe this 
constitutes a representative sample of traders in Ethiopia's sesame markets. While 
the total number of sesame traders is unknown (there is no trading license 
specifically for sesame), we know there are around 80 sesame exporters in Ethiopia. 
No less than 45 of them are contained in the sample. Moreover, the sum of 
Ethiopian sesame production for 2010 and 2012 was about 450,000 tonnes. 
Aggregating across individuals and survey years, the traders in the sample traded 
almost 300,000 tonnes. This amount almost certainly includes some double-
counting (as the same quantity of sesame may be sold more than once along the 
value chain), so we cannot conclude that the sample covers 70% of total 
production. But these statistics do suggest that we cover a sizeable share of total 
sesame production (even if the size of the trader sample is small, also see Loveridge 
(1995)). 
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Table 15: Characteristics of traders in the 2010 and 2012 surveys and in panel data  
 All traders Traders in panel 
 2010 2012  
(2010 and 2012) 
Type of trader  n % n %  n % 
Exporter 75 38.7 45 23.0  30 28.6 
Wholesaler 71 36.6 80 40.8  51 48.6 
Supplier 14 7.2 7 3.6  6 5.7 
Assembler 18 9.3 52 26.5  14 13.3 
Other type of trader 16 8.2 13 6.6  4 3.8 
Demographic variables 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Age of traders (in years) 40.63 
(8.81) 
39.07 
(7.75) 
39.73 
(8.46) 
40.11 
(8.46) 
Female traders 
(proportion) 0.088 0.038 0.052 0.038 
Education (proportion) 
- Illiterate 
- Primary/secondary 
school 
- Third grade 
 
0.31 
0.37 
0.33 
 
0.12 
0.41 
0.47 
 
0.20 
0.35 
0.45 
 
0.20 
0.35 
0.45 
Age of firm 10.37 
(8.60) 
7.476 
(4.91) 
7.64 
(4.77) 
9.34 
(6.54) 
Sesame trade-related variables 
Quantity purchased 1808.74 
(3070.58) 
2474.16 
(14837.13) 
1889.84 
(3912.55) 
3213.29 
(19463.97) 
Purchase price  1541.81 
(277.24) 
1700.93 
(196.98) 
1568.31 
(334.96) 
1692.69 
(229.30) 
Quantity sold 1652.78 
(1760.22) 
1381.62 
(2232.39) 
1511.32 
(1839.51) 
1552.86 
(2376.83) 
Selling price 1614.12 
(304.77) 
1896.61 
(273.68) 
1587.84 
(302.59) 
1885.60 
(295.47) 
2010 survey: N=194; 2012 survey: N=196; Panel data: N=105 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 In terms of demographics, the population of traders has not changed much 
(table 15). A small share of the traders in the sample is female (around 4%), and 
this percentage has decreased somewhat. Traders in the 2012 survey are on average 
two years younger than those in the 2010 survey (39 and 41 years, respectively, p-
value = 0.008). There are fewer illiterate traders and more traders with a third grade 
education (after secondary school). The average time the trader has been in 
business (age of firm) is around three years shorter than in 2010. These shifts seem 
to indicate that the ECX has made the sesame business more demanding, leading 
to a small exit of illiterate, female and older traders. We have also included some 
variables about involvement in the sesame trade, which show that traders tended to 
 
purchase more in 2012 than in 2010. The amount sold is similar or even a little less, 
indicating that traders had not sold everything at the time of the second interview. 
Prices were higher, but this largely captures inflation. 
 As is evident from table 15, the composition of the trader population has 
changed considerably. For example, in 2012, there were fewer exporters and more 
assemblers, reflecting (financial) requirements implied by ECX membership and a 
trend towards larger volumes. Most of the interviewed traders say they use the 
ECX through members, especially the wholesalers and assemblers. Hence, they do 
not sell directly on the ECX, but sell to other traders who are full or limited 
members. While most exporters have full or limited ECX membership, the picture 
for suppliers is mixed. 
5.4.2 methodology 
defining social capital 
We are interested in exploring whether the creation of the ECX has affected the 
role of social capital in the sesame value chain. Social capital is a multi-faceted 
concept, and we measure it by several indicators or proxies. For example, following 
Fafchamps and Minten (2002) we seek to capture measures of the size and strength 
of a trader’s network. First, following Fafchamps and Minten (2002), we consider 
the number of trading contacts and regular customers. If formal regulation reduces 
the risk of malfeasance, replacing trust and personal connections, then we would 
expect the number of trading contacts to expand as traders can now engage with a 
broader set of partners. Second, we asked whether and how much trade credit 
traders provide to their clients. Providing trade credit to other traders requires 
social capital, and can be used to create personalised relationships (Fisman & Raturi 
2004; Giannetti et al. 2011; Hermes et al. 2012). If less credit is extended in the 
sesame value chain, this might indicate an erosion of social capital. Third, we 
measure the use of intermediaries such as selling and buying agents. Such 
intermediaries can substitute for social capital (Gabre-Madhin 2001; Quattri et al. 
2012), so an increase in the use of intermediaries may signal a reduction in social 
capital. In addition, we look at the ‘nature’ of the social relationship of traders with 
intermediaries. Fourth and finally, we measured trust perceptions of traders. 
Specifically, we measured their assessment of the trustworthiness of their partners 
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Table 15: Characteristics of traders in the 2010 and 2012 surveys and in panel data  
 All traders Traders in panel 
 2010 2012  
(2010 and 2012) 
Type of trader  n % n %  n % 
Exporter 75 38.7 45 23.0  30 28.6 
Wholesaler 71 36.6 80 40.8  51 48.6 
Supplier 14 7.2 7 3.6  6 5.7 
Assembler 18 9.3 52 26.5  14 13.3 
Other type of trader 16 8.2 13 6.6  4 3.8 
Demographic variables 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Age of traders (in years) 40.63 
(8.81) 
39.07 
(7.75) 
39.73 
(8.46) 
40.11 
(8.46) 
Female traders 
(proportion) 0.088 0.038 0.052 0.038 
Education (proportion) 
- Illiterate 
- Primary/secondary 
school 
- Third grade 
 
0.31 
0.37 
0.33 
 
0.12 
0.41 
0.47 
 
0.20 
0.35 
0.45 
 
0.20 
0.35 
0.45 
Age of firm 10.37 
(8.60) 
7.476 
(4.91) 
7.64 
(4.77) 
9.34 
(6.54) 
Sesame trade-related variables 
Quantity purchased 1808.74 
(3070.58) 
2474.16 
(14837.13) 
1889.84 
(3912.55) 
3213.29 
(19463.97) 
Purchase price  1541.81 
(277.24) 
1700.93 
(196.98) 
1568.31 
(334.96) 
1692.69 
(229.30) 
Quantity sold 1652.78 
(1760.22) 
1381.62 
(2232.39) 
1511.32 
(1839.51) 
1552.86 
(2376.83) 
Selling price 1614.12 
(304.77) 
1896.61 
(273.68) 
1587.84 
(302.59) 
1885.60 
(295.47) 
2010 survey: N=194; 2012 survey: N=196; Panel data: N=105 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 In terms of demographics, the population of traders has not changed much 
(table 15). A small share of the traders in the sample is female (around 4%), and 
this percentage has decreased somewhat. Traders in the 2012 survey are on average 
two years younger than those in the 2010 survey (39 and 41 years, respectively, p-
value = 0.008). There are fewer illiterate traders and more traders with a third grade 
education (after secondary school). The average time the trader has been in 
business (age of firm) is around three years shorter than in 2010. These shifts seem 
to indicate that the ECX has made the sesame business more demanding, leading 
to a small exit of illiterate, female and older traders. We have also included some 
variables about involvement in the sesame trade, which show that traders tended to 
 
purchase more in 2012 than in 2010. The amount sold is similar or even a little less, 
indicating that traders had not sold everything at the time of the second interview. 
Prices were higher, but this largely captures inflation. 
 As is evident from table 15, the composition of the trader population has 
changed considerably. For example, in 2012, there were fewer exporters and more 
assemblers, reflecting (financial) requirements implied by ECX membership and a 
trend towards larger volumes. Most of the interviewed traders say they use the 
ECX through members, especially the wholesalers and assemblers. Hence, they do 
not sell directly on the ECX, but sell to other traders who are full or limited 
members. While most exporters have full or limited ECX membership, the picture 
for suppliers is mixed. 
5.4.2 methodology 
defining social capital 
We are interested in exploring whether the creation of the ECX has affected the 
role of social capital in the sesame value chain. Social capital is a multi-faceted 
concept, and we measure it by several indicators or proxies. For example, following 
Fafchamps and Minten (2002) we seek to capture measures of the size and strength 
of a trader’s network. First, following Fafchamps and Minten (2002), we consider 
the number of trading contacts and regular customers. If formal regulation reduces 
the risk of malfeasance, replacing trust and personal connections, then we would 
expect the number of trading contacts to expand as traders can now engage with a 
broader set of partners. Second, we asked whether and how much trade credit 
traders provide to their clients. Providing trade credit to other traders requires 
social capital, and can be used to create personalised relationships (Fisman & Raturi 
2004; Giannetti et al. 2011; Hermes et al. 2012). If less credit is extended in the 
sesame value chain, this might indicate an erosion of social capital. Third, we 
measure the use of intermediaries such as selling and buying agents. Such 
intermediaries can substitute for social capital (Gabre-Madhin 2001; Quattri et al. 
2012), so an increase in the use of intermediaries may signal a reduction in social 
capital. In addition, we look at the ‘nature’ of the social relationship of traders with 
intermediaries. Fourth and finally, we measured trust perceptions of traders. 
Specifically, we measured their assessment of the trustworthiness of their partners 
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(i.e. goodwill trust) and their appraisal of the ability of their partners (Das & Teng 
2004; Williamson 1993). 
 
causal effects and attribution 
Our main objective is to explore how the ECX has affected the role of social 
capital in the sesame value chain. Identification of such effects is complicated by 
the fact that the ECX affects all trading parties in Ethiopia – all sesame exports are 
traded via the ECX, and the impact of the ECX (for example via the dissemination 
of price information) affects all trading parties to some extent. In other words: a 
proper control group does not exist for the ECX treatment, and a simple 
difference-in-difference approach to gauging the impact of the ECX is not feasible. 
 We therefore have to resort to an identification strategy that is decidedly 
second-best. We first compare “before” and “after” social capital measures for 
various subsamples of traders, and attribute differences over time to the creation of 
the ECX. This is clearly a strong assumption as other factors may have intervened 
– affecting social capital levels. We therefore emphasise that the empirical results 
should be interpreted with care. 
 To attenuate concerns about attribution we argue the following. First, the 
time lag between the two survey rounds was relatively short (two years), so the 
scope for other factors to intervene was limited. Second, we focus the presentation 
on panel data, which implies we automatically control for time-invariant factors. 
Third, we seek to exploit variation in the degree to which traders are actually 
governed by the ECX. As mentioned, while all transactions of exporters are 
governed by the ECX monitoring and enforcement system, the other traders in the 
system (assemblers, wholesalers, and suppliers) have one foot in the realm of the 
ECX and the other in the domain of informal institutions and social capital – 
conducting trades beyond the scope of the ECX enforcement and arbitrage 
services. By assessing differences in the evolution of social capital for the two types 
of traders, we are hopefully able to learn something about the causal effect of the 
ECX on social capital. Since all other macro factors (e.g. changes in policies and 
prices) are the same for the two types of traders, any differences in the evolution of 
social capital cannot be attributed to these. Instead, we argue, it is more likely they 
can be attributed to the ECX. Specifically, the theoretical model predicts that 
formal institutions substitute for informal ones, so we expect that changes in the 
 
measures of social capital should be larger for “exposed” exporters than for “semi-
exposed” other traders. 
 Fourth, as a robustness test we estimate a simple regression model. We 
estimate the following model for the panel sub-sample: sit = α + β1Tit + β2Eit + β3EitTit + ∑γiXit + εit (1) 
 where s represents a measure of social capital for individual i=1, …, 105 at 
time t (2010 or 2012), T is a treatment dummy (or a dummy for the 2012 
observations), E is an exporter dummy, and X is a vector of trader controls 
(summarised in table 1). As usual, ε is an iid error term. We also estimate models 
with trader fixed effects, replacing α in (1) with αi. 
 The hypothesis that formal institutions substitute for social capital for 
suppliers, wholesalers, and assemblers is consistent with the result that β1<0 for 
some variables (e.g. probability of extending credit or advance payments and 
number of regular suppliers). For other variables, such as the number of trading 
contacts or the share of goods purchased via a buying agent, the substitution 
hypothesis is consistent with a positive coefficient. Moreover, in light of the fact 
that exporters are more exposed to the ECX and are therefore (even) more likely to 
be characterised by a fall in social capital, we also hypothesise that β3<0 for some 
variables, and β3 > for others. 
5.5  results 
We now discuss how the formal institutions created by the ECX have impacted 
various dimensions of social capital for the 105 traders for whom we have collected 
pre-ECX (2010) and post-ECX (2012) data. We have also compared the 2010 and 
2012 cross-section data (using all respondents, not just the panel subsample), to 
compare the characteristics of the sampled populations of traders over time. This 
nearly doubled the sample (improving the power), but of course makes attribution 
even more difficult as we cannot control for time-invariant characteristics. 
Qualitatively, the results for the cross-section comparison tend to support the panel 
results, but identification based on distinguishing between exporters and “other 
traders” is less successful (which may not be surprising given the changes in the 
composition of the trader population following the introduction of the ECX). To 
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(i.e. goodwill trust) and their appraisal of the ability of their partners (Das & Teng 
2004; Williamson 1993). 
 
causal effects and attribution 
Our main objective is to explore how the ECX has affected the role of social 
capital in the sesame value chain. Identification of such effects is complicated by 
the fact that the ECX affects all trading parties in Ethiopia – all sesame exports are 
traded via the ECX, and the impact of the ECX (for example via the dissemination 
of price information) affects all trading parties to some extent. In other words: a 
proper control group does not exist for the ECX treatment, and a simple 
difference-in-difference approach to gauging the impact of the ECX is not feasible. 
 We therefore have to resort to an identification strategy that is decidedly 
second-best. We first compare “before” and “after” social capital measures for 
various subsamples of traders, and attribute differences over time to the creation of 
the ECX. This is clearly a strong assumption as other factors may have intervened 
– affecting social capital levels. We therefore emphasise that the empirical results 
should be interpreted with care. 
 To attenuate concerns about attribution we argue the following. First, the 
time lag between the two survey rounds was relatively short (two years), so the 
scope for other factors to intervene was limited. Second, we focus the presentation 
on panel data, which implies we automatically control for time-invariant factors. 
Third, we seek to exploit variation in the degree to which traders are actually 
governed by the ECX. As mentioned, while all transactions of exporters are 
governed by the ECX monitoring and enforcement system, the other traders in the 
system (assemblers, wholesalers, and suppliers) have one foot in the realm of the 
ECX and the other in the domain of informal institutions and social capital – 
conducting trades beyond the scope of the ECX enforcement and arbitrage 
services. By assessing differences in the evolution of social capital for the two types 
of traders, we are hopefully able to learn something about the causal effect of the 
ECX on social capital. Since all other macro factors (e.g. changes in policies and 
prices) are the same for the two types of traders, any differences in the evolution of 
social capital cannot be attributed to these. Instead, we argue, it is more likely they 
can be attributed to the ECX. Specifically, the theoretical model predicts that 
formal institutions substitute for informal ones, so we expect that changes in the 
 
measures of social capital should be larger for “exposed” exporters than for “semi-
exposed” other traders. 
 Fourth, as a robustness test we estimate a simple regression model. We 
estimate the following model for the panel sub-sample: sit = α + β1Tit + β2Eit + β3EitTit + ∑γiXit + εit (1) 
 where s represents a measure of social capital for individual i=1, …, 105 at 
time t (2010 or 2012), T is a treatment dummy (or a dummy for the 2012 
observations), E is an exporter dummy, and X is a vector of trader controls 
(summarised in table 1). As usual, ε is an iid error term. We also estimate models 
with trader fixed effects, replacing α in (1) with αi. 
 The hypothesis that formal institutions substitute for social capital for 
suppliers, wholesalers, and assemblers is consistent with the result that β1<0 for 
some variables (e.g. probability of extending credit or advance payments and 
number of regular suppliers). For other variables, such as the number of trading 
contacts or the share of goods purchased via a buying agent, the substitution 
hypothesis is consistent with a positive coefficient. Moreover, in light of the fact 
that exporters are more exposed to the ECX and are therefore (even) more likely to 
be characterised by a fall in social capital, we also hypothesise that β3<0 for some 
variables, and β3 > for others. 
5.5  results 
We now discuss how the formal institutions created by the ECX have impacted 
various dimensions of social capital for the 105 traders for whom we have collected 
pre-ECX (2010) and post-ECX (2012) data. We have also compared the 2010 and 
2012 cross-section data (using all respondents, not just the panel subsample), to 
compare the characteristics of the sampled populations of traders over time. This 
nearly doubled the sample (improving the power), but of course makes attribution 
even more difficult as we cannot control for time-invariant characteristics. 
Qualitatively, the results for the cross-section comparison tend to support the panel 
results, but identification based on distinguishing between exporters and “other 
traders” is less successful (which may not be surprising given the changes in the 
composition of the trader population following the introduction of the ECX). To 
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economise on space the cross-section is not reported here, but the details are 
available in appendix 3, which provides a link to further detail. 
5.5.1 trading contacts and the ecx 
We speculate that the presence of formal enforcement and arbitrage institutions 
enables traders to engage in trade with a larger number of parties, no longer 
confining them to interact with an inner circle of trusted partners. In table 16 we 
summarise panel data on the number of trading contacts, distinguishing between 
the full panel subsample and the two sub-types of traders. While at the aggregate 
level there is no evidence to suggest that the number of trading contacts has 
significantly changed after the ECX, we note that the number of contacts in the 
purchase market has increased for the subsample of exporters. This is consistent 
with the expectation that exporters can more easily broaden their set of trading 
partners. 
 Consistent with the expectations, the same is not true for “other traders” 
operating outside the governance system supported by the ECX. Indeed, the 
reverse seems true. While the number of contacts on the purchase side has stayed 
the same, the number of trading partners on the sales side has decreased – arguably 
reflecting overall consolidation in higher segments of the sesame value chain (due 
to increased fixed costs of trading via the ECX). In contrast, the mean number of 
trading contacts for exporters in sales markets increased from 4.5 to 6.1, but this 
increase is not significant. In what follows, we will focus on social capital among 
Ethiopian traders, and not on governance between exporters and importers (details 
about how the ECX affected governance on the sales side are available on request). 
Table 16: Trading contacts and the ECX (panel data only, N=105) 
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
Indicator 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Number of trading 
contacts 
      
Number of trading 
contacts in main 
purchase market 
5.37 5.77 3.14 5.16* 6.35 6.12 
Number of trading 
contacts in main sales 
market 
3.84 3.14 4.5 6.1 3.7 2.02** 
 
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
Indicator 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Number of regular 
suppliers 
      
Number of regular 
suppliers  
13.66 8.85 10.43 1.46** 14.92 11.61 
Proportion of purchases 
with regular suppliers 
49.90 29.59*** 68.80 25.00*** 43.74 31.32* 
Number of regular 
suppliers you meet 
socially  
5.60 2.34* 1.36 0.14* 6.87 3.16 
Number of regular 
suppliers who are close 
relatives 
1.30 0.53 0.00 0.04 1.65 0.72 
Number of suppliers 
who sell exclusively to 
you  
5.18 2.02*** 3.73 0.36*** 5.52 2.64 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
 We have also asked about the identity of trading contacts, and particularly 
whether the ECX affected the propensity to limit trade to “regular customers and 
suppliers”. Table 16 shows that regular suppliers have become less important after 
the ECX. Aggregating across all traders, the data are consistent with the hypothesis 
that in the ECX era, the number of regular traders and the proportion of sesame 
purchased from regular traders have gone down. The respondents also trade less 
with friends (traders they meet socially) or close relatives – trading partners 
characterised by relatively low informal monitoring and enforcement costs (Gabre-
Madhin 2001). The same patterns emerge in the data when we consider customers 
(sales side of the market). These data suggest it has become less important for 
traders to have a network of regular customers and suppliers, as the ECX has taken 
over the role of the trading network, and that traders are investing less in 
maintaining social capital (by meeting socially with regulars). When distinguishing 
between exporters and other traders, it is evident that these results are especially 
driven by developments among the subsample of exporters. Other traders still 
predominantly trade with the same regular partners as before, and continue to 
spend time with these partners outside business hours as well. 
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economise on space the cross-section is not reported here, but the details are 
available in appendix 3, which provides a link to further detail. 
5.5.1 trading contacts and the ecx 
We speculate that the presence of formal enforcement and arbitrage institutions 
enables traders to engage in trade with a larger number of parties, no longer 
confining them to interact with an inner circle of trusted partners. In table 16 we 
summarise panel data on the number of trading contacts, distinguishing between 
the full panel subsample and the two sub-types of traders. While at the aggregate 
level there is no evidence to suggest that the number of trading contacts has 
significantly changed after the ECX, we note that the number of contacts in the 
purchase market has increased for the subsample of exporters. This is consistent 
with the expectation that exporters can more easily broaden their set of trading 
partners. 
 Consistent with the expectations, the same is not true for “other traders” 
operating outside the governance system supported by the ECX. Indeed, the 
reverse seems true. While the number of contacts on the purchase side has stayed 
the same, the number of trading partners on the sales side has decreased – arguably 
reflecting overall consolidation in higher segments of the sesame value chain (due 
to increased fixed costs of trading via the ECX). In contrast, the mean number of 
trading contacts for exporters in sales markets increased from 4.5 to 6.1, but this 
increase is not significant. In what follows, we will focus on social capital among 
Ethiopian traders, and not on governance between exporters and importers (details 
about how the ECX affected governance on the sales side are available on request). 
Table 16: Trading contacts and the ECX (panel data only, N=105) 
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
Indicator 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Number of trading 
contacts 
      
Number of trading 
contacts in main 
purchase market 
5.37 5.77 3.14 5.16* 6.35 6.12 
Number of trading 
contacts in main sales 
market 
3.84 3.14 4.5 6.1 3.7 2.02** 
 
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
Indicator 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Number of regular 
suppliers 
      
Number of regular 
suppliers  
13.66 8.85 10.43 1.46** 14.92 11.61 
Proportion of purchases 
with regular suppliers 
49.90 29.59*** 68.80 25.00*** 43.74 31.32* 
Number of regular 
suppliers you meet 
socially  
5.60 2.34* 1.36 0.14* 6.87 3.16 
Number of regular 
suppliers who are close 
relatives 
1.30 0.53 0.00 0.04 1.65 0.72 
Number of suppliers 
who sell exclusively to 
you  
5.18 2.02*** 3.73 0.36*** 5.52 2.64 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
 We have also asked about the identity of trading contacts, and particularly 
whether the ECX affected the propensity to limit trade to “regular customers and 
suppliers”. Table 16 shows that regular suppliers have become less important after 
the ECX. Aggregating across all traders, the data are consistent with the hypothesis 
that in the ECX era, the number of regular traders and the proportion of sesame 
purchased from regular traders have gone down. The respondents also trade less 
with friends (traders they meet socially) or close relatives – trading partners 
characterised by relatively low informal monitoring and enforcement costs (Gabre-
Madhin 2001). The same patterns emerge in the data when we consider customers 
(sales side of the market). These data suggest it has become less important for 
traders to have a network of regular customers and suppliers, as the ECX has taken 
over the role of the trading network, and that traders are investing less in 
maintaining social capital (by meeting socially with regulars). When distinguishing 
between exporters and other traders, it is evident that these results are especially 
driven by developments among the subsample of exporters. Other traders still 
predominantly trade with the same regular partners as before, and continue to 
spend time with these partners outside business hours as well. 
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5.5.2 credit and the ecx 
The extension of credit is an important part of social capital and personalised 
exchange in trading networks. We have two proxies for credit: the share of 
purchases associated with the extension of credit (via advanced or delayed 
payments), and a measure of the stated willingness of traders to extend credit to 
each other. Table 17 indicates that the share of commodities purchased on credit 
has decreased, and that “payment on delivery” has become the dominant mode of 
purchasing (now covering some 72% of all trades). If we break this result down by 
distinguishing between exporters and other traders, a mixed picture emerges. 
Comparing baseline (2010) data, it is evident that exporters have always relied more 
on “payment upon delivery” and less on the extension of credit to their partners 
than the category of “other traders”. Nevertheless, suppliers’ credit became even 
less important after implementation of the ECX (to a paltry 0.17% of all 
purchases), while suppliers’ credit became significantly more important for other 
traders (from nearly 16% to 24% of all purchases). However, we also document 
that advance payments to traders became less important for “other traders”. We 
believe this reflects the establishment of primary trading centres (PTCs), so that 
securing supply via brokers and small-scale traders has become less important. The 
decline in advance payments to farmers simply reflects that buying directly from 
farmers is now officially banned. 
Table 17: Credit and the ECX (panel data only, N=105)  
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Payment mode (as a share of total purchases) 
Suppliers credit  12.08 17.25 2.43 0.17* 15.93 24.18* 
Advance payment to 
traders 7.18 3.03** 1.90 8.00 9.29 1.01*** 
Advance payment to 
farmers  16.94 5.59*** 2.47 1.67 22.73 7.18*** 
Payment upon delivery  58.87 71.63** 83.8 83.5 48.89 66.82*** 
Credit received or advance given in sesame trade 
Do suppliers let you 
buy on credit? a 2.13 1.42*** 2.31 1.00*** 2.07 1.59*** 
Do you let customers 
buy on credit? a 1.17 1.30*** 1.10 1.10 1.20 1.44*** 
 
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Do you buy with 
advance to farmers? b 2.38 1.40*** 2.43 1.07*** 2.36 1.53*** 
Do you buy with 
advance to traders?  1.84 1.35*** 1.90 1.10*** 1.81 1.44*** 
a 1= none; 2=some; 3=all. Values are average scores 
b 1=never; 2=sometimes; 3=often; 4=always. Values are average scores 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
 Table 17 also provides information on the willingness of suppliers and 
customers to provide credit, and the willingness of the trader to provide credit. 
Consistent with the results above, and considering the full panel, we find that this 
willingness has decreased. Across the board, this seems true for both exporters and 
other traders, but “other traders” are more willing to extend credit customers in 
2012. The overall patterns in the data are consistent with the hypothesis that formal 
institutions substitute for informal ones, and curtail the extension of credit in 
informal trading networks. But we acknowledge that attributing these changes to 
the ECX is not straightforward as there is some evidence of a broad trend of 
reduced credit extension affecting both exporters and other traders. 
5.5.3 use of intermediaries 
If social capital becomes less important, traders can more easily work through 
intermediaries. Hence, we expect that the number of buying agents and brokers 
used by the trader should increase, and that the interaction between traders and 
intermediaries becomes increasingly “professional” – i.e. less closely governed by 
social interactions. The reduced importance of “regular trading partners” was 
already established in table 16. The results in table 18 provide further support for 
this hypothesis. We observe that exporters have significantly increased the number 
of intermediaries via whom they trade, and that they seem somewhat less likely to 
meet such buying agents socially (even if the latter effect is not significant at the 
10% level). Similar patterns in the data do not exist for “other traders”. 
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5.5.2 credit and the ecx 
The extension of credit is an important part of social capital and personalised 
exchange in trading networks. We have two proxies for credit: the share of 
purchases associated with the extension of credit (via advanced or delayed 
payments), and a measure of the stated willingness of traders to extend credit to 
each other. Table 17 indicates that the share of commodities purchased on credit 
has decreased, and that “payment on delivery” has become the dominant mode of 
purchasing (now covering some 72% of all trades). If we break this result down by 
distinguishing between exporters and other traders, a mixed picture emerges. 
Comparing baseline (2010) data, it is evident that exporters have always relied more 
on “payment upon delivery” and less on the extension of credit to their partners 
than the category of “other traders”. Nevertheless, suppliers’ credit became even 
less important after implementation of the ECX (to a paltry 0.17% of all 
purchases), while suppliers’ credit became significantly more important for other 
traders (from nearly 16% to 24% of all purchases). However, we also document 
that advance payments to traders became less important for “other traders”. We 
believe this reflects the establishment of primary trading centres (PTCs), so that 
securing supply via brokers and small-scale traders has become less important. The 
decline in advance payments to farmers simply reflects that buying directly from 
farmers is now officially banned. 
Table 17: Credit and the ECX (panel data only, N=105)  
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Payment mode (as a share of total purchases) 
Suppliers credit  12.08 17.25 2.43 0.17* 15.93 24.18* 
Advance payment to 
traders 7.18 3.03** 1.90 8.00 9.29 1.01*** 
Advance payment to 
farmers  16.94 5.59*** 2.47 1.67 22.73 7.18*** 
Payment upon delivery  58.87 71.63** 83.8 83.5 48.89 66.82*** 
Credit received or advance given in sesame trade 
Do suppliers let you 
buy on credit? a 2.13 1.42*** 2.31 1.00*** 2.07 1.59*** 
Do you let customers 
buy on credit? a 1.17 1.30*** 1.10 1.10 1.20 1.44*** 
 
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Do you buy with 
advance to farmers? b 2.38 1.40*** 2.43 1.07*** 2.36 1.53*** 
Do you buy with 
advance to traders?  1.84 1.35*** 1.90 1.10*** 1.81 1.44*** 
a 1= none; 2=some; 3=all. Values are average scores 
b 1=never; 2=sometimes; 3=often; 4=always. Values are average scores 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
 Table 17 also provides information on the willingness of suppliers and 
customers to provide credit, and the willingness of the trader to provide credit. 
Consistent with the results above, and considering the full panel, we find that this 
willingness has decreased. Across the board, this seems true for both exporters and 
other traders, but “other traders” are more willing to extend credit customers in 
2012. The overall patterns in the data are consistent with the hypothesis that formal 
institutions substitute for informal ones, and curtail the extension of credit in 
informal trading networks. But we acknowledge that attributing these changes to 
the ECX is not straightforward as there is some evidence of a broad trend of 
reduced credit extension affecting both exporters and other traders. 
5.5.3 use of intermediaries 
If social capital becomes less important, traders can more easily work through 
intermediaries. Hence, we expect that the number of buying agents and brokers 
used by the trader should increase, and that the interaction between traders and 
intermediaries becomes increasingly “professional” – i.e. less closely governed by 
social interactions. The reduced importance of “regular trading partners” was 
already established in table 16. The results in table 18 provide further support for 
this hypothesis. We observe that exporters have significantly increased the number 
of intermediaries via whom they trade, and that they seem somewhat less likely to 
meet such buying agents socially (even if the latter effect is not significant at the 
10% level). Similar patterns in the data do not exist for “other traders”. 
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Table 18: Number of intermediaries used in total purchases and relationships with those 
intermediaries (panel data only, N=105)  
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
 
2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Number of buying 
agents  0.58 0.93** 0.40 0.88** 0.65 0.95 
Number of buying 
agents you meet 
socially 0.29 0.46 0.25 0.12 0.31 0.51 
Number of buying 
agents that are close 
relatives 0.17 0.2 0.25 0.08 0.13 0.25 
Share of goods 
purchased via buying 
agent  12.08 34.42*** 5.17 69.17*** 15.32 25.6** 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001 
 
 The share of goods purchased through an intermediary (buying agent) has 
increased. Distinguishing between exporters and other traders, we observe that this 
result is driven by both categories of traders, but also note that the exporters’ share 
of goods purchased through a buying agent has especially increased (from 5% to 
nearly 70%, compared to an increase from 15% to only 26% for “other traders”). 
5.5.4 trust and disputes: goodwill trust and trust in ability 
If formal institutions substitute for informal ones, we would expect that 
transactions are increasingly governed by rules rather than shared norms and trust. 
If so, we also expect an deterioration in (average) trust levels in the sesame value 
chain – not necessarily because traders suddenly distrust their existing trade 
partners, but because they have expanded the set of partners with whom they 
interact and trade. We distinguish between two types of trust: goodwill trust, or 
trust in the intentions of others, and trust in the ability of partners to produce or 
deliver as promised. Table 19 summarises traders’ perceptions. 
 
Table 19: Average scores for trust perceptions of sesame traders (panel data only, N=105)  
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
  2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Goodwill trust             
Average trust in suppliers  3.15 3.14 3.94 2.46*** 2.81 3.44*** 
Knows price well but does 
not share info  3.33 3.13 3.96 2.57*** 2.79 3.16 
Knows quality of produce 
but does not share info 3.25 2.69*** 3.96 2.57*** 2.87 2.75 
Knows quantity well but 
does not share info  3.28 2.84** 3.89 2.71*** 2.98 2.89 
Able to pay but cheats  3.47 3.57 4.20 2.39*** 3.08 4.10*** 
Colludes with other 
buyers/sellers and 
suppliers  3.05 3.91*** 3.67 2.61** 2.80 4.49*** 
Trust in ability 
Average trust in ability of 
suppliers  3.34 3.06* 3.96 2.66*** 3.09 3.23 
Does not know price well  3.16 2.98 3.96 2.96*** 3.00 3.21 
Does not know quality of 
produce  3.39 2.84*** 3.96 2.57*** 2.87 2.75 
Does not know quantity  3.56 2.62*** 4.00 2.39*** 3.39 2.71*** 
Cannot pay you because 
short of cash  2.82 3.36 2.92 2.25 2.79 3.86*** 
General 
Importance of trust  4.04 3.71** 4.45 4.10* 3.88 3.56* 
How much do you trust 
traders in general? 3.87 3.6* 4.28 3.83** 3.71 3.51 
How much do you trust 
buyer of last transaction?  3.93 3.54*** 4.46 3.76*** 3.73 3.45* 
Number of transactions 
you undertake before trust  3.85 3.43 3.81 3.10 3.86 3.52 
Number of years it takes to 
trust trade partners  2.81 1.45*** 2.40 0.95*** 2.96 1.58*** 
1=very low trust; 2=low trust; 3= neutral; 4=high trust;5=very high trust. Values reflect averages 
for traders of these scores 
Underlined figures denote a significant decrease, bold figures denote a significant increase 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001  
 Across the board, we indeed find that goodwill trust and trust in ability have 
decreased over time. Traders increasingly believe their partners may try to benefit 
from asymmetric information, and that their partners are unable to properly assess 
the quantity and quality of sesame they promise to deliver. This is due to the fact 
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that quantity and quality is now assessed at the warehouses by warehouse managers, 
and corresponds with findings by Coulter (2012). One positive point is that traders 
see less collusion among the sellers from whom they purchase sesame – trust levels 
in this area have increased. One possible reason is that social capital may facilitate 
collusion (Adler 2000; Fafchamps & Minten 2002) so that a reduction in social 
capital may lead to lower levels of collusion. 
 Consistent with expectations, there are striking differences between 
exporters and “other traders” in their trust perceptions. While exporters’ 
perceptions of goodwill trust and trust in ability have significantly deteriorated 
across all dimensions, the same is not true for “other traders”. Indeed, in contrast, 
average goodwill trust among these traders has increased, as has trust for specific 
dimensions (less cheating and less collusion). Trust in ability among other traders 
has not been affected robustly in either direction. 
 Turning to more general statements at the bottom of table 19, it is 
interesting to note that traders argue that trust between traders has become less 
important, but is still highly valued. Traders also state it takes fewer years to trust 
other traders. This may both reflect ECX’s increasing transparency and decreasing 
contract default. 
 We have also looked at trade disputes in the sesame value chain. Specifically, 
table 20 summarises the share of traders with trade disputes over various issues, 
and documents how often such disputes occur (as a share of all disputes). This 
table substantiates anecdotal evidence about quality problems reported by Coulter 
(2012) and Van den Broek (2012), and corroborates the results of low trust in 
quality hinted at in table 19. 
Table 20: Reported disputes by sesame traders (panel data only, N=105)  
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
Indicators 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Dispute with suppliers due to 
bad quality purchase  0.28 0.50*** 0.10 0.48*** 0.47 0.66** 
% Of all disputes with 
suppliers due to bad quality 
purchase  15.08 18.39 2.67 19.64** 16.14 18.02 
Dispute with suppliers due to 
disagreement over measuring 
unit  0.22 0.22 0.07 0.28** 0.31 0.30 
% Of all disputes with 
suppliers due to disagreement 
over measurement  9.40 8.17 5.00 3.00** 9.78 10.05 
 
 All traders Exporters Other traders 
Indicators 2010 2012 2010 2012 2010 2012 
Dispute with suppliers due to 
attempt to renegotiate  0.40 0.19*** 0.76 0.10*** 0.87 0.37*** 
% Of all disputes with 
suppliers due to attempt to 
renegotiate  11.24 15.67 13.09 2.67*** 10.57 17.11** 
Dispute with suppliers due to 
stolen property  0.06 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.11 0.06 
% Of all disputes with 
suppliers due to stolen 
property  3.11 4.00 0.17 0.00 2.88 4.00 
Dispute with suppliers due to 
place of delivery  0.25 0.13*** 0.17 0.21 0.39 0.12*** 
% Of all disputes with 
suppliers due to place of 
delivery  2.14 3.19 0.57 7.61** 2.77 1.36 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001 
Disputes variables measure the proportion of traders indicating they have had a dispute. % of all 
disputes… reflects how important the particular dispute was compared to all disputes a trader 
may have had (in %). 
Underlined figures denote a significant decrease, bold figures denote a significant increase 
 
 As expected, the ECX resulted in a reduction in disputes over renegotiation 
with suppliers (as when prices change quickly). The warehouse system also 
attenuated problems associated with stolen property. However, disputes over 
measuring units persist, and around a third of all traders reports this, although the 
actual number of disputes is low. 
 Breaking down the results between exporters and other traders, we again 
detect significant differences. Overall, exporters are more likely to report an 
increase in disputes, and indicate an increase in the share of disputes with suppliers 
due to bad quality, measuring units, or the place of delivery. However, they also 
reported a decrease in the shares of disputes due to disagreement over 
measurement or attempts to renegotiate. The overall conclusion is that the ECX 
has succeeded in bringing down the incidence of disputes in some areas, but has 
increased them in other areas. Given the fact that not all of the components of the 
ECX are functioning as expected (such as the quality control at warehouses), this is 
to be expected. 
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5.6  robustness analysis 
As a robustness analysis we used a regression analysis to explain variation in the 
main dependent variables (equation 1). To economise on space we only report 
coefficients and standard errors associated with the ECX dummy, the exporter 
dummy, and the interaction term (additional details are available in appendix 3, 
which provides a link). Additional controls were included in the estimations. In one 
model we only include demographic characteristics (age, education, sex, and years 
in business), obviously exogenous to the creation of the ECX. In another model we 
include both demographic as well as potentially endogenous variables (amounts 
purchased and sold, and prices paid and received). In light of the potential 
endogeneity of these variables we emphasise that these latter regression results 
should be interpreted with care. We ran the regression model for all indicators 
shown in the previous tables and find that, overall, the regression results support 
the patterns discussed above; social capital became less important after the 
introduction of the ECX, in particular for exporters. 
Table 21: Robustness analysis: regression results  
 OLS Fixed effects model 
 Parsimonious Elaborate Parsimonious Elaborate 
Number of trading contacts in main sales market  
Year (ECX dummy) -0.47 (0.31) 
-0.30 
(0.31) 
-0.9 
(0.61) 
-0.61 
(0.75) 
Exporter dummy -3462.0** (1173) 
-2693.0** 
(1165) 
-8.14 
(6.06) 
0.76 
(5.97) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
1.72** 
(0.58) 
1.34** 
(0.58) 
3.4*** 
(1.16) 
2.81* 
(1.41) 
Number of trading contacts in main purchase market 
Year (ECX dummy) 0.30 (0.54) 
-0.02 
(0.64) 
0.7 
(1.07) 
-0.81 
(1.30) 
Exporter dummy -2261.0 (2057) 
-3138.0 
(2406) 
-11.42 
(10.63) 
-5.74 
(10.37) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
1.12 
(1.02) 
1.56 
(1.20) 
2.35 
(2.03) 
2.63* 
(2.45) 
Proportion of purchases with regular suppliers 
Year (ECX dummy) -6.36* (3.45) 
-9.77** 
(3.86) 
-17.52*** 
(7.05) 
-23.86** 
(9.40) 
Exporter dummy 31687.3** (13838) 
58090*** 
(15840) 
  
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-15.75** 
(6.88) 
-28.89*** 
(7.88) 
-39.98** 
(15.09) 
-38.38* 
(20.80) 
 
 OLS Fixed effects model 
 Parsimonious Elaborate Parsimonious Elaborate 
Do suppliers let you buy on credit? 
Year (ECX dummy) -0.24*** (0.05) 
-0.25*** 
(0.05) 
-0.49*** 
(0.1) 
-0.53*** 
(0.12) 
Exporter dummy 836.40*** (173.9) 
843.20*** 
(192.9) 
0.98 
(0.99) 1.24 (0.96) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.42*** 
(0.09) 
-0.42*** 
(0.10) 
-0.86*** 
(0.19) 
-0.716*** 
(0.23) 
Do you let customers buy on credit? 
Year (ECX dummy) 0.12*** (0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.23*** 
(0.07) 
0.208** 
(0.09) 
Exporter dummy 233.50* (135.4) 
344.1** 
(156.7) 
-0.02 
(0.67) 
0.231 
(0.71) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.12* 
(0.07) 
-0.17** 
(0.08) 
-0.25* 
(0.13) 
-0.309* 
(0.17) 
Do you buy with advance to farmers? 
Year (ECX dummy) -0.42*** (0.10) 
-0.44*** 
(0.06) 
-0.84*** 
(0.11) 
-0.89*** 
(0.14) 
Exporter dummy 535.62** (217) 
526.8** 
(240.1) 
-1.66 
(1.07) 
-0.84 
(1.13) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.27** 
(0.l0) 
-0.26** 
(0.12) 
-0.53** 
(0.21) 
-0.35 
(0.27) 
Do you buy with advance to traders? 
Year (ECX dummy) -0.19*** (0.04) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.37*** 
(0.07) 
-0.30*** 
(0.09) 
Exporter dummy 421.97** (170.4) 
546.3*** 
(193.1) 
0.15 
(0.71) 
0.78 
(0.73) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
-0.27*** 
(0.l0) 
-0.46*** 
(0.14) 
-0.42** 
(0.17) 
Share of goods purchased via buying agent 
Year (ECX dummy) 5.82** (2.34) 
3.99 
(2.85) 
11.14** 
(4.97) 
4.84 
(6.86) 
Exporter dummy -53220*** (9160) 
-54500*** 
(1050) 
61.18 
(48.32) 
34.81 
(54.0) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
26.47*** 
(4.56) 
27.11*** 
(5.49) 
50.37*** 
(10.01) 
39.78*** 
(13.43) 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
For the online full regression output see reference in appendix 3. 
 Table 21 contains the results for a large and representative sample of social 
capital indicators. Columns (1) and (2) present OLS results and columns (3) and (4) 
contain the regression output for models with trader fixed effects. The coefficient 
associated with the ECX dummy picks up any effect of the ECX on social capital 
for other traders. Depending on the nature of the proxy, as mentioned above, the 
substitution hypothesis is consistent with a negative (e.g. credit provision) or 
positive coefficient (e.g. number of trading contacts). Similarly, for the ECX to 
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344.1** 
(156.7) 
-0. 2 
(0.67) 
0.231 
(0.71) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.12* 
(0. 7) 
-0.17** 
(0. 8) 
-0.25* 
(0.13) 
-0.309* 
(0.17) 
Do you buy with advance to farmers? 
Year (ECX dum y) -0.42**  (0.10) 
-0.44**  
(0. 6) 
-0.84**  
(0.11) 
-0.89**  
(0.14) 
Exporter dum y 53 .62** (217) 
526.8** 
(240.1) 
-1.66 
(1.07) 
-0.84 
(1. 3) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.27** 
(0.l ) 
-0.26** 
(0.12) 
-0.53** 
(0.21) 
-0.35 
(0.27) 
Do you buy with advance to traders? 
Year (ECX dum y) -0.19**  (0. 4) 
-0.17**  
(0. 5) 
-0.37**  
(0. 7) 
-0.30**  
(0. 9) 
Exporter dum y 421.97** (170.4) 
546.3**  
(193.1) 
0.15 
(0.71) 
0.78 
(0.73) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.21** 
(0. 8) 
-0.27**  
(0.l ) 
-0.46**  
(0.14) 
-0.42** 
(0.17) 
Share of goods purchased via buying agent 
Year (ECX dum y) 5.82** (2.34) 
3.99 
(2.85) 
11. 4** 
(4.97) 
4.84 
(6.86) 
Exporter dum y -53220**  (9160) 
-54 00**  
(105 ) 
61. 8 
(48.32) 
34.81 
(54.0) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
26.47**  
(4.56) 
27.11**  
(5.49) 
50.37**  
(10. 1) 
39.78**  
(13.43) 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0. 5 **  p<0. 01, standard erro s in parenthes  
For the online full regression output see ref r nce in appendix 3. 
 Table 21 contains the results for a large and repres nta ive sample of social 
capital indicators. Columns (1) and (2) pres nt OLS results and columns (3) and (4) 
contain the regression output for models with trader fixed effects. The coeffic ent 
associated with the ECX dum y picks up any effect of the ECX on social capital 
for other traders. Depending on the nature of the proxy, as mentioned above, the 
substitution hypothesi  is consi tent with a negative (e.g  credit provision) or 
positive coeffic ent (e.g  number of trading contacts). Similarly, for the ECX to 
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5.6  robustness analysis 
As a robustness analysis we used a regression analysis to explain variation in the 
main dependent variables (equation 1). To economise on space we only report 
coefficients and standard errors associated with the ECX dummy, the exporter 
dummy, and the interaction term (additional details are available in appendix 3, 
which provides a link). Additional controls were included in the estimations. In one 
model we only include demographic characteristics (age, education, sex, and years 
in business), obviously exogenous to the creation of the ECX. In another model we 
include both demographic as well as potentially endogenous variables (amounts 
purchased and sold, and prices paid and received). In light of the potential 
endogeneity of these variables we emphasise that these latter regression results 
should be interpreted with care. We ran the regression model for all indicators 
shown in the previous tables and find that, overall, the regression results support 
the patterns discussed above; social capital became less important after the 
introduction of the ECX, in particular for exporters. 
Table 21: Robustness analysis: regression results  
 OLS Fixed effects model 
 Parsimonious Elaborate Parsimonious Elaborate 
Number of trading contacts in main sales market  
Year (ECX dummy) -0.47 (0.31) 
-0.30 
(0.31) 
-0.9 
(0.61) 
-0.61 
(0.75) 
Exporter dummy -3462.0** (1173) 
-2693.0** 
(1165) 
-8.14 
(6.06) 
0.76 
(5.97) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
1.72** 
(0.58) 
1.34** 
(0.58) 
3.4*** 
(1.16) 
2.81* 
(1.41) 
Number of trading contacts in main purchase market 
Year (ECX dummy) 0.30 (0.54) 
-0.02 
(0.64) 
0.7 
(1.07) 
-0.81 
(1.30) 
Exporter dummy -2261.0 (2057) 
-3138.0 
(2406) 
-11.42 
(10.63) 
-5.74 
(10.37) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
1.12 
(1.02) 
1.56 
(1.20) 
2.35 
(2.03) 
2.63* 
(2.45) 
Proportion of purchases with regular suppliers 
Year (ECX dummy) -6.36* (3.45) 
-9.77** 
(3.86) 
-17.52*** 
(7.05) 
-23.86** 
(9.40) 
Exporter dummy 31687.3** (13838) 
58090*** 
(15840) 
  
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-15.75** 
(6.88) 
-28.89*** 
(7.88) 
-39.98** 
(15.09) 
-38.38* 
(20.80) 
 
 OLS Fixed effects model 
 Parsimonious Elaborate Parsimonious Elaborate 
Do suppliers let you buy on credit? 
Year (ECX dummy) -0.24*** (0.05) 
-0.25*** 
(0.05) 
-0.49*** 
(0.1) 
-0.53*** 
(0.12) 
Exporter dummy 836.40*** (173.9) 
843.20*** 
(192.9) 
0.98 
(0.99) 1.24 (0.96) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.42*** 
(0.09) 
-0.42*** 
(0.10) 
-0.86*** 
(0.19) 
-0.716*** 
(0.23) 
Do you let customers buy on credit? 
Year (ECX dummy) 0.12*** (0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.23*** 
(0.07) 
0.208** 
(0.09) 
Exporter dummy 233.50* (135.4) 
344.1** 
(156.7) 
-0.02 
(0.67) 
0.231 
(0.71) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.12* 
(0.07) 
-0.17** 
(0.08) 
-0.25* 
(0.13) 
-0.309* 
(0.17) 
Do you buy with advance to farmers? 
Year (ECX dummy) -0.42*** (0.10) 
-0.44*** 
(0.06) 
-0.84*** 
(0.11) 
-0.89*** 
(0.14) 
Exporter dummy 535.62** (217) 
526.8** 
(240.1) 
-1.66 
(1.07) 
-0.84 
(1.13) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.27** 
(0.l0) 
-0.26** 
(0.12) 
-0.53** 
(0.21) 
-0.35 
(0.27) 
Do you buy with advance to traders? 
Year (ECX dummy) -0.19*** (0.04) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.37*** 
(0.07) 
-0.30*** 
(0.09) 
Exporter dummy 421.97** (170.4) 
546.3*** 
(193.1) 
0.15 
(0.71) 
0.78 
(0.73) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.21** 
(0.08) 
-0.27*** 
(0.l0) 
-0.46*** 
(0.14) 
-0.42** 
(0.17) 
Share of goods purchased via buying agent 
Year (ECX dummy) 5.82** (2.34) 
3.99 
(2.85) 
11.14** 
(4.97) 
4.84 
(6.86) 
Exporter dummy -53220*** (9160) 
-54500*** 
(1050) 
61.18 
(48.32) 
34.81 
(54.0) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
26.47*** 
(4.56) 
27.11*** 
(5.49) 
50.37*** 
(10.01) 
39.78*** 
(13.43) 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
For the online full regression output see reference in appendix 3. 
 Table 21 contains the results for a large and representative sample of social 
capital indicators. Columns (1) and (2) present OLS results and columns (3) and (4) 
contain the regression output for models with trader fixed effects. The coefficient 
associated with the ECX dummy picks up any effect of the ECX on social capital 
for other traders. Depending on the nature of the proxy, as mentioned above, the 
substitution hypothesis is consistent with a negative (e.g. credit provision) or 
positive coefficient (e.g. number of trading contacts). Similarly, for the ECX to 
 
5.6  robustness analy is 
As a robustness analy is we used a regression analy is to explain variation in the 
main dependent variables (equation 1). To economise on space we only report 
coeff cients and standard errors associated with the ECX du my, the exporter 
du my, and the interaction term (additional details are available in appendix 3, 
which provides a link). Additional controls w re included in th  estimations. In one 
model we only include demographi  ch racteristics (age, education, sex, and years 
in business), obviously exogenous to the creation of the ECX. In another model we 
include both demographic as well as potentially endogenous variables (amounts 
purchased and sold, and prices paid and received). In light of the potential 
endogeneity of th se variables we empha ise tha  th se latter regression results 
should be interpr ted with care. We ran the regression model for all indicators 
shown in the previous tables and find that, overall, the regression result  su port 
the patterns discussed above; social capital became less important after the 
introduction of the ECX, in particular for exporters. 
Table 21: Robustness analy is: regression results  
 OLS Fixed effects model 
 Parsimonious Elaborate Parsimonious Elaborate 
Number of trading contacts in main sales market  
Year (ECX du my) -0.47 (0.31) 
-0.30 
(0.31) 
-0.9 
(0.61) 
-0.61 
(0.75) 
Exporter du my -3462.0** (1173) 
-2693.0** 
(1165) 
-8.14 
(6.06) 
0.76 
(5.97) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
1.72** 
(0.58) 
1.34** 
(0.58) 
3.4 ** 
( .16) 
2.81* 
(1.41) 
Number of trading contacts in main purchase market 
Year (ECX du my) 0.30 (0.54) 
- .02 
(0.64) 
0.7 
(1.07) 
-0.81 
(1.30) 
Exporter du my -2261.0 (2057) 
- 138.0 
(2406) 
-11.42 
(10.63) 
-5.74 
(10.37) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
.12 
(1.02) 
1.56 
(1.20) 
2.35 
(2.03) 
2.63* 
(2.45) 
Proportion of purcha es with regular suppliers 
Year (ECX du my) -6.36* (3.45) 
-9.77** 
(3.86) 
-17.52 ** 
(7.05) 
-23.86** 
(9.40) 
Exporter du my 31687.3** (1 38) 
58 90 ** 
(15840) 
  
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-15.75** 
(6.88) 
-2 .89 ** 
(7.88) 
-3 .98** 
(15.09) 
-38.38* 
(20.80) 
 
 OLS Fixed effects model 
 Parsimonious Elaborate Parsimonious Elaborate 
Do suppliers let you buy on credit? 
Year (ECX dum y) -0.24**  (0. 5) 
-0.25**  
(0. 5) 
-0.49**  
(0.1) 
-0.53**  
(0.12) 
Exporter dum y 836.40**  (173.9) 
843.20**  
(192.9) 
0.98 
(0.99) 1.24 (0.96) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.42**  
(0. 9) 
-0.42**  
(0.10) 
-0.86**  
(0.19) 
-0.716**  
(0.23) 
Do you let customers buy on credit? 
Year (ECX dum y) 0.12**  (0. 4) 
0.11**  
(0. 4) 
0.23**  
(0. 7) 
0.208** 
(0. 9) 
Exporter dum y 233.50* (135.4) 
344.1** 
(156.7) 
-0. 2 
(0.67) 
0.231 
(0.71) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.12* 
(0. 7) 
-0.17** 
(0. 8) 
-0.25* 
(0.13) 
-0.309* 
(0.17) 
Do you buy with advance to farmers? 
Year (ECX dum y) -0.42**  (0.10) 
-0.44**  
(0. 6) 
-0.84**  
(0.11) 
-0.89**  
(0.14) 
Exporter dum y 53 .62** (217) 
526.8** 
(240.1) 
-1.66 
(1.07) 
-0.84 
(1. 3) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.27** 
(0.l ) 
-0.26** 
(0.12) 
-0.53** 
(0.21) 
-0.35 
(0.27) 
Do you buy with advance to traders? 
Year (ECX dum y) -0.19**  (0. 4) 
-0.17**  
(0. 5) 
-0.37**  
(0. 7) 
-0.30**  
(0. 9) 
Exporter dum y 421.97** (170.4) 
546.3**  
(193.1) 
0.15 
(0.71) 
0.78 
(0.73) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
-0.21** 
(0. 8) 
-0.27**  
(0.l ) 
-0.46**  
(0.14) 
-0.42** 
(0.17) 
Share of goods purchased via buying agent 
Year (ECX dum y) 5.82** (2.34) 
3.99 
(2.85) 
11. 4** 
(4.97) 
4.84 
(6.86) 
Exporter dum y -53220**  (9160) 
-54 00**  
(105 ) 
61. 8 
(48.32) 
34.81 
(54.0) 
Interaction term 
(year*exporter) 
26.47**  
(4.56) 
27.11**  
(5.49) 
50.37**  
(10. 1) 
39.78**  
(13.43) 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0. 5 **  p<0. 01, standard erro s in parenthes  
For the online full regression output see ref r nce in appendix 3. 
 Table 21 contains the results for a large and repres nta ive sample of social 
capital indicators. Columns (1) and (2) pres nt OLS results and columns (3) and (4) 
contain the regression output for models with trader fixed effects. The coeffic ent 
associated with the ECX dum y picks up any effect of the ECX on social capital 
for other traders. Depending on the nature of the proxy, as mentioned above, the 
substitution hypothesi  is consi tent with a negative (e.g  credit provision) or 
positive coeffic ent (e.g  number of trading contacts). Similarly, for the ECX to 
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have a more profound effect on exporters than on other traders, the coefficient of 
the interaction term should be negative for some proxies and positive for others. 
 The regression results tend to match the earlier findings, as reported in 
tables 2–6. For example, consider the results in the column of the parsimonious 
OLS regression model. While the number of trading contacts in the main sales 
market has remained more or less the same for all traders (β1=0), it has increased 
for exporters after the introduction of the ECX (β3>0). Results for the number of 
trading contacts in the purchase market are not significant. The proportion 
purchased with regular suppliers decreased for all traders, but especially for 
exporters (β1<0, β3<0). The same is true with respect to the provision of credit: 
all traders, especially exporters, are less likely to obtain credit (β1<0, β3<0). Also, 
in contrast to other traders, exporters are less likely to extend credit after the 
introduction of the ECX (β1>0, β3<0). We also obtain significant results for the 
proxy measuring the extension of advance payments to farmers, and find that 
advance payments to other traders have fallen for all traders, β1<0, and especially 
for exporters, β3<0. Finally, and also consistent with the earlier results, traders are 
more likely to use a buying agent (β1>0), and again we find a differential response 
from exporters (β3>0). 
 The regression results for the elaborate model are even stronger, and now 
we also obtain significant year and interaction effects for the variable measuring 
advance payments to farmers (β1<0, β3<0). The fixed effects results in columns 
(3) and (4) are also roughly similar. Even if the exporter dummy no longer enters 
significantly in these models, the year variable and year-exporter interaction term 
tend to enter significantly and are of the “right” sign. 
 
5.7  discussion and conclusions 
A small literature considers the multi-faceted relation between integration in formal 
markets and trust. It is clear that trust fosters trade. For trade to extend beyond 
what Fafchamps (2004) has called a “flea market” exchange, where sales are made 
on a cash-and-carry basis, moral obligations of fairness and reciprocity should 
extend to strangers, not just to kith and kin. Generalised morality and trust enables 
expansion of markets (e.g. Qin & Bulte 2010). But, in turn, trade may also affect 
trust. For example, Henrich et al. (2010) argue that integration into markets (or the 
transition from personalised to anonymous exchange) is associated with higher 
levels of generalised trust. They propose that “market norms may have evolved as 
part of an overall process of societal evolution to sustain mutually beneficial 
exchanges in contexts where established social relations (for example, kin, 
reciprocity, and status) were insufficient” (p. 1480). Hence, market integration 
“involved the selective spread of those norms and institutions that best facilitated 
successful exchange…” (p. 1484). If markets foster trust, and trust fosters market 
integration, then markets and trust are complements in development, enabling 
virtuous cycles of development. These results echo those found in chapter three, 
where a positive link between farmers’ trust in traders and market participation was 
found. 
 However, market integration and trust may not necessarily evolve hand-in-
hand. For example, Kumar and Matsusaka (2009) emphasise the difference 
between “village social capital” and “market social capital”. Village social capital 
typifies rural economies in poor countries, capturing kinship ties, patron-client 
relations, and repeated personalised exchange governed by trust and reciprocity. In 
contrast, market social capital involves access to and knowledge about third-party 
punishment, including courts, auditors, credit ratings, and so on – or the type of 
formal institutions associated with the ECX and analysed in the current chapter. To 
fully benefit from specialisation and trade, Kumar and Matsusaka argue, 
communities should adjust the composition of their social capital stocks – divesting 
in village capital and investing in market capital. If so, market integration and trust 
are substitutes, rather than complements, in development. Tentative evidence 
provided by Siziba and Bulte (2012) supports this perspective. 
 Are formal and informal institutions complements or substitutes? To a large 
extent the answer to this question depends on the perspective chosen. For 
example, market integration may foster generalised trust (enabling exchange with 
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have a more profound effect on exporters than on other traders, the coefficient of 
the interaction term should be negative for some proxies and positive for others. 
 The regression results tend to match the earlier findings, as reported in 
tables 2–6. For example, consider the results in the column of the parsimonious 
OLS regression model. While the number of trading contacts in the main sales 
market has remained more or less the same for all traders (β1=0), it has increased 
for exporters after the introduction of the ECX (β3>0). Results for the number of 
trading contacts in the purchase market are not significant. The proportion 
purchased with regular suppliers decreased for all traders, but especially for 
exporters (β1<0, β3<0). The same is true with respect to the provision of credit: 
all traders, especially exporters, are less likely to obtain credit (β1<0, β3<0). Also, 
in contrast to other traders, exporters are less likely to extend credit after the 
introduction of the ECX (β1>0, β3<0). We also obtain significant results for the 
proxy measuring the extension of advance payments to farmers, and find that 
advance payments to other traders have fallen for all traders, β1<0, and especially 
for exporters, β3<0. Finally, and also consistent with the earlier results, traders are 
more likely to use a buying agent (β1>0), and again we find a differential response 
from exporters (β3>0). 
 The regression results for the elaborate model are even stronger, and now 
we also obtain significant year and interaction effects for the variable measuring 
advance payments to farmers (β1<0, β3<0). The fixed effects results in columns 
(3) and (4) are also roughly similar. Even if the exporter dummy no longer enters 
significantly in these models, the year variable and year-exporter interaction term 
tend to enter significantly and are of the “right” sign. 
 
5.7  discussion and conclusions 
A small literature considers the multi-faceted relation between integration in formal 
markets and trust. It is clear that trust fosters trade. For trade to extend beyond 
what Fafchamps (2004) has called a “flea market” exchange, where sales are made 
on a cash-and-carry basis, moral obligations of fairness and reciprocity should 
extend to strangers, not just to kith and kin. Generalised morality and trust enables 
expansion of markets (e.g. Qin & Bulte 2010). But, in turn, trade may also affect 
trust. For example, Henrich et al. (2010) argue that integration into markets (or the 
transition from personalised to anonymous exchange) is associated with higher 
levels of generalised trust. They propose that “market norms may have evolved as 
part of an overall process of societal evolution to sustain mutually beneficial 
exchanges in contexts where established social relations (for example, kin, 
reciprocity, and status) were insufficient” (p. 1480). Hence, market integration 
“involved the selective spread of those norms and institutions that best facilitated 
successful exchange…” (p. 1484). If markets foster trust, and trust fosters market 
integration, then markets and trust are complements in development, enabling 
virtuous cycles of development. These results echo those found in chapter three, 
where a positive link between farmers’ trust in traders and market participation was 
found. 
 However, market integration and trust may not necessarily evolve hand-in-
hand. For example, Kumar and Matsusaka (2009) emphasise the difference 
between “village social capital” and “market social capital”. Village social capital 
typifies rural economies in poor countries, capturing kinship ties, patron-client 
relations, and repeated personalised exchange governed by trust and reciprocity. In 
contrast, market social capital involves access to and knowledge about third-party 
punishment, including courts, auditors, credit ratings, and so on – or the type of 
formal institutions associated with the ECX and analysed in the current chapter. To 
fully benefit from specialisation and trade, Kumar and Matsusaka argue, 
communities should adjust the composition of their social capital stocks – divesting 
in village capital and investing in market capital. If so, market integration and trust 
are substitutes, rather than complements, in development. Tentative evidence 
provided by Siziba and Bulte (2012) supports this perspective. 
 Are formal and informal institutions complements or substitutes? To a large 
extent the answer to this question depends on the perspective chosen. For 
example, market integration may foster generalised trust (enabling exchange with 
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anonymous others) while simultaneously eroding (average) trust in trading partners 
(personalised trust). 
 In this chapter we further probe the relation between formal and informal 
institutions as mechanisms to govern trade. Focusing on the sesame value chain, we 
document evidence suggesting that the ECX has substituted informal governance 
mechanisms – traders have expanded the set of parties with whom they trade, are 
less likely to extend credit to their partners, and are less likely to invest in “social 
relations” with their trading partners. Moreover, traders express that trust has 
become less important following the creation of the ECX, and state that they trust 
their trading partners less than before. These patterns in the data are more 
pronounced for exporters than for “other traders”, consistent with the hypothesis 
that the substitution effects are especially pronounced for exporters who fully 
operate within the realm of the ECX (in contrast to “other traders” who operate 
within and beyond the realm of the ECX). 
 We realise that methodological issues remain. The time lag between the 
creation of the ECX and the ex post measurements is very short, and attribution is 
far from perfect because a proper control group does not exist – no traders in the 
sesame value chain are unaffected by the ECX. Hence the empirical results should 
be interpreted with care, and we argue in favour of future scrutiny and replication 
in different contexts. Nevertheless, we believe the results to be relevant. 
Commodity exchanges are increasingly regarded as a powerful tool to promote 
agricultural development in developing countries, yet the impact of these 
institutions on traders is unclear. Indeed, we believe this is the first attempt to 
document the impact of commodity exchanges on social capital of traders – a 
crucially important yet chronically under-researched set of actors in the broader 
development debate. 
 Our tentative results may have significant implications for policy makers. 
The erosion of social capital could, in theory, attenuate or reverse the potential 
welfare gains associated with expansion of formal institutions (such as commodity 
exchanges). For example, Dixit (2004) compares the outcomes of relational and 
formal contracting, and demonstrates that opportunities created by formal 
contracting may undermine the scope for relational contracting. Formal contracting 
may make first-best outcomes unattainable, so that overall efficiency deteriorates as 
formal institutions develop. The mechanism explaining this counter-intuitive result 
is as follows: the harsher the punishment facing deviators, the better the informal 
 
(repetitive) equilibrium that can be sustained. If formal contracting provides a fall-
back option for deviating traders, then deviating will occur more often unless the 
scope for such behaviour is reduced by altering the terms of the informal contract. 
In other words, when the incentive contract is binding and the informal contract 
yields a second-best outcome, then a partial improvement in formal institutions 
worsens the outcome of the informal contract. However, even in the absence of 
such counter-intuitive outcomes, it is important for policy makers to realise that 
formal institutions have an effect on informal institutions, and that the expansion 
of formal contracts, by new regulations or policies, may invite the erosion of norms 
and informal rules in the same or adjacent domains of human interaction. 
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anonymous others) while simultaneously eroding (average) trust in trading partners 
(personalised trust). 
 In this chapter we further probe the relation between formal and informal 
institutions as mechanisms to govern trade. Focusing on the sesame value chain, we 
document evidence suggesting that the ECX has substituted informal governance 
mechanisms – traders have expanded the set of parties with whom they trade, are 
less likely to extend credit to their partners, and are less likely to invest in “social 
relations” with their trading partners. Moreover, traders express that trust has 
become less important following the creation of the ECX, and state that they trust 
their trading partners less than before. These patterns in the data are more 
pronounced for exporters than for “other traders”, consistent with the hypothesis 
that the substitution effects are especially pronounced for exporters who fully 
operate within the realm of the ECX (in contrast to “other traders” who operate 
within and beyond the realm of the ECX). 
 We realise that methodological issues remain. The time lag between the 
creation of the ECX and the ex post measurements is very short, and attribution is 
far from perfect because a proper control group does not exist – no traders in the 
sesame value chain are unaffected by the ECX. Hence the empirical results should 
be interpreted with care, and we argue in favour of future scrutiny and replication 
in different contexts. Nevertheless, we believe the results to be relevant. 
Commodity exchanges are increasingly regarded as a powerful tool to promote 
agricultural development in developing countries, yet the impact of these 
institutions on traders is unclear. Indeed, we believe this is the first attempt to 
document the impact of commodity exchanges on social capital of traders – a 
crucially important yet chronically under-researched set of actors in the broader 
development debate. 
 Our tentative results may have significant implications for policy makers. 
The erosion of social capital could, in theory, attenuate or reverse the potential 
welfare gains associated with expansion of formal institutions (such as commodity 
exchanges). For example, Dixit (2004) compares the outcomes of relational and 
formal contracting, and demonstrates that opportunities created by formal 
contracting may undermine the scope for relational contracting. Formal contracting 
may make first-best outcomes unattainable, so that overall efficiency deteriorates as 
formal institutions develop. The mechanism explaining this counter-intuitive result 
is as follows: the harsher the punishment facing deviators, the better the informal 
 
(repetitive) equilibrium that can be sustained. If formal contracting provides a fall-
back option for deviating traders, then deviating will occur more often unless the 
scope for such behaviour is reduced by altering the terms of the informal contract. 
In other words, when the incentive contract is binding and the informal contract 
yields a second-best outcome, then a partial improvement in formal institutions 
worsens the outcome of the informal contract. However, even in the absence of 
such counter-intuitive outcomes, it is important for policy makers to realise that 
formal institutions have an effect on informal institutions, and that the expansion 
of formal contracts, by new regulations or policies, may invite the erosion of norms 
and informal rules in the same or adjacent domains of human interaction. 
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abstract 
Trade credit is an important source of financing for businesses, especially in less 
developed countries. This chapter uses two unique surveys of 195 Ethiopian 
sesame traders held in 2010 and 2012 to investigate the nexus between 
performance, credit, and social capital. To obtain credit, a trader needs social capital 
(a few trusted trade partners), but this may limit his ability to buy from other 
traders. The chapter finds that small traders at the upstream end of the trade 
network need credit most, but at the same time, they also need to assemble small 
amounts of sesame from a large number of trade contacts. The Ethiopian 
Commodity Exchange, which became mandatory for all sesame trade after 2010, 
has made trade credit less common although its importance did not decrease. The 
policy implications are that better credit facilities should be available to small 
traders, who are typically overlooked in microcredit schemes and are usually cash-
constrained. 
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6.1 introduction 
Trade credit occurs when there is a delay between the delivery of goods or the 
provision of services by a supplier and payment. It is an important form of 
financing for businesses in countries with well-developed financial markets, but 
especially in less developed countries where financial institutions are less developed 
(Demirgüç-Kunt & Maksimovic 2002; Fisman 2001; Fisman & Love 2003). A lack 
of external financing for (small) firms and traders in such countries is usually a 
constraint to their performance (Fafchamps & Gabre-Madhin 2006; Jabbar et al. 
2008; Lyon 2003; Nkonya 2002; Santorum & Tabaijuka 1992) resulting in lower 
economic growth (Beck et al. 2008). 
 Several studies on trade credit appeared in the 1990s, when many African 
(agricultural) markets were liberalised. Liberalisation was expected to induce 
massive trader entry and the development of competitive markets in Africa. 
Research has identified various constraints that explain why this did not happen. 
For instance, limited access to credit may have limited trader entry to more easily 
accessible niches in which credit and state connections are relatively unimportant 
(Jabbar et al. 2008; Santorum & Tabaijuka 1992). 
 A number of studies have pointed out that traders are often financially 
constrained and that informal trade credit plays an important role. For instance, 
Lyon (2000) describes that in the tomato trade in Ghana, 11% of the farmers 
obtain credit from traders, while around 67% of traders obtain credit from farmers 
or other traders. Gabre-Madhin (2001) reports for the Ethiopian grain trade that 
credit provided by and to traders plays an important role in grain traders’ business. 
However, trade credit does not play an important role in all markets. Fafchamps 
(2004) finds that most transactions in Madagascar, Benin, and Malawi take a simple 
cash-and-carry form and that supplier credit is infrequent. 
 Despite its importance, there are relatively few analytical studies on trade 
credit between agricultural traders in developing countries. Most studies focusing 
on agricultural trade credit are descriptive, and have limited empirical or 
econometric analysis (e.g. Cook et al. 1990; Fafchamps 2004; Fuentes 1998; Lyon 
2003; Osborne 2005; Shepherd 2004), with the exception of Hermes et al. (2012) 
and Nguyen (2011). Studies on trade credit in developing countries have generally 
concentrated on manufacturing firms (Ayele et al. 2009 on handloom business; 
Biggs et al. 2002; Bigsten et al. 2003; Fafchamps 1997; Fafchamps 2004; Fisman 
2001; Fisman & Raturi 2004; McMillan & Woodruff 1999). The empirical literature 
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is usually based on the analysis of large but perhaps unrepresentative firms across 
countries, reflecting data availability (Beck et al. 2008). In addition, while several 
studies focus on the determinants of trade credit, few studies ask why trade credit is 
important in the first place (Fisman 2001). 
 In this chapter, I investigate the interplay between credit, social (network) 
capital, and performance by exploring four hypotheses. First, social capital is 
important for obtaining credit as it relies on trust relations to reduce the risk of 
non-repayment. Second, credit leads to higher performance, as it facilitates traders 
to purchase more at a particular time. Third, because small traders have different 
assets, they will pursue different strategies than large traders. Fourth, the ECX has 
had an influence on traders’ credit relations and performance. Chapter five finds 
that the newly established ECX has changed the informal relationships between 
sesame traders after 2010, when the ECX became a mandatory trade channel. 
 This chapter aims to unravel the close relationship between three factors: 
performance, credit, and social capital. Social capital is important for providing and 
receiving trade credit, as traders need to trust that the loan will be paid back. 
Knowledge of the trustworthiness of the trade partner is important, as is 
knowledge about his or her business. Social capital and credit both may contribute 
to performance. Trading with a few trusted partners who provide credit may be a 
successful strategy to obtain credit and increase working capital, with which larger 
volumes may be purchased (see also Nguyen 2011). However, it may also be a 
restricting strategy, as it obliges traders to restrict their trade partners to these 
trusted few. A different strategy may be to trade with many trade partners, based 
not on trust relationships and possibility to obtain credit, but on amounts of 
sesame for sale and price. This may reduce the amount of credit, however (Ali & 
Peerlings 2011). Kranton (1996) explains the interaction between reciprocal 
exchange systems and anonymous market exchanges. In reciprocal exchange, 
traders may economise on search costs but obtain only the commodity sold by 
their exchange partner. Traders who use the market have access to a variety of 
goods, however they must search for trading partners. According to Kranton (ibid), 
the two systems crowd each other out: if many traders engage in market exchange, 
the market is thick and it is easy to buy and sell but difficult to enforce reciprocal 
exchange. If many people engage in reciprocal exchange, the market becomes thin 
and it becomes more difficult to find trading partners. 
 To explore the questions raised, I use different types of analyses. The 
analysis is constrained by various endogenous relationships. Various studies note 
 
that social capital and working capital might be endogenous to performance 
(Fafchamps & Minten 2001b; Minten et al. 2013). The amount purchased may 
(partly) also determine working capital, or the number of social contacts of a trader. 
Credit may also be endogenous to performance: traders who purchase large 
amounts may receive credit more easily. As there are various possible endogenous 
relationships, I use a new approach (Lewbel’s method) to cope with endogeneity 
issues, which circumvents some of the typical problems of finding suitable 
instrumental variables. To analyse the different strategies pursued by small versus 
large traders, I use quantile regressions, which are suited to explore heterogeneity of 
traders. Finally, I compare different years. Two datasets were collected in 2010 and 
in 2012. In 2010, the ECX became mandatory for sesame export (see chapter two 
for more information on the ECX). Chapter five finds that the ECX has modified 
the social capital relations of traders. Social capital has become less important, 
which has had repercussions on trade credit, which has become less frequent. 
 The analyses show that credit is an important factor in explaining the 
performance of sesame traders but that its role is not straightforward because it is 
tied to social capital. Trading with regular suppliers (social capital) increases the 
likelihood of receiving credit and increases working capital, but reduces the ability 
to purchase large amounts of sesame from multiple traders. Trading with a large 
number of traders (social network capital) increases the amount purchased, but 
reduces the likelihood of obtaining credit, constraining working capital. The 
analyses also shows that the strategy pursued depends on the type of trader and his 
location in the market; small traders who need to accumulate purchases from a 
large number of small traders and farmers seem to employ the second strategy, 
while large traders who need a few large traders to purchase from seem to follow 
the first strategy. 
 Section 6.2 provides a literature review focusing on the different reasons 
why traders extend trade credit, and discusses the literature on trader performance 
and social capital. The hypotheses and research questions are formulated on the 
basis of this literature review. Section 6.3 introduces the data and explains the 
methodology used. Section 6.4 presents the results. Section 6.5 discusses why the 
results differ for small and large traders and section 6.6 compares the “before and 
after” situation of the ECX. Section 6.7 presents conclusions. 
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6.2 literature review 
6.2.1 why do traders extend credit? 
The literature offers various theories explaining the use of trade credit for both 
suppliers and for customers. Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano (2010) distinguish 
financial, operational, and commercial motives. 
 Financial motives for using credit consist of the fact that sellers of products 
have advantages over financial institutions when it comes to information 
acquisition and monitoring of debtors (Petersen & Rajan 1994; Petersen & Rajan 
1997). Suppliers of credit can monitor their customers more closely than financial 
institutions. In addition, the merchandise represents more valuable collateral for 
suppliers than for financial institutions. This motive predicts that firms with easier 
and cheaper access to capital markets will provide more trade credit, while those 
with fewer financial options will resort more to trade credit from their suppliers. 
Beck et al. (2008) confirm this hypothesis in a study of financing patterns of firms 
across 48 countries (except Africa). They note that although small firms use 
significantly more informal finance, such as trade credit than large firms, financing 
from such sources is limited and does little to relax financial constraints. 
 Operational motives for trade credit consist of the benefits linked to 
separating the exchange of goods and payment. If the frequency of purchase is 
either unknown or varies in time, firms need to keep a precautionary level of cash 
holdings to settle these payments. Trade credit transforms an uncertain stream of 
money payments into a sequence that can be known with greater certainty and 
removes the reason for precautionary money holding (Ferris 1981). Especially in 
developing countries, holding on to large amounts of cash may be a problem 
because of risk of theft (Fafchamps 1997; Fafchamps 2004). Trade credit therefore 
also removes the risk associated with carrying larger than necessary sums of cash. It 
provides more flexibility in the conduct of operations (Emery 1984). Finally, firms 
without access to liquidity face barriers to the optimal handling of working capital, 
leading to inventory shortages, and resulting in discontinuities and inefficiencies in 
production. Fisman (2001) finds for five African countries that supplier credit is 
indeed positively correlated with capacity utilisation. 
 Commercial reasons to provide trade credit include the use of trade credit as 
a form of price discrimination by firms, enabling a firm to sell the same product at 
different prices to different customers. Trade credit can also be a way to allow a 
 
customer a period of evaluation of the product, and thus implicitly guarantee 
quality. Ayele et al. (2009) and Fafchamps (2004) find this to be true for traders in 
manufacturing businesses in Africa. It is not clear though whether this motive is 
applicable to agricultural traders in developing countries as usually the goods are 
inspected on the spot. In Ethiopia, for instance, bags of sesame are routinely 
emptied for inspection and put into new bags. 
 A fourth motive for trade credit, not mentioned by Garcia-Teruel & 
Martinez-Solano (2010), is that in a competitive market,29 trade credit can be seen 
as an additional service by which one can attract more buyers and sellers: if trade 
credit is not provided, customers may threaten to purchase from an alternative 
supplier (Fisman & Raturi 2004; Van Horen 2005; Cuñat 2007; Giannetti et al. 
2011; Hermes et al. 2012; Osborne 2005). This argument is disputed by some, who 
argue that suppliers of credit in competitive markets may face difficulties in 
enforcing payment, since buyers may simply renege and move on to other credit 
suppliers (McMillan & Woodruff 1999 for firms in Vietnam; Petersen & Rajan 
1997 for the US). 
 Surprisingly, few authors have focused on the effect of credit on 
performance indicators such as the amount purchased and sold, revenues, or gross 
margins (Akoten et al. 2006; Fisman 2001). Kihanga (2010) explains that Tanzanian 
rice traders provide and receive credit to sell or buy large amounts of rice. By 
receiving credit, traders are able to purchase larger amounts which they could not 
have purchased otherwise. By providing trade credit, traders enable customers to 
purchase large quantities (which they would not be able to afford without trade 
credit) increasing the turnover of trade (avoiding capital being tied up in stock). 
6.2.2 the importance of social capital 
As extending trade credit always entails the risk that credit will not be repaid, 
especially in countries with weak legal enforcement, trade credit depends on the 
extent to which suppliers trust customers (Guiso et al. 2004). Several studies find 
that trade credit is only provided to customers with whom suppliers have 
developed long-term trust relationships (Biggs & Shah 2006; Giannetti et al. 2011) 
or in regions with high social trust (Wu et al. 2014). Traders may thus prefer not to 
provide trade credit to all clients. 
29 The authors do not mean perfect competition where profits are reduced to zero and 
credit would be too costly. 
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 Several papers have looked into ethnic ties (Ali & Peerlings 2011; Biggs et al. 
2002; Fafchamps 1997). These authors find that ethnicity itself is not the 
determinant of trade credit, but that by facilitating credible information flows about 
the creditworthiness of firms, ethnic ties are important. In a similar vein, Macmillan 
& Woodruff (1999) observe that belonging to a business network increases trade 
credit. Fafchamps (1997) discovers sharp differences in purchasing on credit across 
ethnic groups and firm sizes. Ali & Peerlings (2011) find for Ethiopian handloom 
producers and traders that ethnic ties in credit provisions lock producers into trade 
relationships, even when the impact of ethnic ties on economic performance of 
producers result in lower profits. In Ethiopia, where there are more than 80 
languages and as many ethno-linguistic groups, ethnic ties play an important role 
both the day-to-day lives of people and in trade relationships (Ali & Peerlings 
2011). Other authors find that ethnic, clanship, kinship, or religious ties play a 
minimal role in contract enforcement or business relations, such as credit 
(Fafchamps 1997; Haji 2010). 
6.2.3 factors contributing to performance 
Studies by Fafchamps, Minten and Gabre-Madhin on African agricultural markets 
find that both working capital and social network capital are important 
determinants of performance indicators, such as gross value, gross margins, or 
turnover (Fafchamps 2004; Fafchamps & Minten 2001b; Fafchamps et al. 2005; 
Gabre-Madhin 2001). These did not include credit as a factor. Few studies have 
analysed to what extent trade credit contributes to performance of agricultural 
traders. Akoten et al. (2006) find that factors that affect access to credit are 
different from those affecting profitability and growth of firms, indicating that 
credit access is not a decisive factor determining firm performance. Jabbar et al. 
(2008) found that “borrowing” for livestock trade has no significant impact on 
performance (gross margins). Osborne (2005), who did not analyse trade credit per 
se but liquidity, finds that although greater liquidity permits greater purchasing, it 
coincides with a lower expected net marginal revenue (selling price less full 
marginal cost) because traders pay a somewhat higher purchase price. 
 Jabbar et al. (2008) use a comprehensive framework to analyse the factors 
that contribute to performance of (livestock) traders in Ethiopia. They distinguish 
assets (physical, financial, human, and social capital), trading practices, and 
transaction costs. Their analysis shows that traders' financial and human capital as 
 
well as trading practices such as use of brokers and regular suppliers and customers 
had varying effects on margins and costs of cattle and small ruminant trade 
6.2.4 key questions 
The literature review shows that there are various reasons why traders use and 
provide trade credit. The different reasons link up with performance, working 
capital, and social capital. The operational motive for trade credit, consisting of the 
benefits linked to separating the exchange of goods and payment, is relevant for 
performance. The operational motives suggest that trade credit is important for 
performance as it allows traders to increase their working capital without the 
associated risk of carrying large amounts of cash. It permits the trader to be more 
flexible, i.e. purchase goods when the price is right, even if the trader is short on 
cash. Trade credit may facilitate the sales of goods to traders short of cash, by 
extending trade credit. 
 The other motives are closely linked to social capital, which is critical for 
trade credit (see also Grootaert & Bastelaer 2002). The financial motives explain 
that suppliers of credit can monitor their customers more closely than financial 
institutions, but this is only true when traders know each other’s business well. The 
commercial reasons to provide trade credit are that trade credit can be used as a 
form of price discrimination by firms, enabling a firm to sell the same product at 
different prices to different customers. This is again linked to social capital, as 
offering different prices through credit may help cement relationships in a social 
capital setting. The fourth motive for trade credit, whereby trade credit can be seen 
as an additional service by which a trader can attract and “tie” buyers and sellers, 
may be seen as increasing and solidifying social (network) capital. 
 The literature seems to have ignored the question of how the different 
motives for trade credit are linked – specifically how social capital, trade credit, and 
performance are linked. Social capital motives may counteract the operational 
motive: the motive to “tie” customers through credit relationships in competitive 
markets may not be beneficial to buyers of sesame who then forfeit the option to 
buy from other traders (who may provide larger amounts of sesame of better 
quality or for a better price). Trade credit may increase performance by increasing 
working capital, but to obtain credit, traders require social capital, which in turn 
may restrict the number of traders they can trade with, thus potentially decreasing 
performance. 
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 Several papers have looked into ethnic ties (Ali & Peerlings 2011; Biggs et al. 
2002; Fafchamps 1997). These authors find that ethnicity itself is not the 
determinant of trade credit, but that by facilitating credible information flows about 
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 To investigate the interplay between credit, social (network) capital, and 
performance four questions are discussed. First, what is the role of social capital in 
obtaining trade credit?. Second, does trade credit lead to better performance (i.e. 
more sales)? Third, do small traders pursue different strategies than large traders? 
Fourth, what was the influence of the ECX on traders’ credit relations and 
performance?  
6.3 methodology 
6.3.1 data collection 
I pool two waves of cross-section data collected in 2010 and in 2012. Pooling two 
or more independent cross sections is a straightforward extension of standard 
cross-sectional methods; nothing new needs to be done in stating assumptions. The 
practically important issue is allowing for different intercepts, and possibly different 
slopes, across time (Wooldridge 2010). This is done in the analysis by adding a year 
dummy and doing the analyses by year. Data were collected in fourteen main 
sesame growing zones30 (in the Amhara, Benishangul Gumez, Oromiya, and Tigray 
Regions). Almost all sesame is destined for Addis Ababa, from where it is exported, 
and therefore Addis Ababa zone was also included. A total of 51 markets in 34 
different woredas were selected for the survey. These 51 markets represent various 
markets, from small town markets to main wholesale markets (such as Humera, 
Gonder, and Nekemte), allowing for a variety of traders to be interviewed. Table 22 
shows the type of trader for each region. Only four traders were interviewed in 
Benishangul Gumez, which is a relatively new and minor sesame producing area. 
 At the time of the first survey, about 100 traders were registered with ECX 
to trade with sesame, but only a handful had started trading a small amount 
through ECX. When the second survey was conducted, trading through the ECX 
(for export) had become mandatory and the number of traders using the ECX had 
increased significantly. Around 63% used the ECX through (other) members, 27% 
had full membership and 8% had limited membership; of those with ECX 
membership, 60% were exporters. 
30 Ethiopia is administratively subdivided into regions (or regional states), zones, woredas 
(districts), and kebeles (wards). 
 
                                                        
 Total participation in the first (second) survey amounted to 194 (196) 
traders. The total number of sesame traders is not known (there is no trading 
license specifically for sesame). However, the surveys constitute a representative 
sample of traders in Ethiopia's sesame markets. Data obtained from EPOSPEA, 
the oilseeds and pulses trade association, lists around 80 sesame exporters in 
Ethiopia. Around half this number participated in the surveys. Ethiopian sesame 
production for 2010 and 2012 was about 450,000 tonnes (FAO 2014). Aggregating 
across individuals, the traders in the sample traded around 300,000 tonnes in both 
years. This amount almost certainly includes some double-counting (as the same 
quantity of sesame may be sold more than once along the value chain), so it cannot 
be concluded that the samples cover 70% of total production. Nonetheless these 
statistics do suggest that the surveys cover a sizeable share of total sesame 
production. See Loveridge (1995) on sampling traders, who also notes that even if 
the total size of the trader sample is small, it may represent a sizeable share of 
produce traded. 
Table 22: Types of trader per region in surveys for 2010 and 2012 
Region Assembler 
Mixed 
activities Retailer Wholesaler Exporter Broker Total 
Addis 
Ababa 5 11 3 14 101 5 139 
Amhara 44 8 8 60 8   128 
Benishangul 
Gumez 1     3     4 
Oromiya 4   6 50     60 
Tigray 16 4 4 24 11   59 
Total 70 23 21 151 120 5 390 
Note: 105 traders participated in both surveys. 
 
 Table 23 shows the means and standard deviations for the variables included 
in the analysis of determinants of credit as well as the total amount purchased. 
These will also be used later on in the chapter, to analyse the differences for 2010 
and 2012. 
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 Total participation in the first (second) survey amounted to 194 (196) 
traders. The total number of sesame traders is not known (there is no trading 
license specifically for sesame). However, the surveys constitute a representative 
sample of traders in Ethiopia's sesame markets. Data obtained from EPOSPEA, 
the oilseeds and pulses trade association, lists around 80 sesame exporters in 
Ethiopia. Around half this number participated in the surveys. Ethiopian sesame 
production for 2010 and 2012 was about 450,000 tonnes (FAO 2014). Aggregating 
across individuals, the traders in the sample traded around 300,000 tonnes in both 
years. This amount almost certainly includes some double-counting (as the same 
quantity of sesame may be sold more than once along the value chain), so it cannot 
be concluded that the samples cover 70% of total production. Nonetheless these 
statistics do suggest that the surveys cover a sizeable share of total sesame 
production. See Loveridge (1995) on sampling traders, who also notes that even if 
the total size of the trader sample is small, it may represent a sizeable share of 
produce traded. 
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Mixed 
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Addis 
Ababa 5 11 3 14 101 5 139 
Amhara 44 8 8 60 8   128 
Benishangul 
Gumez 1     3     4 
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Note: 105 traders participated in both surveys. 
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in the analysis of determinants of credit as well as the total amount purchased. 
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Table 23: Means and standard deviations for variables 
 All 2010 2012 
 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Total amount purchased (log) 6.45 
(1.49) 
6.70 
(1.49) 
6.22 
(1.45) 
Do your suppliers provide you with credit? (0=no, 1=yes) 
(credit_yn) 
0.83 
(0.38) 
0.88 
(0.32) 
0.78 
(0.41) 
How often do suppliers let you buy on credit? (1=never, 
2=some, 3=all) (oftencredit) 
1.88 
(0.76) 
2.12 
(0.64) 
1.64 
(0.79) 
What share of your purchases is bought with credit? (in %) 
(sharecredit) 
19.71 
(32.64) 
10.54 
(21.92) 
28.84 
(38.53) 
Number of intermediaries used (interm) 3.66 
(4.33) 
3.06 
(4.29) 
4.26 
(4.29) 
Assets    
Number of trucks (truck) 1.91 
(5.07) 
2.22 
(4.97) 
1.60 
(5.16) 
Log of working capital (wcap) 14.42 
(2.03) 
14.74 
(2.47) 
14.11 
(1.40) 
Total number of languages spoken (lan) 2.31 
(0.91) 
2.64 
(0.91) 
1.98 
(0.79) 
Education (edu) 1.65 
(1.16) 
1.25 
(1.23) 
2.08 
(0.91) 
Total number of traders’ contacts (sellers) (tradecont) 2.59 
(15.44) 
1.71 
(2.70) 
3.45 
(21.58) 
Total regular contacts (regtrad) 104.39 
(94.91) 
89.87 
(75.37) 
118.70 
(109.16) 
Transaction costs    
Log of transaction costs per quintal (tc) 5.50 
(1.76) 
4.10 
(0.85) 
6.87 
(1.26) 
Control variables       
Exporter (expo) 0.31 
(0.46) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
Wholesaler (whol) 0.39 
(0.49) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
Retailer (reta) 0.05 
(0.23) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
Assembler (asse) 0.18 
(0.39) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
Gender of trader (sex) 1.07 
(0.25) 
1.09 
(0.28) 
1.05 
(0.22) 
Firm age (firm_age) 9.00 
(6.96) 
10.80 
(8.60) 
7.23 
(4.17) 
Age of trader (age) 40.04 
(7.96) 
40.95 
(8.81) 
39.15 
(6.91 
N 194 
 
6.3.2 analysing determinants of credit 
I use three variables that measure credit: (i) a binary variable that indicates whether 
traders have received credit or not; (ii) an ordinal variable that indicates how often a 
trader receives credit (never, sometimes, and always); and (iii) a continuous variable 
that indicates what share of sesame was purchased with credit. 
 To analyse the determinants of whether a trader had received credit or not, I 
use a probability model for binary choices (Greene & Hensher 2010). The observed 
outcome ci, is determined by a latent regression: 
𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾′𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (3) 
The random variable ci takes two values, one and zero, with probabilities 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ > 0|𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝜸𝜸𝜸𝜸′𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 0) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > −𝜸𝜸𝜸𝜸′𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊). 
 
 
(4) 
 The model is completed by the specification of a particular probability 
distribution for εi. I use a logit model, which had a better fit than the probit model. 
In the logit model, f(εi) is kept in the standardised form with the implied standard 
deviation, σ = π/√3, where π =Prob(class = c) (Greene & Hensher 2010, p. 16). 
 The second variable for credit (how often a trader receives credit from 
traders) is ordinal with three ordered categories. The model has a latent regression 
model: 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝛃𝛃𝛃𝛃′𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (5) 
In which the continuous latent measure di* is observed in discrete form through a 
censoring mechanism: 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇−1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇0 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 
=... = 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽−1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽  
 
 
 
(6) 
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Table 23: Means and standard deviations for variables 
 All 2010 2012 
 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Mean 
(s.e.) 
Total amount purchased (log) 6.45 
(1.49) 
6.70 
(1.49) 
6.22 
(1.45) 
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(credit_yn) 
0.83 
(0.38) 
0.88 
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0.78 
(0.41) 
How often do suppliers let you buy on credit? (1=never, 
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1.88 
(0.76) 
2.12 
(0.64) 
1.64 
(0.79) 
What share of your purchases is bought with credit? (in %) 
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19.71 
(32.64) 
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(21.92) 
28.84 
(38.53) 
Number of intermediaries used (interm) 3.66 
(4.33) 
3.06 
(4.29) 
4.26 
(4.29) 
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Number of trucks (truck) 1.91 
(5.07) 
2.22 
(4.97) 
1.60 
(5.16) 
Log of working capital (wcap) 14.42 
(2.03) 
14.74 
(2.47) 
14.11 
(1.40) 
Total number of languages spoken (lan) 2.31 
(0.91) 
2.64 
(0.91) 
1.98 
(0.79) 
Education (edu) 1.65 
(1.16) 
1.25 
(1.23) 
2.08 
(0.91) 
Total number of traders’ contacts (sellers) (tradecont) 2.59 
(15.44) 
1.71 
(2.70) 
3.45 
(21.58) 
Total regular contacts (regtrad) 104.39 
(94.91) 
89.87 
(75.37) 
118.70 
(109.16) 
Transaction costs    
Log of transaction costs per quintal (tc) 5.50 
(1.76) 
4.10 
(0.85) 
6.87 
(1.26) 
Control variables       
Exporter (expo) 0.31 
(0.46) 
0.39 
(0.49) 
0.23 
(0.42) 
Wholesaler (whol) 0.39 
(0.49) 
0.37 
(0.48) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
Retailer (reta) 0.05 
(0.23) 
0.07 
(0.26) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
Assembler (asse) 0.18 
(0.39) 
0.09 
(0.29) 
0.27 
(0.44) 
Gender of trader (sex) 1.07 
(0.25) 
1.09 
(0.28) 
1.05 
(0.22) 
Firm age (firm_age) 9.00 
(6.96) 
10.80 
(8.60) 
7.23 
(4.17) 
Age of trader (age) 40.04 
(7.96) 
40.95 
(8.81) 
39.15 
(6.91 
N 194 
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The random variable ci takes two values, one and zero, with probabilities 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1|𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ > 0|𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝜸𝜸𝜸𝜸′𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 0) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > −𝜸𝜸𝜸𝜸′𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊). 
 
 
(4) 
 The model is completed by the specification of a particular probability 
distribution for εi. I use a logit model, which had a better fit than the probit model. 
In the logit model, f(εi) is kept in the standardised form with the implied standard 
deviation, σ = π/√3, where π =Prob(class = c) (Greene & Hensher 2010, p. 16). 
 The second variable for credit (how often a trader receives credit from 
traders) is ordinal with three ordered categories. The model has a latent regression 
model: 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝛃𝛃𝛃𝛃′𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊  + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑛𝑛𝑛𝑛 (5) 
In which the continuous latent measure di* is observed in discrete form through a 
censoring mechanism: 
𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇−1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇0 = 1 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇0 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇1 
=... = 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽−1 < 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽  
 
 
 
(6) 
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The probabilities associated with the observed outcomes are 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗|𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝜷𝜷𝜷𝜷′𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊� − 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃�𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗−1 − 𝜷𝜷𝜷𝜷𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒙𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊�, 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗= 0,1, … , 𝐽𝐽𝐽𝐽 (7) 
 The standard treatment completes the ordered choice model by assuming 
either a standard normal distribution for εi or a standardised logistic distribution 
(mean zero, variance π2/3), which produces the ordered logit model (Greene & 
Hensher 2010). I use a standard ordered logit model, again because this was a 
better fit than its alternative, the ordered probit model. 
 The share purchased with credit is a continuous variable and was analysed 
using a simple OLS regression. The robust option was chosen for estimating the 
standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimators. 
 The explanatory variables in all three models are partly based on the 
literature review, which identified working capital and social capital as explanations 
why credit is provided or received. For social capital two proxies are used, number 
of trading contacts (representing social network capital) and number of regular 
customers, in line with the models for performance. In addition, personal 
characteristics (gender, age, education, and languages spoken) are included, as a 
business characteristics (age of firm, whether firm uses buying agent or broker, 
total number of people in firm, and number of trucks). Finally control variables 
year and type of trader are included. To make the link with performance, the same 
variables are included as for the analysis of performance. 
6.3.3 analysing performance 
Jabbar et al. (2008) use a comprehensive framework for analysing the factors that 
contribute to performance, which is used for this study. The relationships between 
trading performance, assets, trading practices and transaction costs may be 
specified in the following way: 
Q = f(A; T,C) (8) 
A = f (M, K, H, S)  (9) 
where Q is a measure of performance of a trader (volume of purchases); A 
represents assets. T is some indicator of trading practice(s), which includes mode of 
payment (credit) as well as intermediaries used, as do Jabbar et al. (ibid). Traders 
 
use a variety of payment terms to settle their transactions of goods and services. 
Trade credit comes in various forms: I distinguish between sale and purchase trade 
credit, and advance payments. When deciding payment terms, suppliers 
simultaneously determine their sales on trade credit, their demand for cash in 
advance, and their cash sales. Mateut and Zanchettin (2013) for instance, find that 
while many firms use supplier credit and cash in advance as substitutes, for small 
vendors, advance payments and credits sales are complementary terms of payment. 
Most traders are buyers and sellers of sesame and may thus receive credit from 
their suppliers’ credit (purchase credit) as well as provide credit to their customers 
(sales credit). This chapter focuses on traders who receive credit. Traders use 
various intermediaries (brokers, and buying and selling agents). I include the total 
number of intermediaries used. Finally, C represents the transaction costs involved 
(in terms of time to find a trader, negotiate, etc.). 
 M, K, H, S are respectively measures or proxies of physical, financial, 
human, and social capital. Physical capital (M) is proxied by the number of trucks 
owned. Financial capital (K) is proxied by working capital. Whether a trader has 
received a loan from the bank was not included. The bank loan may be added to 
working capital, thus double counting. Around a third of traders received loans 
from a bank. Because a bank loan may have an influence on the credit received, I 
tested whether including this variable would make a difference, which was not the 
case. Number of languages spoken and education level are used for human capital 
(H). In their study on performance, Fafchamps and Minten use “traders you know” 
as proxy for social capital (S). I use a close proxy “number of trade contacts”. This 
variable reflects the social network capital of a trader. The second proxy for social 
capital is the number of regular traders whom the trader regularly trades with, 
because there is a (long-term) relationship. Finally, a number of control variables 
are included: year, type of trader, gender and age of trader, as well as firm age. 
6.3.4 quantile regression to model heterogeneity 
The dataset contains traders who display a high degree of heterogeneity in the 
amount of sesame purchased. Quantile regression models heterogeneous effects of 
different variables on a dependent variable. It allows for heteroskedasticity among 
the disturbances (Koenker 2005). The quantile regression model is: 
𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  ~ 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑐𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (0) =  𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏(1) (10) 
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The probabilities associated with the observed outcomes are 
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 The standard treatment completes the ordered choice model by assuming 
either a standard normal distribution for εi or a standardised logistic distribution 
(mean zero, variance π2/3), which produces the ordered logit model (Greene & 
Hensher 2010). I use a standard ordered logit model, again because this was a 
better fit than its alternative, the ordered probit model. 
 The share purchased with credit is a continuous variable and was analysed 
using a simple OLS regression. The robust option was chosen for estimating the 
standard errors using the Huber-White sandwich estimators. 
 The explanatory variables in all three models are partly based on the 
literature review, which identified working capital and social capital as explanations 
why credit is provided or received. For social capital two proxies are used, number 
of trading contacts (representing social network capital) and number of regular 
customers, in line with the models for performance. In addition, personal 
characteristics (gender, age, education, and languages spoken) are included, as a 
business characteristics (age of firm, whether firm uses buying agent or broker, 
total number of people in firm, and number of trucks). Finally control variables 
year and type of trader are included. To make the link with performance, the same 
variables are included as for the analysis of performance. 
6.3.3 analysing performance 
Jabbar et al. (2008) use a comprehensive framework for analysing the factors that 
contribute to performance, which is used for this study. The relationships between 
trading performance, assets, trading practices and transaction costs may be 
specified in the following way: 
Q = f(A; T,C) (8) 
A = f (M, K, H, S)  (9) 
where Q is a measure of performance of a trader (volume of purchases); A 
represents assets. T is some indicator of trading practice(s), which includes mode of 
payment (credit) as well as intermediaries used, as do Jabbar et al. (ibid). Traders 
 
use a variety of payment terms to settle their transactions of goods and services. 
Trade credit comes in various forms: I distinguish between sale and purchase trade 
credit, and advance payments. When deciding payment terms, suppliers 
simultaneously determine their sales on trade credit, their demand for cash in 
advance, and their cash sales. Mateut and Zanchettin (2013) for instance, find that 
while many firms use supplier credit and cash in advance as substitutes, for small 
vendors, advance payments and credits sales are complementary terms of payment. 
Most traders are buyers and sellers of sesame and may thus receive credit from 
their suppliers’ credit (purchase credit) as well as provide credit to their customers 
(sales credit). This chapter focuses on traders who receive credit. Traders use 
various intermediaries (brokers, and buying and selling agents). I include the total 
number of intermediaries used. Finally, C represents the transaction costs involved 
(in terms of time to find a trader, negotiate, etc.). 
 M, K, H, S are respectively measures or proxies of physical, financial, 
human, and social capital. Physical capital (M) is proxied by the number of trucks 
owned. Financial capital (K) is proxied by working capital. Whether a trader has 
received a loan from the bank was not included. The bank loan may be added to 
working capital, thus double counting. Around a third of traders received loans 
from a bank. Because a bank loan may have an influence on the credit received, I 
tested whether including this variable would make a difference, which was not the 
case. Number of languages spoken and education level are used for human capital 
(H). In their study on performance, Fafchamps and Minten use “traders you know” 
as proxy for social capital (S). I use a close proxy “number of trade contacts”. This 
variable reflects the social network capital of a trader. The second proxy for social 
capital is the number of regular traders whom the trader regularly trades with, 
because there is a (long-term) relationship. Finally, a number of control variables 
are included: year, type of trader, gender and age of trader, as well as firm age. 
6.3.4 quantile regression to model heterogeneity 
The dataset contains traders who display a high degree of heterogeneity in the 
amount of sesame purchased. Quantile regression models heterogeneous effects of 
different variables on a dependent variable. It allows for heteroskedasticity among 
the disturbances (Koenker 2005). The quantile regression model is: 
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where i denotes the individual (trader), 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable, Xi is the vector 
of covariates for individual i, 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 denotes the quantile-specific linear effects, and 
0< 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏<1 is a given quantile. Compared with a linear regression model, the 
coefficients of a quantile regression model are allowed to vary between quantiles. 
They are represented in (1) as an unknown function of the quantile 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏. The 
unknown error term 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is characterised by an unspecified cumulative distribution 
function 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . No specific distributional assumptions are made about 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  except 
that the distribution function at 0 is 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏. This is known as a linear quantile restriction 
which may be relaxed if non-parametric versions of the quantile regression models 
are used. 
 The difference between a linear regression model and a quantile regression 
model is that the former assumes that the response variable is conditionally 
Gaussian, which means that the mean equation applies to all parts of the 
distribution. The quantile regression makes no such distributional assumptions, and 
therefore the conditional quantile function may vary across quantiles. Quantile 
regression is not the same as the regressions based on split samples because every 
quantile regression utilises all sample data (with diﬀerent weights). This means that 
quantile regressions avoid the sample selection problem arising from sample 
splitting. In this chapter both methods (quantile regressions and splitting sample 
data) are used. 
6.3.5 lewbel’s approach to take into account endogeneity 
Various studies note that social capital and working capital might be endogenous to 
performance (Fafchamps & Minten 2001b; Minten et al. 2013). Endogeneity issues 
may therefore play a role in the analyses. A loop of causality between the 
independent variables credit and social capital and the dependent variable 
performance is likely to lead to endogeneity issues. The customary approach to take 
into account endogeneity is to use instrumental variables (IV). Reliance on IV 
methods usually requires that appropriate instruments are available to identify the 
model. These instruments (Z), must satisfy three conditions: (i) they must 
themselves satisfy orthogonality conditions (E[uZ] = 0); (ii) they must exhibit 
meaningful correlations with the suspected endogenous variable X; and (iii) they 
must be properly excluded from the model, so that their effect on the dependent 
variable is only indirect. 
 
 Finding appropriate instrumental variables that satisfy all three conditions is 
often problematic. Because this was the case in the regressions analyses presented 
above, I apply a relatively new method developed by Lewbel (2012), which 
identifies structural parameters in models with endogenous or mismeasured 
regressors. The identification comes from having regressors uncorrelated with the 
product of heteroskedastic errors. This method enables the identification of 
endogenous regressors when the chosen instrumental variables are weak or non-
existent. The method can also be used to increase the efficiency of the estimates of 
existing instrumental variables. According to Lewbel (2012) identification can be 
achieved if errors display some heteroskedasticity and if regressors exist that are 
uncorrelated with the product of these heteroskedastic errors. Lewbel’s method 
follows the traditional two-stage instrumental variable approach, except that the 
auxiliary equation or “ﬁrst-stage” regression may be used to provide the necessary 
components for Lewbel’s method. 
 In the simplest version of this approach (as outlined in Baum et al. 2013), 
generated instruments can be constructed from the auxiliary equations’ residuals, 
multiplied by each of the included exogenous variables in mean-centred form: 
𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑍𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = �𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋�� ∙ 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖  (11) 
where 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖 is the vector of residuals from the “ﬁrst-stage regression” of each 
endogenous regressor on all exogenous regressors, including a constant vector. 
These auxiliary regression residuals have zero covariance with each of the 
regressors used to construct them, implying that the means of the generated 
instruments will be zero by construction. If there is clear evidence of “scale 
heteroskedasticity” with respect to the regressors, their element-wise products with 
the centred regressors will not be zero. The greater the degree of scale 
heteroskedasticity in the error process, the higher will be the correlation of the 
generated instruments with the included endogenous variables which are the 
regressands in the auxiliary regressions. I make use of this fact by adding a non-
significant but highly heteroskedastic variable (margin between selling and buying 
price, pricemar), to solve problems of unsatisfactory test statistics. Without this 
additional variable pricemar, the overidentification test of all instruments (Hansen J 
statistic) fails. 
 The ivreg2h program for STATA can be used to apply Lewbel’s method, 
which produces three sets of estimates: the standard 2sls (IV) estimates, estimates 
with only generated instruments, and estimates using both generated and excluded 
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where i denotes the individual (trader), 𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is the dependent variable, Xi is the vector 
of covariates for individual i, 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽 denotes the quantile-specific linear effects, and 
0< 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏<1 is a given quantile. Compared with a linear regression model, the 
coefficients of a quantile regression model are allowed to vary between quantiles. 
They are represented in (1) as an unknown function of the quantile 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏. The 
unknown error term 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is characterised by an unspecified cumulative distribution 
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that the distribution function at 0 is 𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏. This is known as a linear quantile restriction 
which may be relaxed if non-parametric versions of the quantile regression models 
are used. 
 The difference between a linear regression model and a quantile regression 
model is that the former assumes that the response variable is conditionally 
Gaussian, which means that the mean equation applies to all parts of the 
distribution. The quantile regression makes no such distributional assumptions, and 
therefore the conditional quantile function may vary across quantiles. Quantile 
regression is not the same as the regressions based on split samples because every 
quantile regression utilises all sample data (with diﬀerent weights). This means that 
quantile regressions avoid the sample selection problem arising from sample 
splitting. In this chapter both methods (quantile regressions and splitting sample 
data) are used. 
6.3.5 lewbel’s approach to take into account endogeneity 
Various studies note that social capital and working capital might be endogenous to 
performance (Fafchamps & Minten 2001b; Minten et al. 2013). Endogeneity issues 
may therefore play a role in the analyses. A loop of causality between the 
independent variables credit and social capital and the dependent variable 
performance is likely to lead to endogeneity issues. The customary approach to take 
into account endogeneity is to use instrumental variables (IV). Reliance on IV 
methods usually requires that appropriate instruments are available to identify the 
model. These instruments (Z), must satisfy three conditions: (i) they must 
themselves satisfy orthogonality conditions (E[uZ] = 0); (ii) they must exhibit 
meaningful correlations with the suspected endogenous variable X; and (iii) they 
must be properly excluded from the model, so that their effect on the dependent 
variable is only indirect. 
 
 Finding appropriate instrumental variables that satisfy all three conditions is 
often problematic. Because this was the case in the regressions analyses presented 
above, I apply a relatively new method developed by Lewbel (2012), which 
identifies structural parameters in models with endogenous or mismeasured 
regressors. The identification comes from having regressors uncorrelated with the 
product of heteroskedastic errors. This method enables the identification of 
endogenous regressors when the chosen instrumental variables are weak or non-
existent. The method can also be used to increase the efficiency of the estimates of 
existing instrumental variables. According to Lewbel (2012) identification can be 
achieved if errors display some heteroskedasticity and if regressors exist that are 
uncorrelated with the product of these heteroskedastic errors. Lewbel’s method 
follows the traditional two-stage instrumental variable approach, except that the 
auxiliary equation or “ﬁrst-stage” regression may be used to provide the necessary 
components for Lewbel’s method. 
 In the simplest version of this approach (as outlined in Baum et al. 2013), 
generated instruments can be constructed from the auxiliary equations’ residuals, 
multiplied by each of the included exogenous variables in mean-centred form: 
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where 𝜖𝜖𝜖𝜖 is the vector of residuals from the “ﬁrst-stage regression” of each 
endogenous regressor on all exogenous regressors, including a constant vector. 
These auxiliary regression residuals have zero covariance with each of the 
regressors used to construct them, implying that the means of the generated 
instruments will be zero by construction. If there is clear evidence of “scale 
heteroskedasticity” with respect to the regressors, their element-wise products with 
the centred regressors will not be zero. The greater the degree of scale 
heteroskedasticity in the error process, the higher will be the correlation of the 
generated instruments with the included endogenous variables which are the 
regressands in the auxiliary regressions. I make use of this fact by adding a non-
significant but highly heteroskedastic variable (margin between selling and buying 
price, pricemar), to solve problems of unsatisfactory test statistics. Without this 
additional variable pricemar, the overidentification test of all instruments (Hansen J 
statistic) fails. 
 The ivreg2h program for STATA can be used to apply Lewbel’s method, 
which produces three sets of estimates: the standard 2sls (IV) estimates, estimates 
with only generated instruments, and estimates using both generated and excluded 
 
30629 Meijerink.indd   149 26-10-14   10:38
150
Chapter 6
instruments. In the latter case, of an underidentiﬁed equation, only the estimates 
using generated instruments are displayed. The robust option is chosen, which 
produces robust standard errors. 
6.3.6 before and after the ECX 
Two sets of data are used, one from 2010 and one from 2012. However, in 
between these two years, the ECX became a mandatory trading place for all sesame 
for export (which is over 90% of total sesame production). Linked to the ECX are 
local Primary Transaction Centres (PTCs), mandatory market places where farmers 
and different traders meet. These PTCs are equipped with weighing equipment and 
quality control, for example. The ECX also includes a number of local warehouses, 
where sesame to be sold at the ECX trading floor in Addis Ababa is stored until it 
is bought and shipped off. A warehouse receipt system, whereby traders (and 
occasionally farmers) receive credit is likewise part of the ECX. The obligation to 
sell through the ECX has had repercussions for the sesame traders, and especially 
the social trade networks (see chapter five). The formal institution of the ECX 
appears to have reduced the (need for) social and network capital. This may have 
had repercussions on the relationship between performance, credit, and social 
capital. 
 Care should be taken not to see this as a rigorous “before and after” impact 
assessment. It is not, as various other external factors may explain the difference 
between 2010 and 2012, such as (international) prices for sesame, foreign exchange 
availability, and exchange rate, to mention a few. 
6.4 results 
6.4.1 determinants of credit 
To analyse what role social capital (number of regulars) and network capital 
(number of trade contact) play in receiving credit, I analyse which factors 
contribute to the three different variables for credit. Table 24 shows the results. 
 
Table 24: Results of determinants of credit 
Variable  Logit 
credit_yn 
Ordered logit 
oftencredit 
Linear 
regression 
sharecredit 
Social capital 
Number of trading contacts (sellers) 
(tradecont) 
-0.131 **  -0.083 ** -0.215   
(0.057)   (0.040)   (0.403)   
Number of regulars (regtrad) 0.003   0.010 *** 0.184 *** 
(0.002)   (0.002)   (0.015)   
Working capital       
Log of working capital (wcap) 0.394 *** 0.056   -3.076 *** 
(0.129)   (0.083)   (0.811)   
Personal characteristics 
Gender (sex) -0.421   -0.073   2.871   
(0.632)   (0.412)   (5.084)   
Age (age) 0.002   -0.001   -0.244 * 
(0.021)   (0.013)   (0.139)   
Education (edu) 0.364 ** 0.027   -4.157 *** 
(0.180)   (0.106)   (1.341)   
Number of languages spoken by 
trader (lan) 
-0.488 *** -0.419 *** -2.975 * 
(0.238)   (0.136)   (1.724)   
Variable  Logit 
credit_yn 
Ordered logit 
oftencredit 
Linear 
regression 
sharecredit 
Business characteristics 
Age of firm (firm_age) 0.024   -0.004   -0.254 * 
(0.031)   (0.009)   (0.134)   
Buying agent (buyagent) 0.136   0.152 ** -2.445 *** 
(0.148)   (0.076)   (0.691)   
Broker (broker) 0.031   0.017   0.239   
(0.073)   (0.033)   (0.462)   
Total number of people in firm 
(support) 
-0.003   0.001   0.007   
(0.003)   (0.001)   (0.007)   
Number of trucks (truck) 0.028   -0.012   0.019   
(0.059)   (0.030)   (0.231)   
Control variables 
Year (2010 or 2012) (year) -0.706 *** -1.217 *** 4.827 *** 
(0.218)   (0.151)   (1.493)   
Exporter (expo) 0.390   -0.034   -0.282   
(0.664)   (0.429)   (4.972)   
Wholesaler (whol) 0.520   0.389   8.502   
(0.623)   (0.452)   (5.167)   
Retailer (reta) 3.206 ** 0.812   9.015   
(1.348)   (0.590)   (6.839)   
Assembler (asse) 3.085 *** 1.560 *** 17.482 *** 
(0.940)   (0.507)   (5.665)   
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Variable  Logit 
credit_yn 
Ordered logit 
oftencredit 
Linear 
regression 
sharecredit 
Constant (_cons) 1416 ***     -10561 *** 
437       (3229)   
/cut1 
 
/cut2 
 
/cut3 
 
 -2452 
(304.2) 
-2447 
(303.8) 
-2444 
(303.7) 
   
Logit regression credit_yn 
Number of obs = 369 
LR chi2(17) = 62.16 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1897 
Log likelihood = -132.73862 
Ordered logistic regression 
oftencredit 
Number of obs = 369 
Wald chi2(17) = 110.68 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 = 0.1976 
Log pseudolikelihood = 
-325.326 
OLS sharecredit 
Number of obs = 367 
F(17, 349) = 29.70 
Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.6030 
Root MSE = 21.228 
Note: the tables for the logit and ordered logistic regression do not contain the marginal effects, 
and the interpretation of the coefficients should take this into consideration (Greene 2008). 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 The main results are that working capital and social capital are often 
significant but not always. Working capital is significantly and positively related to 
the likelihood of receiving credit, which makes intuitive sense: traders with 
sufficient working capital are more likely to pay back the loan and selling traders are 
therefore more likely to extend credit. It is not significantly related to how often a 
trader received credit. It is negatively related to the amount purchased with credit, 
which also makes intuitive sense: traders with sufficient working capital have less 
need for credit. 
 The social capital variables show an interesting picture. The total number of 
trading contacts (sellers of sesame) is significantly but negatively linked to the 
number of traders who indicated they had received credit and to how often traders 
received credit. The number of regular contacts is positively related with how often 
a trader receives credit and the share of sesame purchased with credit. Network 
capital is therefore important in increasing the prospect of receiving credit, but not 
on how often traders receive credit. This can be explained by the fact that receiving 
credit is based on trust, which is more likely to exist between traders with a (long-
term) relationship. Knowing many different traders enhances the prospect of 
receiving credit, but is not related to how much or how often credit is received. 
 The year is significant. In 2012, traders received credit significantly less often 
than in 2010: fewer traders indicated that they received credit (credit_yn) and fewer 
 
traders indicated that sellers of sesame extended credit more often (oftencredit). 
This corresponds with the results obtained in chapter three. The amount purchased 
with credit (sharecredit) increased, however, by around 5%. The other dummy 
variables, controlling for type of trader, show that assemblers are more likely to 
receive credit than other traders. Assemblers are usually small traders and credit is 
more important to them, as they are often financially constrained. 
 With respect to personal characteristics, gender and age are not significant 
factors. Education is significant: traders with higher education are more likely to 
receive credit, while traders with lower education tend to purchase sesame with a 
larger share of credit. The number of languages spoken affects receiving credit and 
purchased share of sesame with credit negatively. 
 I split the type of intermediaries into buying agents and brokers. Using 
buying agents increases the likelihood of receiving credit more often but decreases 
the share of sesame purchased with credit. Using a broker has no effect on credit. 
The difference between a buying agent and a broker is that a buying agent receives 
an order to buy a certain amount and uses money provided by his client (the buying 
trader). A broker merely finds a potential seller for his client (the buying trader). 
Neither the number of people who are employed by the trader nor the number of 
trucks is related to credit. 
6.4.2 performance, credit, and social capital 
Table 25 shows the results for the different models (OLS and Lewbel’s approach) 
incorporating different credit variables (credit_yn, oftencredit, and sharecredit). The 
model using Lewbel’s approach has three instrumented variables: social capital 
(tradecont), working capital (log, wcap), and credit (credit_yn, oftencredit and 
sharecredit). The instrumented variables are shown in italics. Incorporating more 
instrumented variables demands more instrumental variables. Three instrumental 
variables is already stretching it, and therefore the second proxy for social capital 
(number of regular traders regtrad) was left out of the analysis. This seems a safe 
choice, as the variable is not significant and its coefficient is small.31 
31 The sizes of coefficients may not be comparable. To make them comparable, the standardised 
regression coefficients need to be calculated. When this is done, the standardised regression 
efficient variable “number of regular traders” is a little larger than the variable for total number 
of traders’ contacts (-0.115 versus -0.100). 
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Table 25: Total amount purchased (log) with different credit variables; OLS and Lewbel’s 
approach (with generated IVs).  
 OLS regression Lewbel’s approach with IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trading practice 
Suppliers provide 
credit (0=no, 
1=yes) 
(credit_yn)  
-0.114 
(0.199) 
  
0.302* 
(0.164) 
  How often do 
suppliers let you 
buy on credit? 
(1=never, 
2=some, 3=all)  
(oftencredit) 
 
-0.328*** 
(0.106) 
 
 
 
-0.514*** 
(0.139) 
 Share of 
purchases 
bought with 
credit (in 
%) (sharecredit) 
  
0.007** 
(0.003) 
  
0.002 
(0.003) 
Number of 
intermediaries 
used (interm) 
-0.037*** 
(0.013) 
-0.042*** 
(0.014) 
-0.032 
(0.013) 
-0.037*** 
(0.010) 
-0.052*** 
(0.011) 
-0.037*** 
-0.011 
Assets 
Number of 
trucks (truck) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.009) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
Log of working 
capital (wcap) 
0.233*** 
(0.047) 
0.243*** 
(0.048) 
0.249*** 
(0.048) 
0.213*** 
(0.051) 
0.245*** 
(0.050) 
0.255*** 
(0.048) 
Total number of 
languages spoken 
(lan) 
0.109 
(0.088) 
0.078 
(0.086) 
0.126 
(0.089) 
0.111 
(0.076) 
0.049 
(0.074) 
0.118 
(0.072) 
Education (edu) 0.169** 
(0.066) 
0.168** 
(0.066) 
0.194** 
(0.070) 
0.156** 
(0.060) 
0.193 
(0.062) 
0.167 
(0.059) 
Total number of 
traders’ contacts 
(tradecont) 
-0.031* 
(0.017) 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
-0.028* 
(0.017) 
-0.030* 
(0.018) 
-0.051*** 
(0.016) 
-0.024 
(0.016) 
Total regular 
contacts (regtrad) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001)    
Transaction costs 
Log of 
transaction costs 
per quintal (tc) 
0.295*** 
(0.058) 
0.298*** 
(0.048) 
0.276*** 
(0.057) 
0.267*** 
(0.045) 
0.349*** 
(0.051) 
0.260*** 
(0.051) 
Control variables 
Dummy for 2012 
(year) 
-1.054*** 
(0.203) 
-1.258*** 
(0.215) 
-1.059*** 
(0.197) 
-0.429*** 
(0.085) 
-0.794*** 
(0.103) 
-0.500*** 
(0.085) 
Exporter (expo) -0.119 -0.128 -0.113 -0.106 -0.121 0.147 
  (0.259) (0.253) (0.263) (0.193) (0.201) (0.166) 
 
 OLS regression Lewbel’s approach with IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Wholesaler 
(whol) -0.558** -0.506** -0.633** -0.794*** -0.651*** -0.206 
  (0.297) (0.290) (0.298) (0.232) (0.242) (0.203) 
Retailer (reta) -0.969** -0.901** -1.066*** -0.787** -0.509 -0.805*** 
  (0.408) (0.407) (0.414) (0.307) (0.357) (0.254) 
Assembler (asse) -0.541** 
(0.291) 
-0.408** 
(0.279) 
-0.695** 
(0.303) 
-0.726*** 
(0.253) 
-0.329 
(0.247) 
-0.69** 
(0.32) 
Gender of trader 
(sex) 
-0.097 
(0.193) 
-0.104 
(0.198) 
-0.112 
(0.184) 
0.04 
(0.176) 
-0.079 
(0.197) 
-0.747 
(0.265) 
Firm age 
(firm_age) 
0.018** 0.018** 0.020*** 0.017 0.013 0.018 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age of trader 
(age) 
0.002 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.009** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Additional heteroskedastic 
variable (price margin) 
(pricemargin )  
  
 0.1 
(0.068) 
0.064 
(0.070) 
0.114 
(0.075)     
Constant (_cons) 1.99*** 2.46*** 1.632*** 863.73*** 1598.6*** 1004.64 
  (0.952) (1.016) (0.954) (170.475) (207.93) (169.626) 
Model  Test statistics 
(1) Number of obs = 365; F(17, 347) = 17.13; Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.3898; Root MSE = 1.1496 
(2) Number of obs = 365; F(17, 347) = 20.30; Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.4080; Root MSE = 1.1323 
(3) Number of obs = 363; F(17, 345) = 21.03; Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.3993; Root MSE = 1.1428 
(4) Number of obs = 369; F(17, 351) = 45.96; Prob > F = 0.0000 
Centred R2 = 0.4258 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 109.779; Chi-
sq(42) P-val = 0.0000 
Weak identification test32 (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 8.573 (10-
20%) 
Overidentification test of all instruments Hansen J statistic: 48.517; Chi-
sq(41) P-val = 0.2958 
Exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect instruments C statistic: 0.773; Chi-
sq(2) P-val = 0.6795 
(5) Number of obs = 369; F(17, 351) = 39.92; Prob > F = 0.0000 
entred R2 = 0.4479 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 72.877; Chi-
sq(42) P-val = 0.0053 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 3.106 (<30%) 
Overidentification test of all instruments Hansen J statistic: 45.215; Chi-
sq(41) P-val = 0.4210 
Exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect instruments C statistic: 2.076; Chi-
32 Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: maximal IV relative bias: 
5% 20.66 | 10% 10.81 | 20%  5.77 | 30% 4.04 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). Reproduced by permission 
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Table 25: Total amount purchased (log) with different credit variables; OLS and Lewbel’s 
approach (with generated IVs).  
 OLS regression Lewbel’s approach with IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Trading practice 
Suppliers provide 
credit (0=no, 
1=yes) 
(credit_yn)  
-0.114 
(0.199) 
  
0.302* 
(0.164) 
  How often do 
suppliers let you 
buy on credit? 
(1=never, 
2=some, 3=all)  
(oftencredit) 
 
-0.328*** 
(0.106) 
 
 
 
-0.514*** 
(0.139) 
 Share of 
purchases 
bought with 
credit (in 
%) (sharecredit) 
  
0.007** 
(0.003) 
  
0.002 
(0.003) 
Number of 
intermediaries 
used (interm) 
-0.037*** 
(0.013) 
-0.042*** 
(0.014) 
-0.032 
(0.013) 
-0.037*** 
(0.010) 
-0.052*** 
(0.011) 
-0.037*** 
-0.011 
Assets 
Number of 
trucks (truck) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.008) 
0.017** 
(0.009) 
0.018*** 
(0.005) 
0.015*** 
(0.005) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
Log of working 
capital (wcap) 
0.233*** 
(0.047) 
0.243*** 
(0.048) 
0.249*** 
(0.048) 
0.213*** 
(0.051) 
0.245*** 
(0.050) 
0.255*** 
(0.048) 
Total number of 
languages spoken 
(lan) 
0.109 
(0.088) 
0.078 
(0.086) 
0.126 
(0.089) 
0.111 
(0.076) 
0.049 
(0.074) 
0.118 
(0.072) 
Education (edu) 0.169** 
(0.066) 
0.168** 
(0.066) 
0.194** 
(0.070) 
0.156** 
(0.060) 
0.193 
(0.062) 
0.167 
(0.059) 
Total number of 
traders’ contacts 
(tradecont) 
-0.031* 
(0.017) 
-0.036** 
(0.016) 
-0.028* 
(0.017) 
-0.030* 
(0.018) 
-0.051*** 
(0.016) 
-0.024 
(0.016) 
Total regular 
contacts (regtrad) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.002 
(0.001)    
Transaction costs 
Log of 
transaction costs 
per quintal (tc) 
0.295*** 
(0.058) 
0.298*** 
(0.048) 
0.276*** 
(0.057) 
0.267*** 
(0.045) 
0.349*** 
(0.051) 
0.260*** 
(0.051) 
Control variables 
Dummy for 2012 
(year) 
-1.054*** 
(0.203) 
-1.258*** 
(0.215) 
-1.059*** 
(0.197) 
-0.429*** 
(0.085) 
-0.794*** 
(0.103) 
-0.500*** 
(0.085) 
Exporter (expo) -0.119 -0.128 -0.113 -0.106 -0.121 0.147 
  (0.259) (0.253) (0.263) (0.193) (0.201) (0.166) 
 
 OLS regression Lewbel’s approach with IV 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Wholesaler 
(whol) -0.558** -0.506** -0.633** -0.794*** -0.651*** -0.206 
  (0.297) (0.290) (0.298) (0.232) (0.242) (0.203) 
Retailer (reta) -0.969** -0.901** -1.066*** -0.787** -0.509 -0.805*** 
  (0.408) (0.407) (0.414) (0.307) (0.357) (0.254) 
Assembler (asse) -0.541** 
(0.291) 
-0.408** 
(0.279) 
-0.695** 
(0.303) 
-0.726*** 
(0.253) 
-0.329 
(0.247) 
-0.69** 
(0.32) 
Gender of trader 
(sex) 
-0.097 
(0.193) 
-0.104 
(0.198) 
-0.112 
(0.184) 
0.04 
(0.176) 
-0.079 
(0.197) 
-0.747 
(0.265) 
Firm age 
(firm_age) 
0.018** 0.018** 0.020*** 0.017 0.013 0.018 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Age of trader 
(age) 
0.002 0.001 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.009** 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Additional heteroskedastic 
variable (price margin) 
(pricemargin )  
  
 0.1 
(0.068) 
0.064 
(0.070) 
0.114 
(0.075)     
Constant (_cons) 1.99*** 2.46*** 1.632*** 863.73*** 1598.6*** 1004.64 
  (0.952) (1.016) (0.954) (170.475) (207.93) (169.626) 
Model  Test statistics 
(1) Number of obs = 365; F(17, 347) = 17.13; Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.3898; Root MSE = 1.1496 
(2) Number of obs = 365; F(17, 347) = 20.30; Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.4080; Root MSE = 1.1323 
(3) Number of obs = 363; F(17, 345) = 21.03; Prob > F = 0.0000 
R-squared = 0.3993; Root MSE = 1.1428 
(4) Number of obs = 369; F(17, 351) = 45.96; Prob > F = 0.0000 
Centred R2 = 0.4258 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 109.779; Chi-
sq(42) P-val = 0.0000 
Weak identification test32 (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 8.573 (10-
20%) 
Overidentification test of all instruments Hansen J statistic: 48.517; Chi-
sq(41) P-val = 0.2958 
Exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect instruments C statistic: 0.773; Chi-
sq(2) P-val = 0.6795 
(5) Number of obs = 369; F(17, 351) = 39.92; Prob > F = 0.0000 
entred R2 = 0.4479 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 72.877; Chi-
sq(42) P-val = 0.0053 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 3.106 (<30%) 
Overidentification test of all instruments Hansen J statistic: 45.215; Chi-
sq(41) P-val = 0.4210 
Exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect instruments C statistic: 2.076; Chi-
32 Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: maximal IV relative bias: 
5% 20.66 | 10% 10.81 | 20%  5.77 | 30% 4.04 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). Reproduced by permission 
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sq(2) P-val = 0.3542 
(6) Number of obs = 367; F(17, 349) = 33.76; Prob > F = 0.0000 
Centred R2 = 0.4327 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 81.694; Chi-
sq(42) P-val = 0.0007; 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 5.102 (20-30%) 
Overidentification test of all instruments Hansen J statistic: 54.772; Chi-
sq(41) P-val = 0.1280 
Exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect instruments C statistic: 2.352; Chi-
sq(2) P-val = 0.3086 
Note: standard errors in brackets. Instrumented variables in italic. 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 The test statistics for the Lewbel approach seem reasonable. If the H0 of the 
underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) is not rejected, then 
underidentification is an issue. Underidentification is therefore not an issue for any 
of the models. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics provide values that can be used 
to identify the IV relative bias. The values are rather low for oftencredit (the IV 
relative bias is over 30%), which means the instruments are rather weak. For the 
other two, the bias is acceptable. The Hansen J statistic is used to detect 
overidentification of all instruments. In this case, if the H0 is rejected, then 
overidentification is an issue. Overidentification is not an issue in any of the 
variables. The C statistic is used to check exogeneity of suspect instruments. If the 
C statistic for instruments is highly significant, the instruments do not appear valid 
in the context. This is not the case. 
 In both models, two out of the three credit variables are significant. In the 
OLS (1) oftencredit (how often suppliers let traders buy on credit) is negatively 
correlated with the amount purchased and (2) sharecredit (share of purchases 
bought with credit) is positively linked to amount purchased: 1% increase in 
purchases with credit, increases the amount purchased by around 1 quintal of 
sesame33. In the Lewbel model, oftencredit is also significant, but sharecredit is no 
longer significant, while the binary variable credit_yn (do your suppliers provide 
you credit?) is. The important result is that credit remains significantly linked to 
performance. The result that traders who receive credit from more traders will 
purchase less is surprising. Also the result that using more intermediaries is 
significantly but negatively linked to performance is counter-intuitive and not in 
33 0.008*sharecredit=log of purchase; sharecredit=1 then purchase = 1.008 quintal 
 
                                                        
line with the literature. The question why is explored in the next section, where the 
effect of type of trader is taken into account. 
 With respect to the different types of assets, the number of trucks and 
working capital are both significantly and positively linked to amount purchased, as 
expected. The human capital variable lan (number of languages spoken) is not 
significant, while education is (although not for model 6 in table 25). Social capital 
shows a mixed and again counter-intuitive picture. Total number of traders’ 
contacts (tradecon) is significant, as expected, but negatively linked to performance. 
Transaction costs are significant in all models and positively linked to performance. 
 The year control variable is significant for all models and negatively linked to 
performance. In a following section, the effect of the different years will be further 
explored by splitting the dataset into two years. Firm age is significant in the OLS 
models, but not in the Lewbel models. 
6.5 are small traders different from large traders? 
Some of the counter-intuitive results lead to the suspicion that there might be an 
omitted variable problem; the results may be better explained taking into account 
the type and size of trader because there is quite some heterogeneity amongst 
traders. Assemblers buy sesame either directly from the farmers (mainly in 2010) or 
at the newly established Primary Transaction Centres (mainly in 2012). Retailers 
trade between various traders. Wholesalers usually have a fixed market stall at 
major markets and trade from there. Exporters buy sesame from various other 
traders, occasionally directly from farmers, and sell to foreign markets. Traders who 
take up different roles are designated as “mixed activities” traders. Small upstream 
traders need to buy small amounts of sesame from many farmers and traders and 
therefore need many trade contacts. They are also financially more constrained. 
Very large traders typically have a few contacts to whom they sell large amounts. 
They are usually also less financially constrained. The more downstream traders 
(exporters) are larger traders in terms of number of employees, warehouse capacity, 
and working capital, for example. 
 I explore whether the different traders and their different strategies may 
explain the results in two ways. For this I use quantile regression to investigate the 
differences between traders who purchase varying amounts, using quantile plots to 
analyse the quantile regression results. I also divide the dataset into three subsets 
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sq(2) P-val = 0.3542 
(6) Number of obs = 367; F(17, 349) = 33.76; Prob > F = 0.0000 
Centred R2 = 0.4327 
Underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 81.694; Chi-
sq(42) P-val = 0.0007; 
Weak identification test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 5.102 (20-30%) 
Overidentification test of all instruments Hansen J statistic: 54.772; Chi-
sq(41) P-val = 0.1280 
Exogeneity/orthogonality of suspect instruments C statistic: 2.352; Chi-
sq(2) P-val = 0.3086 
Note: standard errors in brackets. Instrumented variables in italic. 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 The test statistics for the Lewbel approach seem reasonable. If the H0 of the 
underidentification test (Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic) is not rejected, then 
underidentification is an issue. Underidentification is therefore not an issue for any 
of the models. The Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics provide values that can be used 
to identify the IV relative bias. The values are rather low for oftencredit (the IV 
relative bias is over 30%), which means the instruments are rather weak. For the 
other two, the bias is acceptable. The Hansen J statistic is used to detect 
overidentification of all instruments. In this case, if the H0 is rejected, then 
overidentification is an issue. Overidentification is not an issue in any of the 
variables. The C statistic is used to check exogeneity of suspect instruments. If the 
C statistic for instruments is highly significant, the instruments do not appear valid 
in the context. This is not the case. 
 In both models, two out of the three credit variables are significant. In the 
OLS (1) oftencredit (how often suppliers let traders buy on credit) is negatively 
correlated with the amount purchased and (2) sharecredit (share of purchases 
bought with credit) is positively linked to amount purchased: 1% increase in 
purchases with credit, increases the amount purchased by around 1 quintal of 
sesame33. In the Lewbel model, oftencredit is also significant, but sharecredit is no 
longer significant, while the binary variable credit_yn (do your suppliers provide 
you credit?) is. The important result is that credit remains significantly linked to 
performance. The result that traders who receive credit from more traders will 
purchase less is surprising. Also the result that using more intermediaries is 
significantly but negatively linked to performance is counter-intuitive and not in 
33 0.008*sharecredit=log of purchase; sharecredit=1 then purchase = 1.008 quintal 
 
                                                        
line with the literature. The question why is explored in the next section, where the 
effect of type of trader is taken into account. 
 With respect to the different types of assets, the number of trucks and 
working capital are both significantly and positively linked to amount purchased, as 
expected. The human capital variable lan (number of languages spoken) is not 
significant, while education is (although not for model 6 in table 25). Social capital 
shows a mixed and again counter-intuitive picture. Total number of traders’ 
contacts (tradecon) is significant, as expected, but negatively linked to performance. 
Transaction costs are significant in all models and positively linked to performance. 
 The year control variable is significant for all models and negatively linked to 
performance. In a following section, the effect of the different years will be further 
explored by splitting the dataset into two years. Firm age is significant in the OLS 
models, but not in the Lewbel models. 
6.5 are small traders different from large traders? 
Some of the counter-intuitive results lead to the suspicion that there might be an 
omitted variable problem; the results may be better explained taking into account 
the type and size of trader because there is quite some heterogeneity amongst 
traders. Assemblers buy sesame either directly from the farmers (mainly in 2010) or 
at the newly established Primary Transaction Centres (mainly in 2012). Retailers 
trade between various traders. Wholesalers usually have a fixed market stall at 
major markets and trade from there. Exporters buy sesame from various other 
traders, occasionally directly from farmers, and sell to foreign markets. Traders who 
take up different roles are designated as “mixed activities” traders. Small upstream 
traders need to buy small amounts of sesame from many farmers and traders and 
therefore need many trade contacts. They are also financially more constrained. 
Very large traders typically have a few contacts to whom they sell large amounts. 
They are usually also less financially constrained. The more downstream traders 
(exporters) are larger traders in terms of number of employees, warehouse capacity, 
and working capital, for example. 
 I explore whether the different traders and their different strategies may 
explain the results in two ways. For this I use quantile regression to investigate the 
differences between traders who purchase varying amounts, using quantile plots to 
analyse the quantile regression results. I also divide the dataset into three subsets 
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representing traders who purchased small amounts, medium amounts and large 
amounts and run the regressions for the subsets small and large amounts. It is 
assumed that traders who purchase small amounts are small traders (e.g. 
assemblers) who operate at the upstream level, while those who purchase large 
amounts (e.g. exporters) are large traders operating at the downstream level. In 
reality the categories are not that clean-cut; for instance, there are also relatively 
small exporters, but overall, the assumptions hold. 
 The quantile plots show the mean coefficient and the mean confidence 
intervals (i.e. coefficient and confidence intervals of the OLS), and the coefficients 
and confidence intervals for the quantile regression. This allows us to detect 
whether the quantile regression results differ significantly from the standard OLS 
and whether the size of purchases has an effect. I do not show all regression 
results, or all graphs, but focus on the most relevant results. The other results are 
available upon request. 
 Figure 18 shows the quantile regression results for the variable total number 
of traders’ selling contacts (tradecont) and how often suppliers let traders buy on 
credit (oftencredit). I show results for 2010, 2012, and both years (all). The large 
confidence intervals of the low quantiles of 2010 make it difficult to interpret the 
graphs. I therefore note the regression results as well for the 25th, 50th, and 75th 
quantiles. 
Figure 18: Quantile regression results for total amount purchased showing tradecont and 
oftencredit, (2010, 2012, and all pooled data) 
2010 2012 All 
   
 
 Coef  Coef  Coef  
Q25 -.134 
(0.06) ** 
-0.07 
(0.03) *** 
-0.07 
(0.05)  
Q50 -.084 
(0.05) * 
-0.06 
(0.03) ** 
-0.06 
(0.03) * 
Q75 -0.09 
(0.03)  *** 
-0.04 
(0.04)  
 -0.04 
(0.03)  
 
 
2010 2012 All 
   
 Coef  Coef  Coef  
Q25 -0.12 
(0.13)  
-0.10 
(0.26) 
 -0.21 
(0.13) * 
Q50 -0.15 
(0.17)  
-0.18 
(0.26) 
  -0.26 
(0.09) *** 
Q75 -0.35 
(0.17) ** 
 -0.25 
(0.19) 
  -0.42 
(0.11) *** 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 The quantiles of the dependent variable (performance) are on the horizontal 
axis with the coefficient magnitudes on the vertical axis. The OLS coefficient is 
plotted as a dashed horizontal line with the confidence interval as two dotted 
horizontal lines around the coefficient line. The quantile regression coefficients are 
plotted as solid lines with shaded confidence intervals around them. If the quantile 
coefficient is outside the OLS confidence interval, there are significant differences 
between the quantile and OLS coefficients (as denoted by the significance in the 
tables). The quantile coefficients for the number of trading contacts (tradecon) on 
performance are significantly different from the OLS coefficients in 2010 and for 
lower quantiles in 2012. Traders with more trading contacts have a lower 
performance level; those with fewer trading contacts have a higher performance 
level. The quantile regression results for oftencredit show that very large traders 
receive trade credit from fewer traders. The effect becomes larger with higher 
quantiles: for the first 25% the coefficient is -0.213, and it is almost double for the 
remaining 75% (-0.419). 
 The quantile regression results only show the effects of the variables 
tradecon and oftencredit on performance, comparing small traders to large traders. 
To investigate whether total number of contacts and credit has a positive effect on 
amount purchased for small and large traders, I needed to run the regressions for 
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representing traders who purchased small amounts, medium amounts and large 
amounts and run the regressions for the subsets small and large amounts. It is 
assumed that traders who purchase small amounts are small traders (e.g. 
assemblers) who operate at the upstream level, while those who purchase large 
amounts (e.g. exporters) are large traders operating at the downstream level. In 
reality the categories are not that clean-cut; for instance, there are also relatively 
small exporters, but overall, the assumptions hold. 
 The quantile plots show the mean coefficient and the mean confidence 
intervals (i.e. coefficient and confidence intervals of the OLS), and the coefficients 
and confidence intervals for the quantile regression. This allows us to detect 
whether the quantile regression results differ significantly from the standard OLS 
and whether the size of purchases has an effect. I do not show all regression 
results, or all graphs, but focus on the most relevant results. The other results are 
available upon request. 
 Figure 18 shows the quantile regression results for the variable total number 
of traders’ selling contacts (tradecont) and how often suppliers let traders buy on 
credit (oftencredit). I show results for 2010, 2012, and both years (all). The large 
confidence intervals of the low quantiles of 2010 make it difficult to interpret the 
graphs. I therefore note the regression results as well for the 25th, 50th, and 75th 
quantiles. 
Figure 18: Quantile regression results for total amount purchased showing tradecont and 
oftencredit, (2010, 2012, and all pooled data) 
2010 2012 All 
   
 
 Coef  Coef  Coef  
Q25 -.134 
(0.06) ** 
-0.07 
(0.03) *** 
-0.07 
(0.05)  
Q50 -.084 
(0.05) * 
-0.06 
(0.03) ** 
-0.06 
(0.03) * 
Q75 -0.09 
(0.03)  *** 
-0.04 
(0.04)  
 -0.04 
(0.03)  
 
 
2010 2012 All 
   
 Coef  Coef  Coef  
Q25 -0.12 
(0.13)  
-0.10 
(0.26) 
 -0.21 
(0.13) * 
Q50 -0.15 
(0.17)  
-0.18 
(0.26) 
  -0.26 
(0.09) *** 
Q75 -0.35 
(0.17) ** 
 -0.25 
(0.19) 
  -0.42 
(0.11) *** 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 The quantiles of the dependent variable (performance) are on the horizontal 
axis with the coefficient magnitudes on the vertical axis. The OLS coefficient is 
plotted as a dashed horizontal line with the confidence interval as two dotted 
horizontal lines around the coefficient line. The quantile regression coefficients are 
plotted as solid lines with shaded confidence intervals around them. If the quantile 
coefficient is outside the OLS confidence interval, there are significant differences 
between the quantile and OLS coefficients (as denoted by the significance in the 
tables). The quantile coefficients for the number of trading contacts (tradecon) on 
performance are significantly different from the OLS coefficients in 2010 and for 
lower quantiles in 2012. Traders with more trading contacts have a lower 
performance level; those with fewer trading contacts have a higher performance 
level. The quantile regression results for oftencredit show that very large traders 
receive trade credit from fewer traders. The effect becomes larger with higher 
quantiles: for the first 25% the coefficient is -0.213, and it is almost double for the 
remaining 75% (-0.419). 
 The quantile regression results only show the effects of the variables 
tradecon and oftencredit on performance, comparing small traders to large traders. 
To investigate whether total number of contacts and credit has a positive effect on 
amount purchased for small and large traders, I needed to run the regressions for 
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the subset of small and large traders. Table 26 shows the results of the OLS 
regression for the smallest 30% of traders.34 
Table 26: OLS regression results for total amount purchased by small and large traders 
(smallest and largest third of all traders) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Trading practices       
Suppliers provide 
credit (0=no, 
1=yes) 
0.011** 
(0.158) 
-0.304 
(0.201) 
    
How often 
suppliers let you 
buy on credit 
(1=never, 2=some, 
3=all) 
  0.018 
(0.108) 
-0.098 
(0.087) 
  
Share of purchases 
bought with credit 
(in %) 
     0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
Number of 
intermediaries used 
-0.010 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.016) 
-0,015 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
Assets          
Number of trucks -0.039 
(0.109) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.039 
(0.109) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.035 
(0.100) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
Log of working 
capital 
0.028 
(0.058) 
-0.007 
(0.045) 
0.029 
(0.059) 
-0.020 
(0.043) 
0.050 
(0.060) 
-0.026 
(0.045) 
Total number of 
languages spoken 
-0.044 
(0.110) 
-0.022 
(0.067) 
-0.013 
(0.117) 
-0.017 
(0.066) 
-0.010 
(0.116) 
-0.003 
(0.063) 
Education 0.344*** 
(0.105) 
-0.009 
(0.051) 
0.355*** 
(0.107) 
-0.012 
(0.051) 
0.377*** 
(0.101) 
-0.023 
(0.050) 
Total number of 
traders’ contacts 
(sellers) 
0.062* 
(0.035) 
0.031* 
(0.19) 
0.063* 
(0.034) 
0.028 
(0.019) 
0.063* 
(0.032) 
0.031* 
(0.019) 
Total regular 
contacts 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Transaction costs        
Log of transaction 
costs per quintal 
0.160* 
(0.090) 
-0.109* 
(0.061) 
0.159* 
(0.087) 
-0.113* 
(0.061) 
0.141 
(0.087) 
-0.116* 
(0.060) 
34 Instead of following the quantile regression subsets and selecting 25%, I chose to make 
the selection a little larger to obtain more observations. As a test, I also ran the regression 
with smaller subsets and obtained similar results. 
 
                                                        
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Control variables           
Year (2010 or 
2012) 
-0.144 
(0.108) 
0.249* 
(0.140) 
-0.140 
(0.107) 
0.203 
(0.153) 
-0.158 
(0.102) 
0.265* 
(0.139) 
Exporter -1.869 
(1.300) 
-0.146 
(0.134) 
-1.869 
(1.302) 
-0.193 
(0.131) 
-1.891* 
(1.204) 
-0.190 
(0.127) 
Wholesaler -0.556 
(0.341) 
-0.158 
(0.183) 
-0.455 
(0.340) 
-0.144 
(0.174) 
-0.586 
(0.360) 
-0.137 
(0.174) 
Retailer -1.273** 
(0.550) 
-0.223 
(0.244) 
-1.273** 
(0.556) 
-0.253 
(0.225) 
-1.400** 
(0.569) 
-0.284 
(0.227) 
Assembler -0.021 
(0.349) 
-0.584*** 
(0.190) 
-0.007 
(0.350) 
-0.653*** 
(0.177) 
-0.182 
(0.387) 
-0.663*** 
(0.176) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Gender -0.135 
(0.206) 
-0.55 
(0.169) 
-0.134 
(0.204) 
-0.046 
(0.186) 
-0.122 
(0.206) 
-0.050 
(0.181) 
Firm age 0.011 
(0.021) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.203) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Age of trader 0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
Constant 292.40 
(217.14) 
-492.29* 
(282.97) 
285.63 
(215.35) 
-397.93 
(306.85) 
321.74 
(205.14) 
-522.60* 
(279.53) 
Number of 
obs = 124 
F(17, 106) = 
2.23 
Prob > F = 
0.0071 
R-squared = 
0.3943 
Root MSE = 
0.67016 
Number of 
obs = 124 
F(17, 106) 
= 1.81 
Prob > F 
= 0.0358 
R-squared 
= 0.1822 
Root MSE 
= 0.50009 
Number of 
obs = 124 
F(17, 106) = 
2.11 
Prob > F = 
0.0114 
R-squared = 
0.3944 
Root MSE = 
0.67008 
Number of 
obs = 124 
F(17, 106) = 
1.83 
Prob > F = 
0.0332 
R-squared = 
0.1642 
Root MSE = 
0.50557 
Number of 
obs = 123 
F(17, 105) = 
2.07 
Prob > F = 
0.0133 
R-squared = 
0.4149 
Root MSE = 
0.66118 
Number of 
obs = 124 
F(17, 106) = 
1.91 
Prob > F = 
0.0247 
R-squared = 
0.1546 
Root MSE = 
0.50848 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 Table 26 shows that small traders who obtain credit, as well as small traders 
who have a higher share of sesame bought with credit are significantly more likely 
to purchase larger amounts of sesame. These relationships are not significant for 
large traders. Whether a small trader received credit from some or many traders is 
not significant (although the sign is positive, as expected). The total number of 
contacts now is positively and significantly linked to the amount purchased, both 
for small and large traders. Although regular suppliers were not significant in earlier 
models, it turns out that for small traders, the number of regular suppliers is 
negatively linked to the amount purchased. These results may be explained by the 
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the subset of small and large traders. Table 26 shows the results of the OLS 
regression for the smallest 30% of traders.34 
Table 26: OLS regression results for total amount purchased by small and large traders 
(smallest and largest third of all traders) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Trading practices       
Suppliers provide 
credit (0=no, 
1=yes) 
0.011** 
(0.158) 
-0.304 
(0.201) 
    
How often 
suppliers let you 
buy on credit 
(1=never, 2=some, 
3=all) 
  0.018 
(0.108) 
-0.098 
(0.087) 
  
Share of purchases 
bought with credit 
(in %) 
     0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
Number of 
intermediaries used 
-0.010 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
-0.010 
(0.016) 
-0,015 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.016) 
-0.017 
(0.013) 
Assets          
Number of trucks -0.039 
(0.109) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.039 
(0.109) 
0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.035 
(0.100) 
0.001 
(0.013) 
Log of working 
capital 
0.028 
(0.058) 
-0.007 
(0.045) 
0.029 
(0.059) 
-0.020 
(0.043) 
0.050 
(0.060) 
-0.026 
(0.045) 
Total number of 
languages spoken 
-0.044 
(0.110) 
-0.022 
(0.067) 
-0.013 
(0.117) 
-0.017 
(0.066) 
-0.010 
(0.116) 
-0.003 
(0.063) 
Education 0.344*** 
(0.105) 
-0.009 
(0.051) 
0.355*** 
(0.107) 
-0.012 
(0.051) 
0.377*** 
(0.101) 
-0.023 
(0.050) 
Total number of 
traders’ contacts 
(sellers) 
0.062* 
(0.035) 
0.031* 
(0.19) 
0.063* 
(0.034) 
0.028 
(0.019) 
0.063* 
(0.032) 
0.031* 
(0.019) 
Total regular 
contacts 
-0.002** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.000 
(0.001) 
Transaction costs        
Log of transaction 
costs per quintal 
0.160* 
(0.090) 
-0.109* 
(0.061) 
0.159* 
(0.087) 
-0.113* 
(0.061) 
0.141 
(0.087) 
-0.116* 
(0.060) 
34 Instead of following the quantile regression subsets and selecting 25%, I chose to make 
the selection a little larger to obtain more observations. As a test, I also ran the regression 
with smaller subsets and obtained similar results. 
 
                                                        
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Control variables           
Year (2010 or 
2012) 
-0.144 
(0.108) 
0.249* 
(0.140) 
-0.140 
(0.107) 
0.203 
(0.153) 
-0.158 
(0.102) 
0.265* 
(0.139) 
Exporter -1.869 
(1.300) 
-0.146 
(0.134) 
-1.869 
(1.302) 
-0.193 
(0.131) 
-1.891* 
(1.204) 
-0.190 
(0.127) 
Wholesaler -0.556 
(0.341) 
-0.158 
(0.183) 
-0.455 
(0.340) 
-0.144 
(0.174) 
-0.586 
(0.360) 
-0.137 
(0.174) 
Retailer -1.273** 
(0.550) 
-0.223 
(0.244) 
-1.273** 
(0.556) 
-0.253 
(0.225) 
-1.400** 
(0.569) 
-0.284 
(0.227) 
Assembler -0.021 
(0.349) 
-0.584*** 
(0.190) 
-0.007 
(0.350) 
-0.653*** 
(0.177) 
-0.182 
(0.387) 
-0.663*** 
(0.176) 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Small Large Small Large Small Large 
Gender -0.135 
(0.206) 
-0.55 
(0.169) 
-0.134 
(0.204) 
-0.046 
(0.186) 
-0.122 
(0.206) 
-0.050 
(0.181) 
Firm age 0.011 
(0.021) 
-0.001 
(0.005) 
0.010 
(0.203) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
0.009 
(0.020) 
-0.002 
(0.006) 
Age of trader 0.003 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.002 
(0.010) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
Constant 292.40 
(217.14) 
-492.29* 
(282.97) 
285.63 
(215.35) 
-397.93 
(306.85) 
321.74 
(205.14) 
-522.60* 
(279.53) 
Number of 
obs = 124 
F(17, 106) = 
2.23 
Prob > F = 
0.0071 
R-squared = 
0.3943 
Root MSE = 
0.67016 
Number of 
obs = 124 
F(17, 106) 
= 1.81 
Prob > F 
= 0.0358 
R-squared 
= 0.1822 
Root MSE 
= 0.50009 
Number of 
obs = 124 
F(17, 106) = 
2.11 
Prob > F = 
0.0114 
R-squared = 
0.3944 
Root MSE = 
0.67008 
Number of 
obs = 124 
F(17, 106) = 
1.83 
Prob > F = 
0.0332 
R-squared = 
0.1642 
Root MSE = 
0.50557 
Number of 
obs = 123 
F(17, 105) = 
2.07 
Prob > F = 
0.0133 
R-squared = 
0.4149 
Root MSE = 
0.66118 
Number of 
obs = 124 
F(17, 106) = 
1.91 
Prob > F = 
0.0247 
R-squared = 
0.1546 
Root MSE = 
0.50848 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 Table 26 shows that small traders who obtain credit, as well as small traders 
who have a higher share of sesame bought with credit are significantly more likely 
to purchase larger amounts of sesame. These relationships are not significant for 
large traders. Whether a small trader received credit from some or many traders is 
not significant (although the sign is positive, as expected). The total number of 
contacts now is positively and significantly linked to the amount purchased, both 
for small and large traders. Although regular suppliers were not significant in earlier 
models, it turns out that for small traders, the number of regular suppliers is 
negatively linked to the amount purchased. These results may be explained by the 
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fact that having regular suppliers is a constraint to purchase more sesame, because 
if a trader has several regular suppliers, he or she is obliged to purchase from them, 
even if they cannot supply sufficient amounts. The results for the largest 30% of 
traders show that having regular suppliers is not a constraint for these traders. 
 Another surprising result is that although transaction costs are significant for 
both small and large traders, signs are positive for small traders and negative for 
large traders. Apparently, for small traders putting in more effort in finding trade 
partners and bargaining, for example, is positively linked to purchase size. For large 
traders, though, it is negatively linked. These results match with the different 
strategies that small upstream and large downstream traders pursue. Small traders 
put a great deal of effort into purchasing a large number of small amounts of 
sesame, while large traders have a few trading contacts from whom they purchase 
large amounts of sesame. To take into account endogeneity issues, I compared the 
results in table 26 with results obtained using Lewbel’s approach. The main results 
remain unchanged and the results are not shown here. 
6.6 before and after the ecx 
Table 27 shows the results for the two years. Several variables are significantly 
different between the years. The variable regular contacts is left out again, as 
including it as an endogenous variable would stretch the Lewbel approach 
(generating weak instruments). As the variable regular contacts was not significant 
in table 25, omitting the variable will not change the analysis much. 
Table 27: GMM model using Lewbel’s IVs approach with Generated Instruments and External 
Instruments (2010 and 2012) 
 2010 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Trading practices 
Suppliers provide credit 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-1.366*** 
(0.248) 
 
 
 
 
0.517*** 
(0.132) 
  
How often suppliers let 
you buy on credit 
(1=never, 2=some, 
3=all) 
 
 
-0.325* 
(0.190) 
  -0.246 
(0.160) 
 
 
Share of purchases 
bought with credit (in %) 
  0.012*** 
(0.003) 
  0.001*** 
(0.003) 
Number of 
intermediaries used 
-0.027* 
(0.015) 
-0.024 
(0.018) 
-0.040*** 
(0.014) 
-0.045 
(0.021) 
-0.043** 
(0.021) 
-0.040** 
(0.020) 
 
 2010 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Assets 
Total number of traders’ 
contacts 
-0.047** 
(0.021) 
-0.056** 
(0.025) 
-0.058*** 
(0.018) 
-0.047*** 
(0.012) 
-0.057*** 
(0.013) 
-0.059** 
(0.012) 
Log of working capital 0.330*** 
(0.053) 
0.327** 
(0.060) 
0.372*** 
(0.051) 
0.151** 
(0.085) 
0.110 
(0.094 
0.145* 
(0.092) 
Number of trucks 0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.027*** 
(0.009) 
0.034** 
(0.011) 
0.033** 
(0.011) 
Total number of 
languages spoken 
0.184** 
(0.090) 
0.170* 
(0.090) 
0.194** 
(0.090) 
-0.005 
(0.100) 
-0.018 
(0.101) 
-0.006* 
(0.098) 
 2010 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Education -0.062 
(0.066) 
-0.048 
(0.066) 
-0.040 
(0.067) 
0.480*** 
(0.089) 
0.504* 
(0.093) 
0.498* 
(0.084) 
Transaction costs 
Log of transaction 
costs per quintal 
0.202** 
(0.078) 
0.153* 
(0.082) 
0.090 
(0.0700 
0.309 
(0.053) 
0.372* 
(0.058) 
0.367* 
(0.055) 
Control variables 
Exporter 0.109 
(0.154) 
0.074 
(0.170) 
-0.113 
(0.143) 
-0.063 
(0.451) 
0.055 
(0.458) 
0.125 
(0.490) 
Wholesaler 0.434* 
(0.225) 
0.363 
(0.276) 
0.407* 
(0.224) 
-0.803* 
(0.430 
-0.563 
(0.443) 
-0.555 
(0.471) 
Retailer 0.226 
(0.329) 
-0.061 
(0.399) 
-0.136 
(0.272) 
-0.964* 
(0.544) 
-0.617 
(0.543) 
-0.404 
(0.558) 
Assembler 0.610* 
(0.279) 
0.398 
(0.287) 
0.326 
(0.234) 
-1.121** 
(0.442 
-0.577 
(0.457) 
-0.784 
(0.497) 
Gender 0.019 
(0.135) 
-0.009 
(0.142) 
0.061 
(0.157) 
-0.108 
(0.263) 
-0.168 
(0.267) 
-0.213 
(0.276) 
Age of trader 0.002 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.014*** 
(0.008) 
-0.004*** 
(0.009) 
Firm age 0.018 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.024 
(0.017) 
0.028** 
(0.016) 
0.021** 
(0.016) 
Constant 1.030 
(0.917) 
0.771 
(1.027) 
-0.394 
(0.929) 
1.417 
(1.224) 
2.793 
(1.482) 
1.551 
(1.323) 
Note: to save space, the test statistics for these regression analysis are shown in appendix 4. 
Endogenous variables in italic. 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 Whilst appreciating the limitations of this analysis, it is clear that significant 
changes occurred between 2010 and 2012. The most notable change is the switch 
from negative to positive of the coefficient for credit_yn (whether traders received 
credit or not). This result may be explained by taking into account the results 
obtained for small traders. In 2012, traders were officially no longer allowed to buy 
from farmers directly, but were obliged to purchase sesame via the primary 
transaction centres (PTCs), where farmers are also obliged to sell their sesame. 
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fact that having regular suppliers is a constraint to purchase more sesame, because 
if a trader has several regular suppliers, he or she is obliged to purchase from them, 
even if they cannot supply sufficient amounts. The results for the largest 30% of 
traders show that having regular suppliers is not a constraint for these traders. 
 Another surprising result is that although transaction costs are significant for 
both small and large traders, signs are positive for small traders and negative for 
large traders. Apparently, for small traders putting in more effort in finding trade 
partners and bargaining, for example, is positively linked to purchase size. For large 
traders, though, it is negatively linked. These results match with the different 
strategies that small upstream and large downstream traders pursue. Small traders 
put a great deal of effort into purchasing a large number of small amounts of 
sesame, while large traders have a few trading contacts from whom they purchase 
large amounts of sesame. To take into account endogeneity issues, I compared the 
results in table 26 with results obtained using Lewbel’s approach. The main results 
remain unchanged and the results are not shown here. 
6.6 before and after the ecx 
Table 27 shows the results for the two years. Several variables are significantly 
different between the years. The variable regular contacts is left out again, as 
including it as an endogenous variable would stretch the Lewbel approach 
(generating weak instruments). As the variable regular contacts was not significant 
in table 25, omitting the variable will not change the analysis much. 
Table 27: GMM model using Lewbel’s IVs approach with Generated Instruments and External 
Instruments (2010 and 2012) 
 2010 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Trading practices 
Suppliers provide credit 
(0=no, 1=yes) 
-1.366*** 
(0.248) 
 
 
 
 
0.517*** 
(0.132) 
  
How often suppliers let 
you buy on credit 
(1=never, 2=some, 
3=all) 
 
 
-0.325* 
(0.190) 
  -0.246 
(0.160) 
 
 
Share of purchases 
bought with credit (in %) 
  0.012*** 
(0.003) 
  0.001*** 
(0.003) 
Number of 
intermediaries used 
-0.027* 
(0.015) 
-0.024 
(0.018) 
-0.040*** 
(0.014) 
-0.045 
(0.021) 
-0.043** 
(0.021) 
-0.040** 
(0.020) 
 
 2010 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Assets 
Total number of traders’ 
contacts 
-0.047** 
(0.021) 
-0.056** 
(0.025) 
-0.058*** 
(0.018) 
-0.047*** 
(0.012) 
-0.057*** 
(0.013) 
-0.059** 
(0.012) 
Log of working capital 0.330*** 
(0.053) 
0.327** 
(0.060) 
0.372*** 
(0.051) 
0.151** 
(0.085) 
0.110 
(0.094 
0.145* 
(0.092) 
Number of trucks 0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.003 
(0.011) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.027*** 
(0.009) 
0.034** 
(0.011) 
0.033** 
(0.011) 
Total number of 
languages spoken 
0.184** 
(0.090) 
0.170* 
(0.090) 
0.194** 
(0.090) 
-0.005 
(0.100) 
-0.018 
(0.101) 
-0.006* 
(0.098) 
 2010 2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
Education -0.062 
(0.066) 
-0.048 
(0.066) 
-0.040 
(0.067) 
0.480*** 
(0.089) 
0.504* 
(0.093) 
0.498* 
(0.084) 
Transaction costs 
Log of transaction 
costs per quintal 
0.202** 
(0.078) 
0.153* 
(0.082) 
0.090 
(0.0700 
0.309 
(0.053) 
0.372* 
(0.058) 
0.367* 
(0.055) 
Control variables 
Exporter 0.109 
(0.154) 
0.074 
(0.170) 
-0.113 
(0.143) 
-0.063 
(0.451) 
0.055 
(0.458) 
0.125 
(0.490) 
Wholesaler 0.434* 
(0.225) 
0.363 
(0.276) 
0.407* 
(0.224) 
-0.803* 
(0.430 
-0.563 
(0.443) 
-0.555 
(0.471) 
Retailer 0.226 
(0.329) 
-0.061 
(0.399) 
-0.136 
(0.272) 
-0.964* 
(0.544) 
-0.617 
(0.543) 
-0.404 
(0.558) 
Assembler 0.610* 
(0.279) 
0.398 
(0.287) 
0.326 
(0.234) 
-1.121** 
(0.442 
-0.577 
(0.457) 
-0.784 
(0.497) 
Gender 0.019 
(0.135) 
-0.009 
(0.142) 
0.061 
(0.157) 
-0.108 
(0.263) 
-0.168 
(0.267) 
-0.213 
(0.276) 
Age of trader 0.002 
(0.006) 
0.006 
(0.006) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.003 
(0.009) 
-0.014*** 
(0.008) 
-0.004*** 
(0.009) 
Firm age 0.018 
(0.004) 
0.014*** 
(0.004) 
0.015*** 
(0.004) 
0.024 
(0.017) 
0.028** 
(0.016) 
0.021** 
(0.016) 
Constant 1.030 
(0.917) 
0.771 
(1.027) 
-0.394 
(0.929) 
1.417 
(1.224) 
2.793 
(1.482) 
1.551 
(1.323) 
Note: to save space, the test statistics for these regression analysis are shown in appendix 4. 
Endogenous variables in italic. 
* p< 0.10 ** p< 0.05 *** p<0.001, standard errors in parentheses 
 
 Whilst appreciating the limitations of this analysis, it is clear that significant 
changes occurred between 2010 and 2012. The most notable change is the switch 
from negative to positive of the coefficient for credit_yn (whether traders received 
credit or not). This result may be explained by taking into account the results 
obtained for small traders. In 2012, traders were officially no longer allowed to buy 
from farmers directly, but were obliged to purchase sesame via the primary 
transaction centres (PTCs), where farmers are also obliged to sell their sesame. 
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Although the data shows that several assemblers still (illegally) purchase directly 
from farmers, the PTCs have basically taken over the main role that assemblers 
fulfilled: aggregating numerous small amounts of sesame. Although various 
assemblers are purchasing from PTCs, many have also stopped, thus decreasing the 
number of very small traders. This is confirmed by the fact that in 2012, the 
average amount of sesame purchased (per trader) has increased. The “small trader 
effect” is consequently reduced in 2012. 
 The age of the trader becomes significant but negative in 2012: older traders 
purchase less than their younger colleagues. The number of languages spoken is no 
longer an asset in 2012; the sign is negative. Education becomes a significant factor 
in 2012; traders with higher education levels are able to purchase more. The 
number of trucks a trader possesses becomes a significant factor in 2012, while 
warehouse capacity becomes a negative factor. 
6.7 discussion and conclusions  
Credit is an important factor in explaining the performance (amount purchased) of 
sesame traders in Ethiopia. However, the role of credit is not straightforward. On 
the one hand, traders who are able to buy on credit from their supplier are able to 
purchase more because they increase their working capital. On the other hand, 
receiving credit is linked to the number of regular suppliers (social capital), which 
may limit traders’ ability to purchase from other traders who may offer better 
prices, higher quality, or more quantity. Having many trade contacts (social network 
capital) allows a trader to quickly “shop around” and get the best deal. However, 
having many trade contacts is negatively linked to receiving credit; only trusted, 
regular trade contacts will provide credit. The nexus between social (network) 
capital, performance, and credit is therefore not clear-cut. 
 This is exemplified when differentiating between small traders who are 
positioned upstream in the trade network and large traders who are located 
downstream. The quantile regression results show that small upstream traders who 
need to obtain sufficient amounts of sesame from many small sellers, rely on a 
network of trade contacts from whom they purchase. However, the results also 
show that having more trade contacts reduces the likelihood of obtaining credit. 
This hurts small traders because in general, they are more financially constrained 
and need trade credit to increase their working capital to purchase larger quantities 
 
of sesame. These conclusions correspond with those of Kihanga (2010) who argues 
that the importance of using trade credit in financing the purchase of goods by 
(small) traders reflects the difficulties that these firms are faced with when trying to 
get credit. Having regular trade contacts is positively linked to obtaining credit, but 
reduces the amount of sesame purchased. 
 Large traders need less credit because they have more financial means (larger 
amounts of working capital). Nor do they seem to need a large network of trade 
contacts, but appear to have a few trade contacts from whom they are able to 
purchase large amounts of sesame. This fits with their upstream position, where the 
quantities of traded sesame are aggregated. 
 The findings also have methodological implications, as they highlight the 
consequences of pooling different types of traders and years in one dataset. Taking 
averages of these traders may miss crucial differences between different types of 
traders. As noted, small traders upstream will employ different strategies than their 
colleagues at the downstream end because they face different challenges. 
 This chapter has explored the social capital, credit, and performance nexus 
also by comparing different years and the possible effect of the ECX. Chapter five 
finds that the ECX formalised relationships between traders, reducing social 
capital. This seems to have had repercussions on trade credit: in 2012, traders 
received credit significantly less often than in 2010; fewer traders indicated that they 
received credit and fewer traders indicated that sellers of sesame extended credit 
more often. However, the amount purchased with credit increased. Although trade 
credit reduced, it still seems to play an important role in explaining the total 
amount purchased, and it even gains in importance because the relationship 
between whether a trader has received credit or not and performance flips from 
being negative in 2010 to positive in 2012. Thus, while social capital relationships 
have changed after the ECX, the role of social and social network capital in 
obtaining credit and purchasing sesame remains important. This seems to suggest 
that the ECX has yet not replaced trade credit with more formal forms of credit 
(e.g. through its warehouse receipt system). This corresponds with a previous 
study’s findings that the warehouse receipt system, created to provide credit to 
farmers as well as traders, appears to serve only the large traders as yet (Coulter 
2012) 
 The policy implications are that more needs to be done to also alleviate 
credit constraints for small traders, especially with the formalisation of trade 
relationships within the context of the ECX. Small traders are, due to the size of 
their business, often not eligible for loans from formal financial institutions. More 
informal financial institutions usually focus on farmers and farmers’ groups. 
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 7.1 introduction 
This thesis analyses institutional change, specifically how a designed, formal 
institution (the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange or ECX), which became 
mandatory for all sesame trade in late 2010, changed informal market institutions in 
the Ethiopia’s sesame markets. It hypothesises that the ECX will be successful if it 
can complement existing informal institutions or substitute less effective informal 
institutions in terms of coordination and enforcement. For the ECX to succeed, it 
also means that a critical mass of agents (i.e. traders and farmers) needs to begin, 
even if gradually, to modify their beliefs and actions to form a new equilibrium as a 
result of the ECX. The analyses in this thesis use data collected in 2009 and 2012 
among farmers in two main sesame producing areas of Ethiopia (West Tigray and 
East Wellega) as well as data collected in 2010 and 2012 among different traders 
(from collectors to exporters) in different sesame markets. The datasets collected in 
2009 and early 2010 represent the “before the ECX” situation and those collected 
in 2012 the “after the ECX” situation. 
 The question how the ECX has impacted informal institutional 
arrangements is analysed on two levels, which are described in the first chapter. 
The first level is the more theoretical question of how institutional change occurs, 
in particular how informal institutions consisting of norms and beliefs change when 
a designed formal institution is enforced; and whether the formal institution 
complements or substitutes informal institutions. The second level links up with 
the question of whether a formal, designed institution can actually achieve what it 
intended, namely bring more market transparency, reduce transaction costs, and 
benefit (small) farmers and traders alike, or whether there have been unintended 
consequences. In my view, two scholars who worked together on agricultural 
markets in Africa embody two different views. Eleni Gabre-Madhin became a 
strong proponent of the ECX as a researcher, and went on to become its first 
CEO, while Marcel Fafchamps, in his book on African markets, warned that no 
matter how carefully researched a development solution is, there will be always 
unintended (negative) consequences. 
 This thesis provides several insights. First, on the more theoretical question 
of institutional change in section 7.2 and how the ECX complemented and 
substituted informal institutions in section 7.3. Second, it considers the two 
different viewpoints of Gabre-Madhin and Fafchamps on the intended and 
unintended consequences of the ECX, and links this with policy recommendations 
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in section 7.4. I discuss the limitations of my research and make a few 
recommendations on measuring informal institutions in section 7.5. Finally, several 
avenues for future research are suggested in section 7.6. 
7.2 institutional change 
This thesis supports Eggertsson’s suggestions (2005) that the successful transfer or 
introduction of new social technologies is more complex than the transfer of 
production technologies because pre-existing institutional arrangements often 
undermine the effect. The 2010 traders’ survey finds that before the ECX became 
mandatory for all sesame trade in late 2010, it was hardly used by traders, who 
preferred to continue to rely on their informal social networks.35 The lack of 
support from traders was already signalled in an early review of the commodity 
exchanges in Africa by Robbins (2011). As Eggertsson (ibid) predicted, the existing 
institutional arrangements apparently suited the traders fine and they opposed the 
imposition of the ECX. The same seems to hold true for farmers. The 2012 
farmers’ survey finds that farmers prefer not sell to the mandatory Primary 
Transaction Centres (PTCs), but to existing market outlets (e.g. collectors and local 
markets) if they had the choice. However, successful institutional reform depends 
on active support from a large portion of relevant actors (i.e. critical mass) (Aoki 
2001). In addition, commodity exchanges can only function effectively if they 
achieve sufficient market size, both in terms of number of participants as well as 
volume of trade (Mbeng Mezui et al. 2013). To achieve institutional change, the 
Ethiopian government decided to make the ECX mandatory. Ethiopia has the 
capacity to enforce the use of the commodity exchange. Reportedly, traders may be 
sentenced to up to 20 years in jail if they circumvent the ECX (Mbeng Mezui et al. 
2013). 
 Other African commodity exchanges, which have not been made 
mandatory, are languishing (Sitko & Jayne 2012). Sitko & Jayne (ibid) point out that 
commodity markets in Zambia have evolved in such a way that informal 
institutions, characterised by interpersonal relationships between buyer and seller, 
have become of paramount importance in mitigating various risks (e.g. contract 
35 The lack of critical mass and therefore lack of institutional change can still be seen in the 
maize markets: it is not mandatory to trade maize through the ECX and maize trade on 
the ECX has all but petered out. 
 
                                                        
enforcement, ensuring availability of supplies, and protecting against severe price 
collapses). These informal institutions are more reliable and more trusted than the 
formal institution of the Zambian Commodity Exchange (Zamace). This echoes 
Stiglitz’ (2001, p. 67) warning noted in chapter one: “A real disaster may happen 
when states are powerful enough to disrupt an existing local cooperative status but 
not capable enough to replace it with anything functional and less arbitrary”. 
Therefore, making commodity exchanges mandatory may not always solve the 
problem of languishing commodity exchanges but may make problems worse: 
there is always the risk that effective informal institutions are replaced by 
ineffective formal institutions. 
 In this line, it is noteworthy that Robbins (2011) observes that no 
commodity exchange in Africa has been initiated by the traders themselves, while 
most commodity exchanges in developed countries (e.g. CBOT in the USA on 
which the ECX was modelled) were established and developed by the (grain) 
traders themselves (see Pirrong 1995a).36 In these countries, institutional change 
was initiated by the traders themselves; institutional change was in their own 
interest. Pirrong (1995b; 1995a) also describes how crucial a supportive 
government and formal institutions were for the CBOT, e.g. to avoid market 
manipulation by powerful traders and to protect property rights. However, 
introducing new elements to the CBOT (e.g. a grading system) was only possible 
with the cooperation of the participants, whose costs were compensated. This 
illustrates that institutional change (establishing a commodity exchange) required a 
large portion of relevant actors willing to change existing informal institutions, with 
formal institutions substituting and/or complementing these changing informal 
institutions. This leads to the next section, on how informal and formal institutions 
may complement and/or substitute each other. 
36 In this light it is striking that Gabre-Madhin (2012, p. 6) states that she “stumbled upon 
(...) almost by accident” an informal grain exchange, having seen traders and brokers in the 
Addis Ababa grain market gathered to trade at 6 a.m. every morning: “all of this happened 
by tradition, with no government invoment at all”. This informal commodity exchange led 
her to come up with the idea to establish a formal commodity exhange. 
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7.3 complements and substitutes 
This thesis provides evidence that formal and informal institutions are both 
complements and substitutes, depending on the perspective. Chapters three and 
four show that the ECX has provided complementary functions, which has 
fostered farmers’ trust of traders. Chapters five and six show that the ECX has 
substituted informal governance mechanisms, but has eroded trust between traders. 
 Chapter three explains that the informal institutions between farmers and 
traders before the ECX were characterised by farmers’ distrust of traders. Farmers 
in West Tigray and East Wellega had rather negative beliefs about traders’ 
opportunistic behaviour; they expected traders to provide false market and price 
information, and be dishonest about weight, quality standards, and collusion 
(agreeing on prices). Farmers who were located far away from markets, who had no 
means of transport, and who felt they lacked price information were especially 
likely to distrust traders. Chapter three argues that when farmers lack a “yardstick” 
for assessing traders’ behaviour, distrust in traders prevails. There was very little 
relational contracting, and the general distrust among farmers was likely an 
impediment. Farmers who had relatively more favourable views of traders were 
more likely to visit more market outlets, presumably to reduce price risk, but which 
also impeded the development of relational contracting. Dixit (2004) proposes that 
the absence of formal institutions creates informal, alternative institutions to 
provide coordination (information) and enforcement mechanisms instead. 
However, there seems to be an implicit assumption in the theoretical literature that 
these informal alternative institutions consist of social capital, with related 
coordination and enforcement mechanisms such as relational contracting and 
reputation mechanisms, for example. Chapter three shows that this is not always 
the case. 
 Chapter four describes what happens when the formal, imposed institution 
of the ECX (through the PTCs and ECX warehouses) improves market 
transparency (through certified weighing equipment, standard grades, and price 
information). As the existing informal institutions lacked a mechanism for market 
transparency, the ECX provided complementary institutional arrangements. These 
appear to have reduced transaction costs and improved farmers’ beliefs about the 
opportunistic behaviour of traders. As a result, it seems trust is being built up 
between farmers and traders: farmers are entering into relational contracting 
slightly more, and obtaining credit from traders substantially more, although it is 
 
still early days for firm conclusions. The findings of this chapter have an interesting 
link with the literature on customary and formal law. Aldashev et al. (2012a) argue 
that under certain conditions the modern law can act as an outside anchor or a 
“magnet”, pulling the custom in a direction favourable to marginalised groups. 
Cecchi and Melesse (2014) test this in Ethiopia and find that even if participants do 
not use the modern law, the mere fact they have this option changes the behaviour 
of customary judges. A similar process may be happening with the PTCs. Even if 
farmers do not use these, the mere fact that they have this option may change the 
behaviour of traders. In this way also, formal institutions complement informal 
ones. 
 Chapters five and six on traders find that the ECX has substituted informal 
institutions that existed among traders. Chapter five, using the framework of 
Ahlerup et al. (2009), illustrates nicely Stiglitz’ prediction discussed in chapter one, 
that as a formal institution develops, several functions of the social network capital 
will become less useful, and some of the network of interpersonal relations gets 
dispensed with (Stiglitz 2001). The value of social network capital with its personal 
relation declines, replaced by formal contracts. Chapter five finds that as trade in 
sesame is increasingly governed by the formal ECX institution, rather than informal 
institutions, the social (network) capital of traders is changing: traders appear to 
have broadened their trading network, rely more frequently on traders with whom 
they do not have social relations, and have reduced the provision of credit that 
cements personalised relationships. They also have lower levels of trust in the 
intentions and capabilities of their trading partners, and attach less weight to trust. 
 Chapter six delves a bit deeper into the consequences of the change in social 
capital, analysing the interrelationship between credit, social capital, working capital 
and performance (amount of sesame purchased). Social capital is important for 
obtaining credit, which increases a traders’ working capital. However, using social 
capital to obtain credit can also be restricting: it means traders have a few trusted 
trade partners, which may limit their ability to buy from other traders. It is the small 
traders at the upstream end of the trade network who are most constrained by 
social capital, because they need to assemble small amounts of sesame from a large 
number of trade contacts, but also need credit most. The ECX has decreased social 
capital and made trade credit less common although its importance did not 
decrease, putting small traders in a bind. The pre-existing informal institutions 
between traders might have been more effective for small traders. Substituting pre-
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existing informal arrangements may therefore lead to unintended consequences, 
which leads us to the next section. 
7.4 policy recommendations: intended and unintended consequences 
This thesis provides various answers to the policy problem Fafchamps and Gabre-
Madhin were tackling. The short answer is that both were right. Gabre-Madhin has 
stated that the goal of the ECX was not to eliminate traditional markets around the 
country, but to build up these informal markets by adding technology and systems 
to bring about more transparent, more efficient, and more reliable trading (Gabre-
Madhin 2012, p. 6). This thesis shows that many of the intended consequences of 
the ECX have been achieved, finding that it has increased market transparency for 
farmers and reduced their transaction costs, and that it has reduced disagreements 
among traders. It is important that the ECX, the Ethiopian government and 
international donors keep focusing on these objectives, and do not see the means 
to achieve these goals, i.e. setting up and running commodity exchanges as a goal in 
itself. 
 However, Fafchamps was right in that there are always unintended 
consequences. This thesis finds that the ECX has led to an erosion of social capital 
among traders. This is not always a bad thing: farmers note there is less collusion 
among traders, for instance. However, the erosion of social capital could, in theory, 
attenuate or reverse the potential welfare gains associated with the expansion of 
formal institutions (such as commodity exchanges). For example, Dixit (2004) 
compares the outcomes of relational and formal contracting, and demonstrates that 
opportunities created by formal contracting may undermine the scope for relational 
contracting. But even in the absence of such outcomes, it is important for policy 
makers to realise that formal institutions have an effect on informal institutions, 
and that the expansion of formal contracts, by new regulations or policies, may 
invite the erosion of norms and informal rules in the same or adjacent domains of 
human interaction. It seems unlikely that the ECX will come to a halt at some near 
point in the future, but there are some signs (described in chapter two) that it is not 
always operating optimally, and is prone to the rent-seeking behaviour of local 
managers. This is a troubling facet in itself, but combined with declining social 
capital among traders, it poses a real risk, as trust is crucial for markets to function: 
both trust in market institutions and trust between trading partners. One of the 
 
consequences of the erosion of social capital seems to be that traders provide less 
trade credit to each other, which especially hurts small traders. The ECX and the 
government of Ethiopia should therefore ensure that traders trust and benefit from 
the ECX. 
 In this respect, the ECX and the Ethiopian government should be troubled 
by the fact that although the ECX and the PTCs are contributing to market 
transparency, they are regarded with suspicion by farmers and traders. Chapter four 
finds that the PTCs are not the favoured market outlets of farmers. I argue that the 
reason may lie in the fact that farmers in Ethiopia have long viewed government-
run institutions with suspicion, based on negative experiences with the communist 
Derg regime and the government’s control over cooperatives. Traders initially did 
not use the ECX and view the heavy involvement of the government in 
establishing and running the ECX with suspicion. Gabre-Madhin, then CEO of the 
ECX was well aware of this, stating she was troubled by the “perception that 
because the Government of Ethiopia sponsored ECX and fully owns it, ECX 
cannot be a free market, that it must be an instrument of control and a typical, 
bureaucratic, state-owned enterprise, and that it must be a monopoly” (Gabre-
Madhin 2012, p. 15). She has refuted this criticism, explaining that the ECX is a 
unique public–private partnership, sponsored by Ethiopia’s government (with 
donors) while its members obtain the private benefits. 
 This may be true, but if the work of North et al. (2009; 2013) is taken 
seriously, and Ethiopia is seen as a “Limited Access Order”, for which chapter two 
provides reasonable justification, it should be accepted that the ECX will probably 
function differently than its counterparts in developed countries (or “Open Access 
Orders”). Pretending that there is no difference between the institutional 
environments of the US and Ethiopia, and that the ECX is just like the Chicago 
Board of Trade, only in a poor country, misses the crucial point North et al. (ibid), 
are trying to make. In a Limited Access Order, the political and economic systems 
are not independent; politics and economics are intimately intertwined. The 
Ethiopian government is therefore likely to remain heavily involved in the ECX 
and sesame trade in general. It is telling that it has made the ECX mandatory for 
Ethiopia’s two main lucrative export crops (coffee and sesame), while it has left 
grains to traditional markets (despite the fact that grains are the “classic” 
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commodity exchange crops).37 International donors who are interested in 
supporting the establishment of commodity exchanges in other African countries, 
based on the ECX model, should take this into account. Their best hope is that 
governments take on a coordinating role, reducing uncertainty and providing 
solutions to coordination and enforcement problems, as many Asian governments 
have done (Gollwitzer Franke & Quintyn 2012; Mbeng Mezui et al. 2013). 
 However, to take up this role, Ethiopia’s government will need to see 
traders as reliable partners and collaborate with them.. The perception held by 
many in Ethiopian society that traders are untrustworthy might be linked to the 
history of traders in Ethiopia described in chapter two. Historically, trade was seen 
as an inferior profession, practiced by outsiders or members of the lower tiers of 
society. Although this has changed, with an increasing number of Ethiopians of 
different backgrounds becoming involved in trade, negative perceptions have 
persisted. It seems that the many functions traders perform remain invisible to 
policy-makers. The Ethiopian Commodity Exchange Authority (ECEA) states in 
its working paper on sesame that “in line with the goals and objectives of the 
Ethiopia Commodity Exchange (ECX), relentless efforts have to be made to 
reduce market chains” (Abera 2011, p. 22). “Cutting out the middleman” has 
mistakenly become a synonym for making value chains or markets more efficient 
or effective (Arya et al. 2015; Sharma et al. 2013). If this aim is pursued without 
recognising the various important functions traders and intermediaries perform in 
value chains and markets, but purely based on negative beliefs about traders, it is 
likely to backfire and lead to the “unintended consequences” Fafchamps warns 
about. Instead of focusing on cutting out traders and intermediaries, the Ethiopian 
government should focus on further increasing market transparency, while 
supporting and cooperating with traders. This is also emphasised by Mbeng Mezui 
et al. (2013) in their guidebook on African commodity exchanges. 
37 Especially in coffee there have been several “unintended consequences” because coffee is, 
basically, not suited for a commodity exchange. Gabre-Madhin addressed these as CEO 
(Gabre-Madhin 2012) and various modifications were made, but the ECX remained 
mandatory for coffee. 
 
                                                        
7.5 measuring informal institutions: limitations and recommendations 
Measuring institutional change takes time. The ECX has had several direct impacts 
on informal institutions but may also have (more indirect) impacts that will emerge 
over a longer time period, making causal inferences more difficult and increasing 
the need to control for confounding factors. The time lag between the creation of 
the ECX and the ex post measurements of this thesis is short, and attribution is far 
from perfect because a proper control group does not exist – the ECX affected all 
participants in sesame trade. A partial solution to this is to construct data sets that 
include groups affected by the ECX in different degrees. In an ideal scenario, panel 
data are used to control for unobserved, time invariant, individual heterogeneity. 
Lab-in-field experiments may provide additional support for findings, as such set-
ups minimise identification issues. Cecchi and Melesse (2014) provide an example 
of a lab-in-field experiment to test the interaction between formal and informal 
dispute resolution institutions. 
 The research in this thesis relies heavily on survey data and quantitative 
methods. The data and quantitative analyses occasionally provided counter-intuitive 
results, but were of limited use to answer why. Having visited Ethiopia several 
times, during which I talked to farmers and traders, I also learned that in-depth 
interviews are likely to result in contradicting information and opposing viewpoints 
as well. Every time I was in Ethiopia, I felt I had only scratched the surface. Asking 
over a thousand farmers the same question may reveal more than asking one 
farmer a thousand questions. Nonetheless, there is added value in additional 
anthropological and social research that traces changes in farmers’ and traders’ 
views, beliefs, and relationships during the institutional change in Ethiopia’s sesame 
markets. 
 Using a quantitative approach to measure rather obscure concepts such as 
trust and social capital is not easy, yet important. At the time of writing these 
conclusions, a search on Google Scholar for “trust” resulted in over 2.6 million 
sources, while “social capital” produced almost 1.2 million. As discussed in chapter 
three, there is no unique definition of trust (or of social capital for that matter), and 
there is no consensus on how to measure it. The literature of New Institutional 
Economics (NIE) is useful in thinking about these nebulous concepts. The 
rigorous concepts of Aoki (2001), combined with the theory of NIE scholars such 
as North (1990) and Greif (1994; 2006) on the importance of beliefs in institutional 
development, were instrumental in the choice of Likert scales to measure beliefs 
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(e.g. perceptions of trustworthiness) in a quantitative manner. It is somewhat 
surprising that Likert scales are not used more often to measure trust perceptions, 
especially because the most commonly used definition of trust is the belief (or 
expectation) about someone else’s behaviour. This thesis shows Likert scales can be 
a rather useful and rigorous method for measuring trust. 
 The framework of Das and Teng (2001) is useful in distinguishing the 
difference between trust perceptions about opportunistic behaviour (“goodwill 
trust”) and trust perception about someone’s ability (“trust in ability”). The 
realisation that farmers or traders may not trust a trader to pay because of these 
two reasons (i.e. either he is untrustworthy, or short on cash) is an important 
distinction to make. However, because this thesis focuses on informal institutions, 
and relatedly, social capital, the first definition (goodwill trust) plays a more 
important role in the analysis. 
7.6 further research 
This thesis provides several avenues for subsequent research, first on institutional 
change and second on the effectiveness of the ECX. With respect to the first level, 
this thesis finds that improved market transparency seems to increase farmers’ trust 
in traders, leading to more relational contracting and credit relations. Little research 
has been conducted on improving market transparency, which not only includes 
prices information, but also includes standardised weights and grades. Most 
research has been conducted on the impact of price information, e.g. on the 
improved bargaining positions of farmers, market participation, and price 
fluctuation (e.g. David-Benz et al. 2011; Svensson & Yanagizawa 2010; Aker 2010; 
Muto & Yamano 2009). To my knowledge very little research has linked this to 
trust relationships between farmers and traders (but see Molony 2008). Further 
research could explore whether the relationship between increased market 
transparency and trust perceptions exists in other settings. Experimental research 
might be useful to test whether increasing market transparency leads to changed 
perceptions among farmers and traders. Follow-up research in Ethiopia may 
confirm that farmers’ perceptions of and trust in traders has continued to improve 
as a result of the ECX. This could be identified by using the Likert scales for trust 
perceptions, but also by the number of farmers who engage in relational 
contracting, or credit relations. 
 
 In general, agricultural traders are a crucially important yet chronically 
under-researched set of actors, especially small traders (e.g. see Sitko & Jayne 2014). 
Fafchamps made an important contribution with his seminal book on market 
institutions in sub-Saharan Africa (Fafchamps 2004), which greatly improved the 
understanding of the informal institutional arrangements of traders that underpin 
African markets. This thesis discovered the importance of making a distinction 
between different types of traders in research on traders. Small traders use different 
strategies than large traders, for instance with respect to social (network) capital. 
More research is needed not only on the function and roles traders perform, but 
also on the different institutional arrangements used by different traders in order to 
better understand how institutions that underpin agricultural markets may be 
improved. 
 With respect to the second level, on the effectiveness of the ECX, there are 
several suggestions to make, as very few, if any studies have been done on the 
impact of the ECX on farmers or traders. Studies by Robbins (2011) and Coulter 
(2012) being the exceptions (the study by Coulter was never officially published). 
Renkow & Slade (2013) state that an evaluation of the ECX is urgently needed. I 
agree, especially because the ECX is being touted as the model for other African 
commodity exchanges (Mbeng Mezui et al. 2013). The focus of this thesis is on the 
interaction of the ECX and informal institutions and therefore limited in its scope 
to assess whether the ECX has achieved all of its objectives. However, this thesis 
may provide a building block for follow-up work to answer questions that are still 
open. 
 First, an important topic is whether the ECX has led to improved marketing 
margins for both farmers and traders. This is not just about farmers obtaining 
higher prices, which the ECX claims to have achieved (Gabre-Madhin 2012), 
although this is an interesting question. Assessing marketing margins takes a 
broader view as measuring margins indicates how much has been paid for the 
processing and marketing services applied to the product at a particular stage in the 
marketing process (Wohlgenant 2001). Taking into account the cost of the 
marketing services provided by the ECX will provide a more informative 
assessment than only the prices farmers receive. 
 Second, the issue of market information provided by the ECX is an area 
that should be explored more thoroughly. One topic is whether the ECX, through 
its price information system, has led to more arbitration opportunities for traders, 
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and therefore less price variation between markets and in time. Another topic is 
how market information is and should be provided to farmers. The ECX has relied 
heavily on ICT for disseminating price information. This thesis finds that the ECX 
has not yet been successful in providing accessible price information to farmers. 
This thesis also finds that different types of farmers want different types of market 
information. Further research should be focused on how the ECX can deliver 
timely and relevant market information to farmers, few of whom have electricity 
and almost none of whom have a mobile phone. 
 Third, it would be useful to explore other formal institutions that aim to 
achieve similar objectives as the ECX. Such research is important because the 
alternatives may be less costly than the proposed commodity exchanges in Africa. 
As Robbins (2011, p. 5) stated in his review of commodity exchanges in Africa: “it 
seems likely, that so much faith was invested in the new top-down, commodity 
exchange-based system to deliver country-wide reforms, that funding for the nuts 
and bolts of a basic agricultural market system has been crowded out”. No official 
figures are available on what the costs of establishing and running the ECX have 
been. A report by the African Development Bank estimates that costs were above 
US$50 million, with some estimates exceeding US$100 million (Mbeng Mezui et al. 
2013). The designed, formal markets in Tanzania (the so-called MVIWATA 
markets) are an interesting alternative of a more basic agricultural market system.38 
Several wholesale markets (e.g. for maize, fruits and vegetables, and fish) were 
established in Tanzania by not only building the infrastructure, but also by 
imposing market rules enforced by an elected market board and by increasing 
transparency through mandatory weighing scales, keeping records of prices on a 
blackboard. There are many similarities between the objectives of these markets 
and those of the ECX and especially the PTCs. Follow-up research may take on 
similar questions raised in this thesis, focusing on how formal market institutions 
impact pre-existing informal institutions in Tanzania. 
 
38 The MVIWATA markets have not been evaluated thoroughly either, except for a short 
study commissioned by MVIWATA (MVIWATA 2013), which provides preliminary 
evidence that the markets have provided several benefits for traders and farmers. 
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evidence that the markets have provided several benefits for traders and farmers. 
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 appendix 1 addressing endogeneity through bioprobit estimation 
An appropriate instrument requires that it is not correlated with the disturbance 
terms in the equation of interest as it would yield a biased and inconsistent 
instrumental variable estimator (Murray 2006). Tests of overidentifying restrictions 
address this: if and only if an equation is overidentified, can it be tested whether the 
excluded instruments are appropriately independent of the error process. The 
regression analysis is not overidentified, and I could not perform a test such as the 
Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. However, deviations from the 
exclusion restriction may have only small influences upon precision when the 
instruments are strong (Conley et al. 2010), which can be tested. An appropriate 
instrument also requires that it is not strongly correlated with the suspected 
endogenous variable; if not, it would have a larger mean square error than OLS. A 
rule of thumb for checking the strength of an instrument is using the first-stage F 
statistic: when there is a single endogenous regressor, a first-stage F above 10 
indicates that the instrument is strong (Stock & Watson 2003, p. 315). More precise 
statistics and critical values for detecting weak instruments are provided by Stock 
and Yogo (2005). 
 For instrument used, I assume that farmers who are inherently inquisitive 
will collect market information but do not necessarily have a more negative 
perception of traders. To measure this trait, which cannot be measured directly, a 
dummy variable was composed from two other variables that are related to 
obtaining information. The first variable is whether farmers have information on 
the production potential of cash crops, the second is whether farmers have 
information on quality standards of sesame. Farmers who have information on 
both were scored as being inherently inquisitive. Farmers who have information on 
only one or on none of these variables were scored as non-inquisitive farmers. The 
Heckman 2SLS procedure was used to obtain the results for the first stage 
regression and the F statistic, which is 13.9, above the critical value provided by 
Stock and Yogo (2005). This findings suggests that Infodummy is a sufficiently 
strong instrument, implying that any deviations from the exclusion restriction will 
have only small influences upon precision (Conley et al. 2010). 
 Greene (2008, p. 827) suggests that when both the dependent variable and 
the endogenous variable are binary, a bivariate probit model can be used. It is less 
clear what model is best if both the dependent variable and the endogenous 
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variable are ordered categorical data. Buscha and Conte (2010) suggest that a semi-
ordered bivariate probit model is appropriate when the dependent variable is 
ordered with more than two choices and the endogenous variable is binary (see also 
Greene & Hensher 2010). Bivariate ordered probability models can be derived 
from the latent variable model. Assume that two latent variables 
y*1i = x1i β1+ ε1i 
y*2i = x2i β2+ γy
*
1i +ε2i (1) 
where β1 and β1 are vectors of unknown parameters, γ is an unknown scalar, ε1 and 
ε2 are the error terms, and subscript i denotes an individual observation. The 
explanatory variables in the model satisfy the conditions of exogeneity such that 
E(x1i ε1) = 0 and E(x2i ε2) = 0 
 A user-written Stata program (bioprobit) by Sajaia (2009) allows the 
estimation of a two-equation ordered probit model by means of the general Full-
Information Maximum Likelihood Estimates (FIML) algorithm. The option for 
clustering according to village (kebele) is chosen for the standard errors. Details of 
the bioprobit regression are available from the author upon request. For the 
dummy variables, the marginal effects need to be calculated to obtain more 
information on the size of the effects. However, there is still no conventional 
agreement on what exactly should be analysed: Greene and Hensher (2010) state 
that for a bivariate model, it is not obvious what margin is of interest. Partial effects 
for this model are complicated functions of the parameters regardless of how they 
are defined. Therefore, we only provide the coefficients and significance levels. The 
direction and significance levels correspond with those of the ordered probit 
model. 
Table 28: Summary of ordered probit model and bioprobit model 
  Ordered probit Bioprobit 
 
dPr(B=1) 
negative 
perception 
dPr(B=2) 
neutra  
perception 
dPr(B=3  
positiv  
perception 
Coefficient 
Market information 
NoMrktInfo 0.157*** 0.111*** -0.268*** -1.031** 
  (0.040) (0.017) (0.050) (0.459) 
NoTransp 0.147** 0.094*** -0.241*** -0.620*** 
  (0.067) (0.016) (0.077) (0.196) 
TravelTime 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
 
  Ordered probit Bioprobit 
 
dPr(B=1) 
negative 
perception 
dPr(B=2) 
neutra  
perception 
dPr(B=3  
positiv  
perception 
Coefficient 
Experience with traders 
TraderUnexp 0.090** 0.106** -0.196** -0.487** 
  (0.036) (0.047) (0.081) (0.203) 
NoTraderChoice -0.045 -0.053 0.097 0.242 
  (0.033) (0.033) (0.066) (0.160) 
PriceDiff 0.003** 0.004*** -0.007*** -0.017*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.007) 
Price -0.231** -0.274*** 0.505** 1.249** 
  (0.106) (0.100) (0.202) (0.503) 
Revenue -0.001*** -0.002*** 0.003*** 0.007*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) 
PriceFail -0.050*** -0.051*** 0.101*** 0.254*** 
  (0.018) (0.016) (0.033) (0.079) 
PriceQual -0.081*** -0.095** 0.176*** 0.436*** 
  (0.023) (0.041) (0.062) (0.163) 
PriceQuan -0.142** -0.168** 0.310** 0.759** 
  (0.062) (0.082) (0.141) (0.370) 
Environmental and institutional factors 
LstLoss -0.052*** -0.063*** 0.115*** 0.286*** 
  (0.016) (0.024) (0.039) (0.099) 
EthnConfl 0.033 0.033 -0.066 -0.167 
  (0.069) (0.057) (0.126) (0.311) 
HealthProb -0.044** -0.050*** 0.093*** 0.230*** 
  (0.017) (0.012) (0.029) (0.067) 
FoodShort 0.010 0.013 -0.023 -0.060 
  (0.024) (0.031) (0.054) (0.133) 
Drought 0.027** 0.033** -0.060** -0.152** 
  (0.011) (0.017) (0.027) (0.066) 
Personal characteristics 
Region 0.076 0.090 -0.166 -0.422 
  (0.076) (0.100) (0.175) (0.432) 
Gender -0.001 -0.001 0.003 0.002 
  (0.011) (0.013) (0.024) (0.061) 
Age 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
Land 0.002 0.002 -0.005 -0.011 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.011) 
Edu 0.014 0.017 -0.031 -0.075 
  (0.014) (0.015) (0.029) (0.070) 
CropDiv -0.036* -0.043* 0.079* 0.199* 
  (0.021) (0.025) (0.046) (0.115) 
NoMrktInfo         
Infodummy       0.392*** 
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Bioprobit: 
Wald chi2(22) = 158.69 
Log pseudolikelihood = -857.75286 
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Rho: 0.220 (s.e.: 0.213; 95% Conf. Interval: -0.2124493 0.5807508) 
LR test of indep. eqns. : chi2(1) = 0.32 Prob > chi2 = 0.5728 
 
 The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity (rho=0), which 
means that the error terms in the structural equation (probit) and the reduced-form 
equation for the endogenous variable (instrumented regression) are correlated, 
leading to the conclusion that NoMrktInfo is in fact endogenous. However, 
because rho is not very large (0.22) NoMrktInfo is only be weakly endogenous. 
 
 
appendix 2 addressing endogeneity through lewbel’s method 
Because the choice of the “infodummy” instrument is debatable and other 
appropriate external instruments are not available, I apply Lewbel’s (2012) method 
to identify endogenous variables. This method enables the identification of 
endogenous regressors when the chosen instrumental variables are weak or non-
existent. The method can also be used to increase the efficiency of the estimates of 
existing instrumental variables. According to Lewbel (2012) identification can be 
achieved if errors display some heteroskedasticity and if regressors exist that are 
uncorrelated with the product of these heteroskedastic errors. The method 
generates instruments by first regressing each endogenous variable on all 
exogenous variables and a constant. The residuals from these auxiliary regressions 
are then multiplied by each exogenous variable in mean-centred form. The product 
of the residuals with the exogenous variables in mean-centred form generates the 
external instruments. With new external instruments generated, the method allows 
Sargan-Hansen tests of orthogonality in case of exact identification with standard 
external instruments. I use the ivreg2h program for STATA to apply Lewbel’s 
method, which produces three sets of estimates: the standard 2sls (IV) estimates, 
estimates with only generated instruments, and estimates using both generated and 
excluded instruments. I show the results with only generated instruments, leaving 
out possible weak instruments. I assume that NoMrktInfo is endogenous, price is 
endogenous, and both NoMrktInfo and Price are endogenous. I could not use the 
option cluster by village (kebele) because the number of clusters was insufficient to 
calculate robust covariance matrix singleton dummy variable (dummy with one 1 
and N-1 0s or vice versa). Instead, the robust option was chosen. Table 29 presents 
the results. 
 Stata provides several test statistics. First the underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): if H0 is not rejected, then underidentification is 
an issue. This is not the case for any of the three models. The weak identification 
test (Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic) shows that the generated internal instruments 
are sufficiently strong; for market information, it is below the 10% maximal IV 
relative bias, for price it is even below 5% maximal IV relative bias, and for the two 
combined it is again well below the 20% maximal IV relative bias. If H0 is rejected 
then over-identification is an issue. The Hansen J statistic is used to test 
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overidentification of all instruments. In this case, none of the three models suffer 
from overidentification 
 The reported model coefficients show that the three indicators for market 
information remain highly significant, in line with the earlier results. In addition, no 
transport remains significant, and travel time becomes significant, although the 
effect is small. These outcomes simply provides additional support for the main 
result that a lack market information increases the negative perception that farmers 
have about traders. 
Table 29: Summaries of Ordered Probability Model and GMM model with Lewbel’s method 
(generated instruments only).  
  
Ordered probit 
Lewbel’s method (with generated instruments and IV 
infodummy for NoMrktInfo) 
significance levels  
NoMrktInfo 
endogenous 
Price 
endogenous 
NoMrktinfo & 
price 
endogenous 
Constant   0.080 1.638*** -0.128 
    (0.354) (0.397) (0.255) 
Market information  
Mrktinfoa *** -0.147* -0.429*** -0.151* 
    (0.087) (0.074) (0.078) 
NoTranspa *** -0.174*** -0.384*** -0.203*** 
    (0.055) (0.081) (0.053) 
TravelTime ** -0.001*** -0.001* -0.001*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Experience with traders  
TraderUnexpa 
 
*** -0.194*** -0.268*** -0.202*** 
  (0.045) (0.059) (0.118) 
NoTraderChoicea 
 
*** 0.111*** 0.127** 0.141*** 
  (0.042) (0.059) (0.177) 
PriceQuala 
 
*** 0.132*** 0.253*** 0.044*** 
  (0.043) (0.058) (0.042) 
PriceQuanta 
 
*** 0.145 0.504*** 0.042* 
  (0.106) (0.125) (0.101) 
PriceDiff *** -0.005** -0.010*** -0.007*** 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Price *** 0.404*** 0.749*** 0.566*** 
    (0.154) (0.192) (0.112) 
Rev *** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
  
Ordered probit 
Lewbel’s method (with generated instruments and IV 
infodummy for NoMrktInfo) 
significance levels  
NoMrktInfo 
endogenous 
Price 
endogenous 
NoMrktinfo & 
price endog. 
Environmental and institutional factors  
Regiona   -0.178 -0.293 -0.091 
    (0.151) (0.178) (0.112) 
CropDiv * 0.109*** 0.077 0.074 
    (0.037) (0.056) (0.034) 
Droughta   -0.038 -0.106*** -0.037 
    (0.050) (0.062) (0.050) 
Ethnconfla   -0.054 -0.180 -0.064 
    (0.111) (0.163) (0.110) 
FoodShorta   0.032 -0.036 0.035 
    (0.047) (0.063) (0.046) 
HealthProba ** 0.072* 0.107* 0.068* 
    (0.042) (0.059) (0.040) 
Lstlossa *** 0.076* 0.165*** 0.073* 
    (0.042) (0.058) (0.041) 
PriceFaila * 0.053 0.151** 0.067 
    (0.047) (0.067) (0.045) 
Personal characteristics 
Age   -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Edu   -0.041 -0.042 -0.056 * 
    (0.033) (0.044) (0.033) 
Gendera   -0.040 0.041 -0.041 
    (0.079) (0.092) (0.078) 
Land   -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
    (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
NoMrktinfo endogenous 
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 83.574; Chi-sq(22) P-val = 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 13.392 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic): 12.036 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 
5% maximal IV relative bias 21.41 
10% maximal IV relative bias 11.40 
20% maximal IV relative bias 6.20 
30% maximal IV relative bias 4.39 
10% maximal IV size 71.85 
15% maximal IV size 37.57 
20% maximal IV size 25.90 
25% maximal IV size 20.01 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). Reproduced by permission. Critical values 
are for Cragg-Donald F statistic and i.i.d. errors. 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 41.416 
Chi-sq(21) P-val = 0.0106 
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    (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
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    (0.154) (0.192) (0.112) 
Rev *** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
 
  
Ordered probit 
Lewbel’s method (with generated instruments and IV 
infodummy for NoMrktInfo) 
significance levels  
NoMrktInfo 
endogenous 
Price 
endogenous 
NoMrktinfo & 
price endog. 
Environmental and institutional factors  
Regiona   -0.178 -0.293 -0.091 
    (0.151) (0.178) (0.112) 
CropDiv * 0.109*** 0.077 0.074 
    (0.037) (0.056) (0.034) 
Droughta   -0.038 -0.106*** -0.037 
    (0.050) (0.062) (0.050) 
Ethnconfla   -0.054 -0.180 -0.064 
    (0.111) (0.163) (0.110) 
FoodShorta   0.032 -0.036 0.035 
    (0.047) (0.063) (0.046) 
HealthProba ** 0.072* 0.107* 0.068* 
    (0.042) (0.059) (0.040) 
Lstlossa *** 0.076* 0.165*** 0.073* 
    (0.042) (0.058) (0.041) 
PriceFaila * 0.053 0.151** 0.067 
    (0.047) (0.067) (0.045) 
Personal characteristics 
Age   -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 
    (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
Edu   -0.041 -0.042 -0.056 * 
    (0.033) (0.044) (0.033) 
Gendera   -0.040 0.041 -0.041 
    (0.079) (0.092) (0.078) 
Land   -0.002 -0.003 -0.001 
    (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
NoMrktinfo endogenous 
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic): 83.574; Chi-sq(22) P-val = 0.0000 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F statistic): 13.392 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F statistic): 12.036 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values: 
5% maximal IV relative bias 21.41 
10% maximal IV relative bias 11.40 
20% maximal IV relative bias 6.20 
30% maximal IV relative bias 4.39 
10% maximal IV size 71.85 
15% maximal IV size 37.57 
20% maximal IV size 25.90 
25% maximal IV size 20.01 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). Reproduced by permission. Critical values 
are for Cragg-Donald F statistic and i.i.d. errors. 
Hansen J statistic (overidentification test of all instruments): 41.416 
Chi-sq(21) P-val = 0.0106 
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Questionnaires used for farmerssurveys in 2009 and 2012 and trader surveys in 
2010 and 2012 available at 
https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Gerdien_Meijerink  
 
Additional regression analyses linked to chapter 5 available online (paywalled) at 
Food Policy website: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S030691921400089X  
 
(DOI 10.1016/j.foodpol.2014.05.015) 
 
  
 
appendix 4 test statistics for chapter 6 
Test statistics for 2010 
purchase (log of amount 
purchased) with 
sharecredit as credit 
variable 
purchase (log of amount 
purchased) with credit_yn 
as credit variable 
purchase (log of amount 
purchased) with oftencredt 
as credit variable 
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic): 55.265 
Chi-sq(37) P-val = 0.0272 
 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic): 3.564 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic): 8.875 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values: 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
20.54 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
10.81 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
5.82 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
4.09 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). 
Reproduced by permission. 
NB: Critical values are for 
Cragg-Donald F statistic and 
i.i.d. errors. 
 
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments): 44.566 
Chi-sq(36) P-val = 0.1548 
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic): 49.337 
Chi-sq(37) P-val = 0.0845 
 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic): 1.367 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic): 2.295 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values: 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
20.54 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
10.81 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
5.82 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
4.09 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). 
Reproduced by permission. 
NB: Critical values are for 
Cragg-Donald F statistic and 
i.i.d. errors. 
 
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments): 34.433 
Chi-sq(36) P-val = 0.5432 
 
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic): 55.014 
Chi-sq(40) P-val = 0.0573 
 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic): 2.748 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic): 3.950 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values: 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
20.59 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
10.81 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
5.80 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
4.07 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). 
Reproduced by permission. 
NB: Critical values are for 
Cragg-Donald F statistic and 
i.i.d. errors. 
 
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments): 36.617 
Chi-sq(39) P-val = 0.5791 
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Test statistics for 2012 
purchase (log of amount 
purchased) with 
sharecredit as credit 
variable 
purchase (log of amount 
purchased) with credit_yn 
as credit variable 
purchase (log of amount 
purchased) with 
oftencredit as credit 
variable 
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic): 99.530 
Chi-sq(73) P-val = 0.0213 
 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic): 4.059 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic): 7.787 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values: 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
20.81 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
10.77 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
5.66 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
3.92 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). 
Reproduced by permission. 
NB: Critical values are for 
Cragg-Donald F statistic and 
i.i.d. errors. 
 
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments): 87.592 
Chi-sq(72) P-val = 0.1020 
 
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic): 54.661 
Chi-sq(40) P-val = 0.0611 
 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic): 4.706 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic): 12.535 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values: 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
20.59 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
10.81 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
5.80 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
4.07 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). 
Reproduced by permission. 
NB: Critical values are for 
Cragg-Donald F statistic and 
i.i.d. errors. 
 
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments): 44.956 
Chi-sq(39) P-val = 0.2365 
 
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic): 58.011 
Chi-sq(40) P-val = 0.0326 
 
Weak identification test 
(Cragg-Donald Wald F 
statistic): 6.946 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F 
statistic): 10.740 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test 
critical values: 
5% maximal IV relative bias 
20.59 
10% maximal IV relative bias 
10.81 
20% maximal IV relative bias 
5.80 
30% maximal IV relative bias 
4.07 
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). 
Reproduced by permission. 
NB: Critical values are for 
Cragg-Donald F statistic and 
i.i.d. errors. 
 
Hansen J statistic 
(overidentification test of all 
instruments): 46.722 
Chi-sq(39) P-val = 0.1849 
 
The underidentification test and the overidentification test show that there are no 
problems for these regression results. However, the weak identification tests show 
that the generated instruments are rather weak. 
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Sesam is niet het eerste dat in je opkomt als je aan Ethiopië denkt, maar toch is 
sesam het op één na belangrijkste exportgewas van Ethiopië en een belangrijke 
cashcrop voor veel boeren. In de afgelopen decennia zijn de sesamproductie en 
export snel gegroeid. Sesammarkten in Ethiopië, net als veel andere Afrikaanse 
markten voor landbouwproducten, worden gekenmerkt door hoge transactierisico’s 
en kosten. De meeste Afrikaanse markten worden bepaald door informele 
instituties die problemen van coördinatie (of informatie) en handhaving van 
afspraken proberen op te lossen. Eleni Gabre-Madhin, die uitvoerig Ethiopische 
graanmarkten had bestudeerd, heeft een grote rol gespeeld bij het oprichten van 
Ethiopië’s eerste landbouwbeurs (de Ethiopian Commodity Exchange of ECX). 
De ECX zou een oplossing moeten bieden voor coördinatie en handhavings-
problemen, en als doel hebben de transactierisico’s en -kosten voor zowel boeren 
als handelaars te verminderen. De Ethiopische overheid heeft de ECX in 2008 
opgericht voor een aantal gewassen, met inbegrip van sesam. Echter, toen duidelijk 
werd dat niet veel handelaars gebruik maakten van de ECX, heeft de overheid eind 
2010 de ECX verplicht gesteld voor handel in sesam. Even later heeft de overheid 
de “primaire transactiecentra” of Primary Transaction Centres (PTCs) verplicht 
gesteld voor handelaars en boeren die sesam willen kopen en verkopen. De PTCs 
zijn gevestigd in de meeste dorpen en verschaffen prijsinformatie, 
kwaliteitsstandaarden en gecertificeerde weegschalen. De oprichting van de ECX 
vormt een belangrijke institutionele verandering in de sesammarkten in Ethiopië, 
maar waar nog niet veel onderzoek naar is gedaan. De ECX wordt beschouwd als 
een model voor andere Afrikaanse landen, en het is belangrijk om het effect dat de 
ECX heeft gehad beter begrijpen. Marcel Fafchamps, die met Gabre-Madhin 
werkte aan onderzoek naar Afrikaanse markten, is veel voorzichtiger geweest in het 
leveren van oplossingen voor het verbeteren van de Afrikaanse markten, en 
waarschuwde voor onbedoelde gevolgen. 
 Markten zijn belangrijk voor economische ontwikkeling, maar toch heeft de 
moderne hoofdstroom in de economie niet meer dan vluchtige aandacht gegeven 
aan markten als institutie. Echte markten, vooral die in Afrika, voldoen niet aan het 
beeld van de “perfecte markt” dat wordt gebruikt in de economische theorie. Om 
de rol van marktinstituties te begrijpen, zijn twee zaken belangrijk. De eerste is de 
rol en de complexiteit van de institutionele regelingen (zowel formeel als informeel) 
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sesam het op één na belangrijkste exportgewas van Ethiopië en een belangrijke 
cashcrop voor veel boeren. In de afgelopen decennia zijn de sesamproductie en 
export snel gegroeid. Sesammarkten in Ethiopië, net als veel andere Afrikaanse 
markten voor landbouwproducten, worden gekenmerkt door hoge transactierisico’s 
en kosten. De meeste Afrikaanse markten worden bepaald door informele 
instituties die problemen van coördinatie (of informatie) en handhaving van 
afspraken proberen op te lossen. Eleni Gabre-Madhin, die uitvoerig Ethiopische 
graanmarkten had bestudeerd, heeft een grote rol gespeeld bij het oprichten van 
Ethiopië’s eerste landbouwbeurs (de Ethiopian Commodity Exchange of ECX). 
De ECX zou een oplossing moeten bieden voor coördinatie en handhavings-
problemen, en als doel hebben de transactierisico’s en -kosten voor zowel boeren 
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maar waar nog niet veel onderzoek naar is gedaan. De ECX wordt beschouwd als 
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beeld van de “perfecte markt” dat wordt gebruikt in de economische theorie. Om 
de rol van marktinstituties te begrijpen, zijn twee zaken belangrijk. De eerste is de 
rol en de complexiteit van de institutionele regelingen (zowel formeel als informeel) 
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die oplossingen bieden voor problemen van coördinatie (of informatie) en 
handhaving; de tweede is het mechanisme van institutionele verandering in de tijd. 
Een belangrijke vraag in de literatuur is hoe formele op informele instituties 
inwerken en veranderen. 
 Dit proefschrift behandeld deze vraag door te analyseren wat het het effect 
van de ECX (die kan worden gezien als een nieuwe formele, ontworpen institutie) 
is geweest op reeds bestaande sociale normen (de informele instituties) en de 
(spontane) informele institutionele verandering die de ECX heeft teweeggebracht. 
De vraag hoe formele instituties en informele instituties op elkaar inwerken heeft 
ook betrekking op de verschillende standpunten van Gabre-Madhin en Fafchamps. 
De ECX is succesvol als het bestaande informele instituties, waar nodig, kan 
aanvullen en minder effectief informele instituties kan vervangen op het gebied van 
coördinatie en handhaving. Als de ECX wil slagen, betekent het ook dat een 
kritische massa van actoren (d.w.z. handelaars en boeren) moet beginnen, zelfs al is 
dit geleidelijk, hun denkbeelden en activiteiten aan te passen om zo een nieuw 
evenwicht te vormen. 
 In hoofdstuk een identificeer ik twee belangrijke onderzoeksvragen die in dit 
proefschrift worden behandeld. Ten eerste, wat waren de reeds bestaande sociale 
normen, overtuigingen en informele instituties die gebruikt werden door boeren en 
handelaars vóór de ECX? Ten tweede, welke invloed heeft de formele, ontworpen 
institutie van de ECX op de informele institutionele regelingen (bijvoorbeeld 
sociaal kapitaal) gehad? Deze vragen worden geanalyseerd met behulp van vier 
datasets. Gegevens werden verzameld voor en nadat de ECX verplicht werd gesteld 
in 2010. Twee datasets werden verzameld door het interviewen van boeren in West 
Tigray en East Wellega (in 2009 en 2012). Nog twee datasets werden verzameld 
door middel van interviews met handelaars in verschillende markten in het 
noordoosten van Ethiopië (begin 2010 en 2012). 
 In hoofdstuk twee wordt achtergrondinformatie verstrekt over 
sesammarkten Ethiopië. Het biedt een historisch overzicht van het beroep van 
handelaars in Ethiopië, en beschrijft hoe traditioneel de handel werd gezien als een 
minderwaardige bezigheid, uitgevoerd door buitenstaanders of leden van de lagere 
klassen. Landbouw, daarentegen, werd gezien als het meest respectabele beroep. 
Hoewel dit is veranderd in Ethiopië (handel is een lucratieve bezigheid geworden 
die door verschillende leden van de Ethiopische samenleving is opgepakt), kunnen 
deze historische, culturele beelden verklaren waarom handelaars nog steeds gezien 
 
worden als onbetrouwbaar. Sesam is een gewas dat goed groeit in ongunstige 
omstandigheden, het gedoogd droogte en arme gronden, waardoor het een 
belangrijke cashcrop is voor boeren die in achtergestelde gebieden van Ethiopië 
wonen (merendeels in het noordoosten). Het wordt geoogst aan het einde van het 
jaar, net voordat de peulen openspringen en de sesamzaden verstrooien.  
 Verschillende soorten handelaars (kleine verzamelaars of assemblers, 
groothandelaars, detailhandelaars, exporteurs) houden zich bezig met sesam handel, 
verzamelen kleine hoeveelheden uit afgelegen gebieden in Ethiopië, vervoeren deze 
via verschillende regionale markten naar Addis Ababa of export bestemmingen (via 
de haven van Djibouti). De complexiteit van de handel betekent dat handelaars 
verschillende tussenpersonen (brokers, selling, buying en consignment agents) 
inhuren die het bijeenbrengen van vraag en aanbod vergemakkelijken.  
 De ECX werd opgericht in 2008 en eind 2010 werd de ECX verplicht 
gesteld voor alle sesamhandel bestemd voor de export. De ECX is een “open 
outcry” markt, gevestigd in Addis Ababa, waar sesamcontracten worden 
verhandeld. De fysieke zakken sesam bevinden zich in gelieerde opslagplaatsen 
verspreid over Ethiopië, waar de sesam wordt gewogen en ingedeeld in 
kwaliteitsklassen. De ECX is ook gekoppeld aan de PTC's die zich in de meeste 
dorpen (kebeles) bevinden. Boeren en bevoegde sesamhandelaars (met licentie) zijn 
verplicht om op deze PTC’s sesam te (ver)kopen. PTCs bieden onder andere 
prijsinformatie (via de ECX), standaard kwaliteitsklassen en weegschalen. 
Marktinformatie is een belangrijk onderdeel. Omdat de meeste boeren geen 
(mobiele) telefoon hebben, en vaak zelfs geen elektriciteit hebben, beschikken ze 
niet over actuele informatie over markten, inclusief prijzen. Uit de in dit 
proefschrift verzamelde sesamprijzen blijkt dat sesamprijzen een hoge mate van 
fluctuatie vertonen en dat prijzen verschillen tussen markten. Sesamprijzen stegen 
sterk in de afgelopen jaren, evenals de inflatie in Ethiopië. 
 In hoofdstuk drie richt ik me op de sociale normen, overtuigingen en 
informele instituties in sesam markten in West Tigray en East Wellega voor ECX. 
Hoewel vertrouwen een voorwaarde is voor goed functionerende markten, blijkt uit 
deze studie dat dit vertrouwen over het algemeen ontbreekt bij de geïnterviewde 
boeren. De meeste boeren zien handelaars als opportunistisch en slechts zeer 
weinig boeren hebben een langdurige handelsrelatie met vertrouwde handelaars. 
Het hoofdstuk gaat in op de vraag waarom. Ik vind dat een gebrek aan 
marktinformatie is gekoppeld aan een negatief beeld over de betrouwbaarheid van 
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handelaars; zonder informatie vinden boeren het moeilijk om de betrouwbaarheid 
van handelaars bepalen. Ik analyseer de relatie tussen deze negatieve beeldvorming 
en het deelnemen aan markten, en vind een voorlopige indicatie dat boeren die een 
negatiever beeld van handelaars hebben minder deelnemen aan markten, en 
verkopen aan minder afzetkanalen. De implicaties voor beleid zijn dat door te 
investeren in marktinformatie, het vergroten van markttransparantie door 
certificerende weegschalen en het instellen van kwaliteitsklassen en normen, 
vertrouwen tussen boeren en handelaars kan worden bevorderd. 
 In hoofdstuk vier onderzoek ik of de nieuw opgerichte ECX via de gelieerde 
PTCs heeft geleid tot het verbeteren van transparantie in markten. Er wordt 
verondersteld dat een transparantere markt zal leiden tot lagere transactiekosten 
voor boeren. Het hoofdstuk bouwt voort op hoofdstuk drie, waarin de hypothese 
wordt gesteld dat betere marktinformatie zou leiden tot meer vertrouwen tussen 
boeren en handelaars. Ik vind bewijs dat de ECX succesvol is geweest in het 
verhogen van transparantie van de markt en het verminderen van transactiekosten. 
Ik betoog dat handelaars zich minder opportunistisch gedragen als gevolg van 
grotere markttransparantie en dat dit heeft geleid tot een verbeterd 
vertrouwensbeeld van boeren over handelaars en zelfs tot een lichte stijging van 
relationele contracten en een significante toename van krediet. 
 In hoofdstuk vijf onderzoek ik of de oprichting van de ECX en de formele 
controle en handhaving instituties de rol van sociaal kapitaal en vertrouwen in het 
Ethiopische segment van de sesam waardeketen heeft beïnvloed. Consistent met 
een eenvoudig theoretisch marketing model, suggereren de gegevens dat dit 
inderdaad het geval is. De handel in sesam wordt steeds meer beheerst door 
formele, in plaats van informele, instituties, en als antwoord hierop lijken 
handelaars hun handelsnetwerk te hebben verbreed, ze handelen vaker met 
handelaars met wie zij geen sociale relaties hebben, en verstrekken minder krediet 
dat persoonlijke relaties verstevigd. Ze hebben ook minder vertrouwen in de 
bedoelingen en mogelijkheden van hun handelspartners, en hechten minder 
gewicht aan vertrouwen. Beleidsmakers dienen zich derhalve er bewust van te zijn, 
dat uitbreiding van formele instituties tot een erosie aan normen en informele 
regels kan leiden (eventueel met dubbelzinnige welvaartsimplicaties). 
 In hoofdstuk zes analyseer ik handelskrediet dat een belangrijke bron van 
financiering is voor handelaars, met name in minder ontwikkelde landen. Het 
hoofdstuk maakt gebruik van de twee enquêtes onder 195 Ethiopische sesam 
 
handelaars gehouden in 2010 en 2012, om het verband tussen prestaties, krediet en 
sociaal kapitaal te onderzoeken. Om krediet te verkrijgen, heeft een handelaar 
sociaal kapitaal nodig (een paar vertrouwde handelspartners), maar dit kan zijn 
vermogen om van andere handelaars te kopen beperken. Ik vind dat kleine 
handelaars, die aan het begin van het handelsnetwerk staan, krediet het meest nodig 
hebben, maar tegelijkertijd moeten ze ook kleine hoeveelheden sesam verzamelen 
door gebruik te maken van een groot aantal handelscontacten. De ECX, die na 
2010 verplicht werd voor alle sesam handel, heeft tot gevolg gehad dat er minder 
handelskrediet wordt gegeven, hoewel het belang ervan niet is verminderd. De 
beleidsimplicaties zijn dat er betere kredietfaciliteiten beschikbaar zouden moeten 
zijn voor kleine handelaars, die meestal over het hoofd gezien worden in 
microkredieten en die meestal ook weinig contant geld ter beschikking hebben. 
 In het laatste hoofdstuk zeven bespreek ik de bevindingen van de vorige 
hoofdstukken en trek ik conclusies op twee niveaus. Het eerste niveau is de 
theoretische vraag over de institutionele veranderingen en hoe de oprichting van 
een formeel, ontworpen markt institutie informele markt instituties beïnvloedt. Ik 
ontdek, in lijn met onderzoek van Nieuwe Institutionele Economie (NIE), dat al 
bestaande (informele) institutionele regelingen vaak de introductie van een formele, 
ontworpen institutie ondermijnen. Sesamhandelaars vermeden de ECX voordat 
deze verplicht werd gesteld. Boeren geven aan dat de PTC’s niet hun favoriete 
afzetkanaal is, en zij zouden waarschijnlijk ook de PTC’s vermijden als ze niet 
verplicht waren er te verkopen. Als de ECX niet was verplicht gesteld door de 
overheid van Ethiopië, zou er waarschijnlijk weinig institutionele verandering zijn. 
Het verplicht stellen van beurzen houdt echter een risico in; effectieve informele 
instituties kunnen hierdoor worden vervangen door ineffectieve formele instituties. 
 In dit proefschrift concludeer ik ook dat de ECX reeds bestaande informele 
instituties zowel heeft aangevuld als vervangen. De ECX heeft informele instituties 
aangevuld door meer markttransparantie, vooral door het verstrekken van 
kwaliteitsnormen en weegschalen, die eerder ontbraken. Als gevolg hiervan zijn de 
overtuigingen van boeren over opportunistisch gedrag door handelaars veranderd; 
niet veel, maar wel significant. Daardoor zijn boeren (langdurige) relaties met 
handelaars begonnen en krijgen ze vaker krediet. Dit betekent dat er institutionele 
verandering is geweest, in termen van veranderde opvattingen en gedrag. De ECX 
heeft informele instituties tussen handelaars vervangen. Handelaars hebben minder 
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niet veel, maar wel significant. Daardoor zijn boeren (langdurige) relaties met 
handelaars begonnen en krijgen ze vaker krediet. Dit betekent dat er institutionele 
verandering is geweest, in termen van veranderde opvattingen en gedrag. De ECX 
heeft informele instituties tussen handelaars vervangen. Handelaars hebben minder 
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sociaal kapitaal en vertrouwen elkaar minder; informele instituties zijn vervangen 
door formele regels en contracten van de ECX. 
 Het tweede niveau is het meer praktisch niveau van de vraag of de ECX 
haar doelstellingen heeft weten te bereiken is, weerspiegeld in de verschillende 
standpunten van Eleni Gabre-Madhin en Marcel Fafchamps. In dit proefschrift 
vind ik bewijs dat Gabre-Madhin gelijk had dat de ECX meer markttransparantie 
zou kunnen brengen, transactiekosten voor boeren zou kunnen verminderen, en 
dat het conflicten tussen handelaars zou kunnen verminderen. Echter, Fafchamps 
had ook gelijk, er zijn altijd onbedoelde gevolgen. Het verlies van sociaal kapitaal en 
vertrouwen tussen handelaars is zo’n onbedoeld gevolg en een risico omdat 
vertrouwen belangrijk is voor markten. Een verder onbedoeld gevolg van het 
verlies van sociaal kapitaal is dat handelaars elkaar minder handelskrediet geven, 
wat vooral een negatieve invloed heeft op kleine handelaars. 
 De Ethiopische overheid moet het feit dat handelaars en boeren de ECX en 
PTC met argwaan aanschouwen, verontrusten. Deze argwaan kan worden verklaard 
door negatieve ervaringen in het verleden met door de overheid geleide organisaties 
in Ethiopië. De zware betrokkenheid van de Ethiopische overheid is verdedigd 
door Gabre-Madhin, die het een unieke publiek-private samenwerking noemde. 
Echter, in het licht van het werk van North et al., over samenlevingen die kunnen 
worden gekarakteriseerd als “limited access orders”, is de verstrengeling van 
economische en politieke organisaties te verwachten. Een optimistische visie is dat 
de Ethiopische overheid een coördinerende rol op zich neemt, onzekerheid 
verminderd en oplossingen kan bieden voor coördinatie en handhaving problemen, 
zoals veel Aziatische overheiden hebben gedaan. Echter, als de Ethiopische 
overheid zo’n coördinerende rol op zich neemt, moet het handelaars gaan zien als 
betrouwbare partners, en ze niet met achterdocht beschouwen, zoals zij heeft 
gedaan in het verleden, en nog steeds doet. In plaats van het streven om 
tussenpersonen te elimineren, moet de overheid de verschillende belangrijke 
functies handelaars en en tussenpersonen erkennen en zorgen voor verdere 
ondersteuning. 
 Ten aanzien van methodologische kwesties, stel ik in dit proefschrift dat het 
meten van institutionele verandering tijd kost; de ECX kan lange termijn effecten 
hebben die moeilijker te meten zijn. Dit proefschrift gebruikt data die kort na de 
oprichting van de ECX zijn verzameld. Het ontbreken van een goede controle 
groep maakt toewijzing van effecten (attributie) zeer moeilijk. Een gedeeltelijke 
 
oplossing is om in de dataverzameling groepen toe te voegen die in verschillende 
mate beïnvloedt worden door de ECX, om gebruik te maken van panel data en 
resultaten aan te vullen met data verzameld door experimenten. Ik heb in dit 
proefschrift zwaar geleund op survey data en kwantitatieve methoden, die echter 
contra-intuïtieve resultaten moeilijk kunnen verklaren. Meer diepte-interviews 
kunnen echter ook leiden tot tegenstrijdige informatie. Aanvullend antropologisch 
en sociaal onderzoek kan van waarde zijn om veranderingen in de opvattingen en 
relaties van boeren en handelaars te traceren tijdens institutionele verandering. Het 
meten van nogal onduidelijke begrippen als vertrouwen en sociaal kapitaal is niet 
eenvoudig, maar wel belangrijk. De literatuur en strikte begrippen van de Nieuwe 
Institutionele Economie (NIE) zijn nuttig in het denken over deze vage begrippen. 
Hoewel er verrassend weinig gebruik van gemaakt wordt in economisch onderzoek, 
zijn Likert-schalen een nuttig meetinstrument. Ook het onderscheiden van 
verschillende soorten van vertrouwen is belangrijk bij het meten ervan: er zijn aan 
de ene kant denkbeelden over opportunistisch gedrag (“trust goodwill”) en aan de 
andere kant over iemands vermogen (“trust in ability”). 
 Dit proefschrift biedt een aantal mogelijkheden voor nieuw onderzoek, (i) 
naar institutionele veranderingen en (ii) naar het beoordelen van de effectiviteit van 
de ECX en andere goederen beurzen. Met betrekking tot (i), zou het goed zijn als 
er vervolg onderzoek gedaan wordt naar de vraag of de in dit proefschrift 
gevonden relatie tussen toegenomen markttransparantie en vertrouwen ook bestaat 
in andere situaties. Ook is meer onderzoek nodig naar handelaars in 
landbouwproducten, die van cruciaal belang zijn maar waar te weinig onderzoek 
naar is gedaan. Vooral onderzoek naar de verschillende institutionele regelingen die 
verschillende soorten handelaars gebruiken, en hoe deze beïnvloedt worden door 
veranderend beleid of institutionele verandering is een relatief onontgonnen maar 
belangrijk gebied. Wat (ii) betreft, zijn er verschillende suggesties voor verder 
onderzoek omdat er nog geen impact evaluatie van de ECX is gedaan. Dit is hard 
nodig, vooral omdat de ECX wordt aangeprezen als een model voor andere 
Afrikaanse landen. Ten eerste is er meer onderzoek nodig over de vraag of en hoe 
de marketing marges van boeren zijn verbeterd. Ten tweede is er verder onderzoek 
nodig naar de vraag of de prijs informatie die wordt verschaft door de ECX wordt 
gebruikt door handelaars voor arbitrage doeleinden (waardoor prijsschommelingen 
worden verminderd), en of deze nuttig is voor boeren die elektriciteit en mobiele 
telefoons missen. Ten derde zou het nuttig kunnen zijn om andere formele 
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institutionele regelingen te onderzoeken, die gericht zijn op het bereiken van 
dezelfde doelen die de ECX heeft gesteld, maar die minder kostbare, meer 
eenvoudige markten vertegenwoordigen. De MVIWATA markten in Tanzania 
zouden zo’n dergelijke alternatief kunnen zijn. 
 
 
S U M M A R Y  
 
Sesame is not what comes to mind first for most people when thinking about 
Ethiopia, yet it is Ethiopia’s second largest export crop and an important cash crop 
for many farmers. In the past decades, sesame production and exports have grown 
rapidly. Ethiopia’s sesame markets, like many other African agricultural markets, 
are characterised by high transaction risks and costs. Most African markets are 
governed by informal institutions that aim to solve problems of coordination (or 
information) and enforcement. Eleni Gabre-Madhin, having studied extensively 
Ethiopian grain markets, was instrumental in the establishment of Ethiopia’s first 
agricultural commodity exchange (ECX). The ECX aims to provide a solution for 
coordination and enforcement problems, aiming to reduce transaction risks and 
costs for both farmers and traders. The Ethiopian government established the 
ECX in 2008 for several commodities, including sesame. However, when it became 
clear that not many traders were using the ECX, the government made the ECX 
mandatory for sesame trade in 2010. A little later, the government made Primary 
Transaction Centres, located in most villages with price information, grades and 
certified weighing equipment, mandatory for traders and farmers to trade sesame. 
The establishment of the ECX constitutes a major institutional change in 
Ethiopia’s sesame markets, which has not been subjected yet to much research. 
The ECX is seen as a model for other African countries, and it is important to 
better understand the impact it has had. Marcel Fafchamps, who collaborated with 
Gabre-Madhin on research on African markets, has been much more careful in 
providing solutions to improving African markets, warning for unintended 
consequences. 
 Markets are important to economic development, yet modern mainstream 
economics has given no more than fleeting consideration to the market as an 
institution. Actual markets, especially those in Africa, do not fit the assumptions of 
“perfect markets” used in much of economic theory. To understand the role of 
market institutions, two areas are important. The first is the role and complexity of 
institutional arrangements (both formal and informal), that solve problems of 
coordination (or information) and enforcement; the second is the mechanism of 
institutional change over time. An important question in the literature is how 
formal and informal institutions interact and change. 
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 This thesis addresses this question by examining the establishment of the 
ECX (which can be seen as a new formal, designed institution), its impact on pre-
existing social norms and the (spontaneous) informal institutional change it has 
brought about. The question how formal institutions and informal institutions 
interact also relates to the different viewpoints of Gabre-Madhin and Fafchamps. 
The ECX will be successful if it can complement existing informal institutions 
where necessary and substitute less effective informal institutions in terms of 
coordination and enforcement. For the ECX to succeed, it also means that a critical 
mass of agents (i.e. traders and farmers) needs to begin, even if gradually, to modify 
their beliefs and actions to form a new equilibrium as a result of the ECX. 
 In chapter one, I identify two main research questions that are addressed in 
this thesis. First, what were the pre-existing social norms, beliefs, and informal 
institutions used by farmers and traders before the ECX? Second, what impact did 
the formal designed institution of the ECX have on informal institutional 
arrangements (e.g. social capital)? These questions are addressed by using four 
datasets. Datasets were collected before and after the ECX became mandatory in 
late 2010. Two datasets were collected by interviewing farmers in West Tigray and 
East Wellega (in 2009 and 2012). Another two datasets were collected by 
interviewing traders in various markets in the north-east of Ethiopia (in early 2010 
and in 2012). 
 Chapter two provides background information on Ethiopia’s sesame 
markets. It provides a historical overview of the trade profession in Ethiopia, which 
describes how traditionally trade was seen as an inferior occupation, performed by 
outsiders or members of the lower classes. Farming, by contrast, was seen as the 
most respectable occupation. Although this has changed in Ethiopia, with trade 
being a lucrative occupation, taken up by different members of Ethiopian society, 
these historical, cultural perceptions may hold a clue as to why traders are still seen 
as untrustworthy. Sesame is a crop that will grow in adverse circumstances, 
tolerating drought and poor soils, making it an important cash crop for farmers 
who live in unfavourable areas of Ethiopia (mostly in the north-east). It is 
harvested at the end of the year, just before its pods shatter all seeds. Various types 
of traders (small collectors or assemblers, wholesalers, retailers, and exporters) are 
engaged in sesame trade, assembling small amounts from remote parts in Ethiopia, 
transporting it via various regional markets to Addis Ababa or export destinations 
(via the port of Djibouti). The complexity of trade means that traders hire different 
 
intermediaries (brokers, and selling, buying, and consignment agents), who facilitate 
in matching supply and demand. The ECX was established in 2008 and became 
mandatory for all sesame trade destined for export in late 2010. The ECX is an 
open outcry market place in Addis Ababa where sesame contracts are traded. The 
physical bags of sesame are located in affiliated warehouses across Ethiopia, where 
the sesame is weighed and graded. The ECX is also linked to Primary Transaction 
Centres (PTCs) that are located in most villages (kebeles). Farmers and licenced 
sesame traders are required to sell and buy sesame at these PTCs, which offer price 
information (through the ECX), standard grades and weighing equipment, amongst 
others. Market information is an important issue: as most farmers do not own a 
(mobile) telephone, and often even lack electricity, they have no current 
information on markets, including prices. The information gathered on sesame 
prices in this thesis demonstrates that sesame prices show a high degree of 
fluctuation and differences between markets. Sesame prices have surged in recent 
years, but so has inflation in Ethiopia. 
 In chapter three, I focus on the social norms, beliefs and informal 
institutions in sesame markets in West Tigray and East Wellega before the ECX. 
Although trust is a prerequisite for well-functioning markets, this trust is generally 
lacking among the interviewed farmers. Most interviewed farmers view traders as 
opportunistic and only very few farmers engage in long-term relational trading with 
trusted traders. The chapter addresses the question why. It finds that a lack of 
market information is linked to negative perceptions of traders’ trustworthiness; 
without information, farmers find it difficult to verify traders’ trustworthiness. I 
analyse the relationship between these negative perceptions and market 
participation, finding tentative evidence that farmers who have a more negative 
perceptions of traders tend to participate less in markets, selling to fewer market 
outlets. The policy implications are that by investing in market information and 
increasing transparency through certifying weighing equipment and setting quality 
grades and standards, trust between farmers and traders can be fostered. 
 In chapter four, I examine whether the newly established ECX through its 
affiliated PTCs has led to improved market transparency. I hypothesise that market 
transparency will reduce transaction costs for farmers. The chapter builds on 
chapter three, which hypothesised that better market information would increase 
trust between farmers and traders. I find that the ECX has been successful in 
increasing market transparency and decreasing transaction costs. I argue that 
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traders are behaving less opportunistically as a result of market transparency, and 
this has improved farmers’ trust perceptions about traders, slightly increased 
relational contracting, and significantly increased credit relations. 
 In chapter five I explore whether the creation of the ECX and its formal 
monitoring and enforcement institutions has affected the role of social capital and 
trust in the Ethiopian segment of the sesame value chain. Consistent with a simple 
theoretical marketing model, the panel data suggest this is indeed the case. Trade in 
sesame is increasingly governed by formal rather than informal institutions, and in 
response traders appear to have broadened their trading network, rely more 
frequently on traders with whom they do not have social relations, and have 
reduced the provision of credit that cements personalised relationships. They also 
have lower levels of trust in the intentions and capabilities of their trading partners, 
and attach less weight to trust. Policy-makers should therefore be aware that 
expanding formal institutions may invite the erosion of norms and informal rules in 
the same or adjacent domains of human interaction (possibly with ambiguous 
welfare implications). 
 In chapter six, I analyse trade credit, which is an important source of 
financing for businesses, especially in less developed countries. The chapter uses 
the two surveys of 195 Ethiopian sesame traders held in 2010 and 2012 to 
investigate the nexus between performance, credit, and social capital. To obtain 
credit, traders need social capital (a few trusted trade partners), but this may limit 
their ability to buy from other traders. The chapter finds that small traders at the 
upstream end of the trade network need credit most, but at the same time, they also 
need to assemble small amounts of sesame from a large number of trade contacts. 
The ECX, which became mandatory for all sesame trade after 2010, has made trade 
credit less common although its importance did not decrease. The policy 
implications are that better credit facilities should be available to small traders, who 
are typically overlooked in microcredit schemes and are usually cash-constrained. 
 In the final chapter, I discuss the findings presented in the previous chapters 
and draw conclusions on two levels. The first level is the theoretical question of 
institutional change and how the establishment of a formal, designed market 
institution impacted informal market institutions. The thesis finds evidence in line 
with research in the area of New Institutional Economics, that pre-existing 
(informal) institutional arrangements often undermine the introduction of a formal, 
designed institution. Sesame traders avoided using the ECX before it became 
 
mandatory. Farmers stated that the PTCs are not their favoured outlet, and would 
probably also avoid them if they were not mandatory. If the ECX had not been 
made mandatory by the government of Ethiopia, there would probably have been 
little institutional change. Making commodity exchanges mandatory entails the risk, 
however, that effective informal institutions are replaced by ineffective formal 
ones. 
 This thesis also concludes that the ECX has both complemented and 
substituted pre-existing informal institutions. It complemented informal 
arrangements between farmers and traders by providing more market transparency, 
especially in the areas of quality standards and weighing equipment that were 
previously lacking. As a result, farmers’ views that traders behave opportunistically 
have changed; not greatly, but significantly. As a result, farmers have started (long-
term) relationships with traders and are receiving credit more often. This means 
there has been institutional change, in terms of changed beliefs and behaviour. The 
ECX has substituted informal arrangements between traders. Traders have less 
social capital and trust each other less; informal institutions have been replaced by 
formal rules and contracts of the ECX. 
 The second level is the more practical level of whether the ECX has been 
able to achieve its aims, reflecting the different viewpoints of Eleni Gabre-Madhin 
and Marcel Fafchamps. The thesis finds evidence that Gabre-Madhin was right that 
the ECX could bring about more market transparency and reduce transaction costs 
for farmers, and that it reduced disagreements among traders. However, Fafchamps 
was right that there are always unintended consequences. The loss of social capital 
and trust between traders is such an unintended consequence, and poses a risk, as 
trust is important to markets. A further unintended consequence of the loss of 
social capital is that traders provide less trade credit to each other, which especially 
affects small traders negatively. 
 The Ethiopian government should find the fact that traders and farmers 
view the ECX and PTC with suspicion troubling. This suspicion may be explained 
by negative experiences with government-run organisations in the past. The heavy 
involvement of the Ethiopian government has been defended by Gabre-Madhin, 
who called it a unique public–private partnership. However, in the light of the work 
by North et al. on societies, which can be characterised as “limited access orders”, 
the intertwining of economic and political organisations is to be expected. An 
optimistic view is that Ethiopia’s government may take on a coordinating role, 
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reducing uncertainty and providing solutions to coordination and enforcement 
problems, as many Asian governments have done. If the Ethiopian government 
takes on such a coordinating role, it should view traders as reliable partners, and 
not view them with suspicion, as it has done in the past, and still does. Instead of 
aiming to cut out middlemen, it should recognise the various important functions 
traders and intermediaries perform in markets and provide further support. 
 With respect to methodological issues, this thesis concludes that measuring 
institutional change takes time. The ECX may have longer-term impacts which will 
be more difficult to measure. The data used in this thesis was collected only shortly 
after the establishment of the ECX. In addition, the lack of a proper control group 
makes attribution far from perfect. A partial solution is to include groups that are 
affected by the ECX in different degrees, using panel data and complementing 
results with experimental data. This thesis relies heavily on survey data and 
quantitative methods, which are not always able to explain counter-intuitive results. 
More in-depth interviews may, however, also lead to contradicting information and 
therefore additional anthropological and social research may be of added value, to 
trace changes in farmers’ and traders’ beliefs and relationships during institutional 
change. Using a quantitative approach to measure rather obscure concepts such as 
trust and social capital is not easy, yet important. The literature and rigorous 
concepts used in the New Institutional Economics are useful in thinking about 
these nebulous concepts. Although used surprisingly infrequently in economic 
research, Likert scales are a useful measurement tool. Distinguishing the difference 
between trust linked to opportunistic behaviour (“goodwill trust”) and trusting 
someone’s ability (“trust in ability) is also an important distinction to make when 
measuring trust. 
 This thesis provides some avenues for new research, (i) on institutional 
change and (ii) on assessing the effectiveness of the ECX and other commodity 
exchanges. With respect to (i), it would be valuable to conduct follow-up research 
on whether the relationship found in this thesis between increased market 
transparency and trust perceptions also exists in other settings. In addition, more 
research is needed on agricultural traders, who are a crucially important yet 
chronically under-researched set of actors. Especially research on the different 
institutional arrangements used by different types of traders and how these change 
as result of policy or institutional change is a relatively unexplored but important 
area. With respect to (ii), there are several suggestions for further research as there 
 
has never been an impact evaluation of the ECX. Such an evaluation is urgently 
needed, especially because the ECX is being touted as a model for other African 
countries. First, more research is needed on whether and how marketing margins 
of farmers have improved. Second, research on whether the price information 
provided by the ECX is useful to traders for arbitration purposes (reducing price 
variation) and useful to farmers who lack electricity and mobile phones. Third, it 
would be useful to explore other formal institutional arrangements that aim to 
achieve similar objectives as the ECX, but represent less costly, basic agricultural 
market systems. The MVIWATA markets in Tanzania may be such alternatives. 
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